THE storm which lately threatened us from the far West, has blown over. We are not going to have war with America about the question of the Trent. But the question of the Trent never would have arisen, had not the feelings of the American people and Government been very hostile to England, and there is nothing to show that the American Government and people are at all reconciled to us by the manner of its solution. The evidence, on the contrary, is all the other way. The Americans have been coerced into an act of justice, which they performed with the worst possible grace; and we are frankly assured that a time is coming, when they mean to take ample vengeance for present humiliations. It appears, then, that a war with the Federal States of America is only deferred. If not imminent, it is pretty sure to come sooner or later. The point, therefore, for us to determine, in the meanwhile, is-How shall we prepare for such a contingency, and conduct the war when it comes?

There are two modes of carrying on war with America-one aggressive, the other defensive. We shall probably adopt both. We shall assail their harbours, burn their fleets, destroy their commerce, and keep their whole seaboard in a state of constant alarm; and we shall give employment by these means to no inconsiderable portion of the half million of men whom they boast to have under arms. But we shall have a defensive war like wise to provide for, on the side of Canada. How shall we best effect that purpose? This is a question which cannot be rightly answered, unless we possess some knowledge of what has occurred in that part of the world already; for it is not less true of wars in America than of wars elsewhere, that, making due allowance for change of time and

circumstances, they almost always repeat themselves. We propose, therefore, in the present paper, to preface our suggestions, in regard to the future, with a brief sketch of the various contests which have already taken place, in and for the mastery of Canada.

Before the breaking out of the seven years' war, which occurred in 1754-5, the American provinces which now acknowledge the sway of Queen Victoria were, with one or two exceptions, dependent upon France. Cape Breton, with the whole of what is now called New Brunswick, formed their extreme limits on the east; and they stretched away westward by Lake Champlain, through Lake Ontario to Niagara, whence they held out their hands by the Ohio river towards New Orleans. In contradistinction to this arrangement, Nova Scotia, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, were English settlements; of which both the dignity, and, as it was, assumed, the material interests, were endangered, by this bold attempt on the part of their rivals to hem them in, by connecting Lake Erie with the Mississippi.

There had been little amity between the English and French settlers at any time, and now the encroachments of the latter upon their hunting-grounds, stirred the indignation of the former to a high degree. Frequent skirmishes went on between them, till at last the Cabinet of St James's determined to bring matters to an issue, and to strike in that quarter with all the force of the Empire. Accordingly, General Braddock, carrying with him 2000 regular troops, sailed from England, and in February 1755 arrived in America.

General Braddock called together the provincial governors at Alexandria in Virginia, and arranged with them a plan of campaign. It

as they came in, and to build, with as little delay as possible, such a flotilla as might be trusted on the lake at all seasons.

It is never safe in war to select a base which shall lie between your own headquarters and the army of the enemy. The Marquis de Montcalm, Governor-General of Canada, saw that Lord Lowdon had committed this mistake, and took advantage of it. At Frontignac, now called Toronto, he embarked 3000 excellent troops, and on the 10th of August appeared off Oswego, his lighter vessels being protected by two sloops, one of sixteen, the other of twelve guns. To land and invest the place was the work of a few hours, and on the 14th it surrendered. There was an immediate end to the campaign. The vessels of war and of transport, which the English were building, fell into the enemy's hands; so did all the provisions and stores which during the summer had been accumulated. Lord Lowdon, therefore, despaired of success against either Niagara or Crown Point, and, leaving garrisons in his own advanced posts at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, he withdrew into winter quarters in and about Albany.

It will be seen that in both of these campaigns Canada was threatened after precisely the same fashion. The object of the invaders was to gain the command of Lake Ontario, while at the same time they moved upon Montreal by the route of Lakes George and Champlain. In 1757 a new scheme was devised. Lord Lowdon received instructions from home to act every where else on the defensive, while, with all the force which he could collect, he endeavoured to reduce Cape Breton. Sixteen line-of-battle ships and eight frigates accordingly assembled at Halifax, for the purpose of transporting to Cape Breton an army of 10,000 men. But, before the expedition could sail, intelligence was received of the arrival at Louisburg of a superior French fleet; and at the

same time such an account was given of the strength and preparations of the garrison, that Lord Lowdon despaired, with the force at his disposal, of being able to reduce it. The projected invasion of Cape Breton was therefore abandoned, and the army again broke up. But the campaign was not abortive merely. The enemy, taking advantage of the exposed condition of the frontier, moved upon Fort William Henry. It was gallantly defended for a while, but surrendered on the 9th of August by capitulation; after which Montcalm, made aware of Lord Lowdon's return to Albany, blew up the works, and fell back again to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

Dissatisfied, as they had every reason to be, with the mismanagement exhibited in these proceedings, the British Government superseded Lord Lowdon, and gave the command of the army, already on the spot, to Major-General Abercrombie. He was directed, with 15,000 men, of whom 6500 were regular troops, to resume the attack on Crown Point and Ticonderoga; while a second corps, 7000 strong, and entirely composed of provincials, should move, as General Braddock had done, on Fort Du Quesne. At the same time, a third division from England, having General Amherst at its head, was to reduce Cape Breton, assisted in that operation by a fleet of twenty-two ships of the line and fifteen frigates. All these instructions seem to have been issued early in 1758. But there was no locomotion in those days either on land or water by steam, and fleets took months to accomplish voyages which are now calculated by weeks. As, therefore, on this as on former occasions, the march of the several corps was to be simultaneous-as, indeed, success in one operation was expected to be coincident with, or at all events necessary to, success in all- neither General Abercrombie nor General Forbes, the latter commanding the force which was di

he appears to have done about the middle of May. He brought with him 11,000 good troops, and, sailing from Halifax on the 28th, he anchored on the 2d of June in Gabarus Bay, Cape Breton.

