Moore and Wittgenstein on CertaintyOxford University Press, 3. 2. 1994 - 208 strán (strany) Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty was finished just before his death in 1951 and is a running commentary on three of G.E. Moore's greatest epistemological papers. In the early 1930s, Moore had written a lengthy commentary on Wittgenstein, anticipating some of the issues Wittgenstein would discuss in On Certainty. The philosophical relationship between these two great philosophers and their overlapping, but nevertheless differing, views is the subject of this book. Both defended the existence of certainty and thus opposed any form of skepticism. However, their defenses and conceptions of certainty differed widely, as did their understanding of the nature of skepticism and how best to combat it. Stroll's book contains a careful and critical analysis of their differing approaches to a set of fundamental epistemological problems. |
Obsah
| 3 | |
2 Is There Such a Thing as Certainty? | 20 |
3 Moore | 28 |
4 Moores Strategy | 40 |
5 Moores Proof of an External World | 55 |
6 Finding the Beginning | 79 |
7 The Oddity of Moores Proof | 97 |
8 Dreaming Knowing Doubting | 119 |
9 Wittgensteins Foundationalism | 138 |
10 Folk Theory Standing Fast and Scepticism | 160 |
Bibliography | 183 |
Index | 187 |
Iné vydania - Zobraziť všetky
Časté výrazy a frázy
absurd after-image answer argue argument asserting believe broken text certitude challenge chapter cigar circumstances claim to know common sense framework common sense view concept context contrast course Descartes describe discussion distinction doubt dreaming earth entails epistemic epistemological example exist expressed external world fact folk physics folk psychology follows foundational foundationalism foundationalist G.E. Moore give hand hinge propositions human important interpretation J.L. Austin kind knowledge language game language-game Leibniz's law locutions logical mental mind mistake mistaken Moore and Wittgenstein Moore means Moore's proof nonsense Norman Malcolm notion one's pain paper passage Paul Churchland person philosophical physical objects position possible practices premises presented in space presupposes principle prove question Quine reasons revision sceptic senseless sensible sentence sort stands fast statement Suppose term theory things tion Tractatus traditional true with certainty understand utterance W.V. Quine Wittgen Wittgenstein says words world picture wrong
Populárne pasáže
Strana 91 - Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.
Strana 86 - The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. — The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.
Strana 157 - The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the riverbed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science
Strana 157 - It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
Strana 87 - proposition," "name" — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?
Strana 30 - Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth ; and, at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions...
Strana 108 - I know etc." is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the "I" cannot be important. And it properly means "There is no such thing as a doubt in this case" or "The expression 'I do not know' makes no sense in this case".
Strana 84 - What then is time? If no one asks me. I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not...
Strana 158 - I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.