the very reason why the capacity of redemption still exists is, that before Christ the perfect revelation could not be rejected.

2. As concerns, first of all, the objective presuppositions of sin, according to Holy Scripture the possibility of sin is based on the fact that a law exists for man, to which he is under obligation, and the validity of which does not depend on his choice. Certainly this obligation rests for us on the ground that God is the Lord, on whose power man is absolutely dependent, and who has a right to command. But with the right of God which flows from His creative power, Holy Scripture at once combines the further consideration, that God's preceptive will is in harmony with His holy nature, nay, so far as essential destination is to be reckoned a part of the nature of anything, in harmony also with the nature of man who was made in God's image. This is summed up in the O. T. in the general command: "Be ye holy, for I am holy," in the N. T. in the command: “Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect." This inner goodness of the good, which accords with the nature of God and man, and is therefore intelligible to reason as such, is made prominent both in the Old and New Testaments.2 God's laws are truth, i.e. not bare words, arbitrary thoughts or commands, but in harmony with true reality, with God's nature, which is essentially good and holy. Because the law issues out of this essential goodness of God, it is called Pneumatic. That this law harmonizes also with the nature of man, who is in God's image, is expressly testified.1 This law, then, conditions the possibility of evil. Were there no law, there would be no sin, and of course no moral good. The

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man (p. 335), whereas it is allowed ignorance may make man an enemy to God (p. 334), namely, in so far as it erroneously looks on God as angry with the sinner, an error which separates him from God, and may issue in hardened hostility of will to God. Accordingly, the main task of redemption is said to be the removal of this error, the opinion of God's enmity and anger.

1 Lev. xix. 2, xi. 44; Matt. v. 48.

2 Ps. xix. 10, 11, xxxiii. 5, cxix. 7, 30, 43; Rom. vii. 12, 14; 1 John iv. 16. 3 Rom. vii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 16; cf. Lev. xix. 2, xi. 45; Ex. xxii. 31.

Deut. xxx. 14; Rom. vii. 22, 25, according to which the inner man, his rational nature, delights in God's law.

5 Rom. iv. 15. Cf. also Rom. v. 13, where it is said: Sin, even if it exists, is not regarded, if no positive law or no consciousness of law exists; and 1 John iii. 4 : ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία.

words denote an estimate of worth, and presuppose a standard, nay, an absolutely binding norm. To this position, then, that the law is the necessary objective ground of the possibility of sin, nothing more or less, objection is raised from two opposite sides, in both instances with an appeal to the Apostle Paul. One theory says: The law springs from Sisin, i.e. sin is the ground of the possibility of law; the other: Sin springs from the law, the law begets sin, and is the ground of its existence. The attempt to deduce the position, that the law springs from sin, from the line of Pauline thought takes the following shape: "The state under the law is wretched, a state of bondage, which already presupposes sin. The sinless,

normal state is that in which the law does not exist above or outside man, in which rather no law exists for him; 1 for the mention of law implies that man is not as he ought to be. Where the good exists in man, in desire and will as well as in knowledge, there it no longer figures as law. The latter always implies an existing discord between what ought to be and what is. The law and the consciousness of law originate in this discord." But this theory is untenable. The theory itself acknowledges as normal the state in which goodness is man's inwardly actuating motive. But in this very circumstance goodness is acknowledged as a norm; and it would be an arbitrary proceeding, to regard it not as the norm or measure of worth absolutely, but only when being is out of harmony with it. Certain as it is that the law may have diverse modes of existence in man, either in his intelligence only or in his will and being also, still in its essence it is immoveably the same. Frequently, indeed, to the apostle the vóμos is the law of God standing outside man as yρáμμa. But this form of existence is not essential to it. On the contrary, it seeks to exist in the will and being of man. Paul therefore speaks also of a law of the life and spirit in man; and the very means by which the gospel establishes the law is by the latter becoming the animating, will-inspiring principle. From another point of view, man is said to be in the law. Were the law born of sin only, it

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11 Tim. i. 9 : τῷ δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται.

3 Rom. viii. 2 f., iii. 31.

2 Rom. iii. 31, x. 3.

1 Cor. ix. 21: ivvoμos Xpisto. Cf. with Rom. x. 4; 1 Cor. i. 30.

would be simply doomed to abolition.'-The notion of the law as such springing only from a sinful state must by logical sequence resolve evil into subjective illusion, or issue in a Manichæan theory. For how can anything be called evil, unless it deviate from an obligatory good, and be therefore a violation of what ought to be (Seinsollendes)—of the holy law? If evil exists in the world before law exists at all, it is of a merely physical nature, and is traceable to the Creator or a primary evil Power.-But this theory relies also on the fact, that man cannot be morally perfect from the beginning, but must first fulfil his moral duty, and that therefore the law presupposes initial imperfection. Since, then, in the beginning goodness exists as a duty outside man, i.e. outside his will and being, although not outside his intelligence, this certainly seems to imply an antinomy between what he is and what he ought to be (Sein und Sollen); and if this antinomy is identified with evil, we necessarily have evil as the presupposition of law, at least in the beginning of moral development, progress in which then takes this form, that the goodness which stands outside man's will, while seeking its place in that will, appears as law which disapproves this beginning. But Holy Scripture does not call every imperfection evil, least of all the inevitable imperfection of the beginning. Man is not made evil by the fact of his will still having duties to fulfil in order to selfimprovement, but simply by his will not overtaking the duty of the moment, but instead obstinately lagging behind. Thus, according to the apostle, it is certain that so little does the law spring from sin, that it is rather the objective ground of sin's possibility.3