General Amherst carried all before him. Wolfe, who commanded the brigade which first made good its landing, soon effected the investment of Louisburg. More than one hundred boats were indeed lost while conveying troops and stores to the shore, and a garrison of 3000 men, supported by 2500 seamen, offered a stout resistance; but on the 26th of July the place capitulated. The capitulation included, not the whole of Cape Breton only, but Prince Edward Island into the bargain, and both have continued ever since dependent upon the British Crown. Neither were General Abercrombie's efforts, though foiled in their main object, altogether fruitless. He passed his corps on the 5th of July down Lake George in 1035 boats, which he had assembled at the point where Fort William Henry formerly stood, and, driving in the enemy's pickets, made preparations to carry Ticonderoga by assault. It was a strong position on the neck of land lying between the waters of Lake George and the river, which in its course opens out to form Lake Champlain, and was covered by intrenchments, having a line of abattis laid down in front of them. Just where the waters meet, stood a small square fort with bastions, serving the purposes of a keep to the other works. Without, as it would appear, having paused to reconnoitre these intrenchments, General Abercrombie sent his troops against them in six columns of attack, of which the consequence was, that his people got into confusion, and were repulsed with the loss of nearly 2000 men. He immediately withdrew to the head of Lake George, where, amid the ruins of what had once been

Fort William Henry, he began to intrench himself. But he did not remain entirely on the defensive. Intrusting 3000 men to Colonel Bradstreet, an enterprising and able officer, he sent them to execute a plan which the Colonel had devised. They passed by the Mohawk river and Lake Oneida to Oswego, whence, having provided themselves with a sufficiency of boats and canoes, they crossed the lake unobserved, and landed on the 25th of August close to Fort Frontignac. This they immediately invested, and on the 27th made themselves masters of the place. It was, however, too much in advance of the English lines to be permanently retained; and so Bradstreet, after loading with stores all the vessels which he could find, of which not fewer than nine carried from eighteen to eight guns respectively, partially ruined the fortifications, and recrossed the lake to Oswego.

Alarmed and disappointed by the failure before Ticonderoga, General Amherst left sufficient garrisons at Louisburg and Halifax, and set off with five of his most effective battalions to join General Abercrombie. Had he proceeded by sea to New York, there might yet have been time, before winter set in, to retrieve the disaster; but, distrusting the winds which had kept him a fortnight between Cape Breton and Boston, he made up his mind to disembark at the latter place. The distance from Boston to Albany is only 165 miles; but not only were there in those days no roads through the forest, but it does not appear that the country had ever been surveyed. General Amherst accordingly found that he had undertaken a very difficult task. He made his way slowly, with much labour and fatigue to his men, and reached Fort William Henry only on the 5th of October, too late in the season to commence operations with any hope of bringing them to a successful issue.

He left his battalions with General Abercrombie, and returned to

Albany, where in due time information came in of the complete success of General Forbes. That officer had marched from Philadelphia, threaded the forest in the track which Braddock's army had cleared, and, after a sharp action in which his advanced-guard suffered severely, debouched in front of Fort Du Quesne. The French governor, not considering himself strong enough to sustain a siege, evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by the English. These repaired and enlarged the works, and leaving a garrison, called it Fort Pitt, the name which it still retains.

The capture of Fort Du Quesne was important only so far as it redeemed to some extent the tarnished lustre of the British arms, and relieved the colonists of Maryland and Virginia from the vicinity of neighbours who had long kept them uneasy. Had Abercrombie carried Ticonderoga, establishing at the same time his ascendancy on Lake Ontario, the front of Canada would have been a good deal exposed; but neither achievement, however complete in itself, could have vied in importance with the conquest of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island. The loss of these settlements cut off, during six months in the year, all communication between France and her American settlements. No French fleet could longer find shelter in the Bay of Fundy, and the St Lawrence was as completely closed against navigation then as it is now, except in seasons unnaturally mild, from the middle of December up to the middle of May. Nor was this all. There was no reason why the tide of conquest should stop at Fort Beau Sejour. The whole of New Brunswick lay open to invasion, and through it, when overrun, a road might be constructed, which should lead an invading force to the Lower St Lawrence. It does not appear, indeed, that the value of the conquest presented itself in this point of view to the authorities either at home or abroad; but they equally

saw that a good base was established for a combined operation of the fleet and army in Lower Canada; and the Government made its preparations during winter to turn it to account.

The plan of campaign for 1759 was formed upon a grand scale. It was settled that upon four separate lines the enemy should be assailed. Away upon the extreme left, a force was to assemble at Fort Du Quesne for the reduction of all the posts which the French had established in order to keep open the communications between Lake Erie and the Ohio. The expedition which had been arranged in 1755 against Niagara was to be renewed. Once more Ticonderoga and Crown Point were to be assailed from Albany, and an attempt made to penetrate by Lake Champlain to the St Lawrence, while a powerful armament, despatched from England, should make its way up that river, and endeavour to take possession of Quebec itself. Once more we must ask our readers to stop and consider the scope and tendency of these arrangements. The operations from Fort Du Quesne were rather local than imperial; they sought no higher object than to clear away certain hornets' nests which troubled the English trappers, and kept the advanced colonists of Maryland and Virginia uneasy. The rest were manifestly aimed at the conquest of French America; and though, in the circumstances which then existed, the most remote of the three, that directed against Niagara may be regarded as superfluous, even in this case there was something like a definite end to serve. The capture of Fort Niagara, it was assumed, would isolate the whole of the enemy's settlements on Lake Erie, besides contributing to establish for the English the command of the navigation of Lake Ontario. No doubt the command of Lake Ontario, and of all the lakes, must have fallen as a matter of course to the power which, being already mistress of the provinces to