But it is not on this account the ground of sin's actuality, as supposed by those who teach, that sin springs from the law. It is true, the apostle teaches that the law excites mistaken, previously slumbering desire, and further that the law multi

1 In opposition to Rom. iii. 31, vii. 14, x. 5; Gal. iii. 12.

2 This is implied in 1 Cor. xv. 45 f. (cf. Rom. v. 12 ff.); xoïxés and Yuxixés are clearly conceived in the passage as imperfect, but not on this account sinful, stages, which are followed by the completion of the creation of man. And in Adam &μapría (Rom. v. 12) is referred not to the creation, but to the Tapáßaris (Rom. v. 12-18), which presupposes a law (Rom. iv. 15).

3 Rom. iv. 15.

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plies sin, and not merely the consciousness or the knowledge of sin, nay, that the law is the strength of sin.1 But the first of these statements already presupposes disorderly, although slumbering, desire, so that the law is merely the occasion of that actual delight in forbidden objects which false desire for freedom excites; for he does not say, the law of itself impels to sin and necessitates it. Nay, it urges to the opposite, to conflict with the false desire for freedom. Just as little certainly, according to the apostle, does it compel to good. On the contrary, it shows itself in part powerless in comparison with the strength of evil desire, in part multiplies or strengthens sin in the following way (as the latter passages affirm): irritated by the limits which the law would impose on false desire for freedom, sin overpowers the hindrance or resistance which the law offers to evil. But self-evidently this result is not a positive effect or act of the law, but a consequence of the power of the flesh, in comparison with which the law proves itself too weak an impulse to good. In addition, the law unintentionally multiplies and becomes the strength of sin by revealing God's wrath or displeasure, and thus forcing the evil state to a crisis; for through the law it comes to pass that the sinner sees himself placed in inner discord with and alienation from God. Fear of the Holy and Just One drives him into sullen flight from God, and therefore into an aggravated, worse condition, unless a saving counteractive power intervene. The law, which implants the idea of moral determination in man's consciousness, and, appealing to the will, awakens the sense of freedom, thereby no doubt establishes the possibility of variance with the law, but not the actuality. But for the existence of wrong desire, with which is also associated God-fleeing remorse as wrong aversion, the law would impel to obedience, although it is unable, in consequence of the isolated character of its requirements, to lay hold of the entire man or be to him a spring of moral life. This is the impotence of all mere law. Hence the Gospel must be added

1 Rom. vii. 7 f., v. 20; Gal. iii. 22; 1 Cor. xv. 56.

2 Rom. viii. 3: ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου.

3 Rom. vii. 13.

What the apostle calls xpa so, e.g. Rom. viii. 7, cf. 15.

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to the law. But although the law of itself is powerless to overcome the evil which it punishes, still, according to Paul, it is not the law that works evil, but the flesh. Nor is it correct to say that the law, because it appeals to man's own strength, diverts him from God and teaches him selfsufficiency; for humility and faith are part of the contents of the law, ie. it requires right reception and willingness to be led (Sichbestimmenlassen), not mere originative action. Still less does sin follow from the consciousness of law; not even the consciousness of sin does so. The non-coincidence of what ought to be and what is remains innocent, unless the will is wanting at once to set about the duty of the moment. That the knowledge of duty should precede its discharge, is indispensable, if the will is to take part in that discharge.The result of what has been stated may be thus summarized: Neither does the law spring from sin, nor sin from the law as its cause, but the existence of the law is merely the necessary objective presupposition or condition of the possibility of evil as of good, and therefore in general of an existence subject to moral estimate. On the other hand, the actuality of the one or the other requires yet another factor.

3. The presupposition of evil on the subjective side is the moral capacity of man, to which, according to Holy Scripture, two elements belong-Conscience, and the Will subjected by conscience to the objective law.

The existence of Conscience is acknowledged throughout Holy Scripture as regards the thing. So in the case of the first man before and after the act, as also in that of Cain. The O. T. uses for this the general word "heart" as the centre of man's whole life." The N. T. has a word of its own, although an ambiguous one-ovveídnous. It is described as an eye in man, and as light, which implies that a faculty of moral vision is inherent in man, and that

1 This must by no means be confounded with "ignorance." It is the mere issue and effect of ignorance.

2 Gen. iii. 4; cf. xlii. 22, xliv. 16.

31 Sam. xxiv. 5; 2 Sam. xxiv. 10; 1 Kings ii. 44. Cf. Rom. ii. 15. Rom. ii. 15; 1 Pet. iii. 21; John viii. 9; Heb. ix. 9, 14, x. 2, 22, xiii. 18; Rom. xiii. 5; 1 Cor. viii. 7, 10, 12, x. 25, 27-29; 1 Tim. iii. 9, iv. 2. 5 Luke xi. 34; Matt. vi. 22.