A FRAGMENT. ON MACKINTOSH. SECTION I. Sir James on a great Philosophical Error. SIR James says, that moral inquiries "relate to at least two perfectly distinct subjects. 1. The nature of the distinction between right and wrong in human conduct; and, 2. The nature of those feelings with which right and wrong are contemplated by human beings."* Sir James does not go the length of claiming this distinction as his own. But he says expressly that nobody but himself has understood the value of it. The first of the two subjects he calls, "the nature of the distinction between right and wrong." The nature of the distinction between *Dissert. Sect. I. B two things depends (does it not?) upon the nature of the things distinguished. The things to be distinguished here are, right, and wrong. We must therefore know what right is, and what wrong, before we can know what the difference between them is. He gives us another expression for the same thing. He says the investigation of "the nature of the distinction BETWEEN right and wrong in human conduct," is the same with "investigation into the criterion of morality in action." This expression is not more satisfactory than the former. The word criterion commonly means something by which another thing is tried, or tested, and shown to be what it is. Thus chemists have a number of tests or criteria by which they determine what things are, one to test an alkali, another an acid; and so on. But what thing is it by which we test morality? And, above all, because that is the previous question, what is morality? A test, is a test of a thing known, not of a thing unknown. When a man desires a touchstone, a test, or criterion of gold, he knows beforehand what gold is—he only knows not whether such a piece of matter be gold or not. The test does not show what gold is; so neither does a test of morality show what morality is. When we know morality, we shall not be much in difficulty about the criterion of it. 66 "Morality in action" is Sir James's expression. And, as usual with Sir James's expressions, it is ambiguous. When we speak of a thing in action, we commonly mean a thing acting. A hand in action, is a hand acting; a mind in action, is a mind acting. When Sir James speaks of morality in action, does he mean morality acting? I conclude not; because when I ask myself what morality not acting is-I cannot find an answer. Morality not acting appears to me to be the negation of morality. There is another meaning we can suppose; and that is, the morality which is in an action: as we say the smell which is in a rose. Did Sir James then imagine, that there is morality in anything else? Did he mean to speak of the morality which is in action, as distinct from a morality which is not in action? When we say morality, we name an attribute of action. But then we need to be informed what that attribute is. Sir James says, the business of the moral inquirer is to find out the criterion of it. But the criterion of a thing does not tell us what it is it only ascertains whether such or such a thing be the thing in question or not. The only hypothesis by which I can annex anything like a meaning to the words of Sir James, is by supposing that he has misapplied the word criterion; that he means by "the criterion of morality in action," the moral quality of the act; that, whatever it be, on account of which we call it right, moral, good. Sir James's proposition in this sense is, that the criterion of morality is morality. We shall find, as we go on, other propositions of Sir James, of the same description. Well, Sir James says, this quality of actions, this something, in or belonging to action, is one thing, which deserves our inquiry; and we fully agree with him. Another thing, as he says, is, the feelings which men have, when this something is perceived or contemplated by them. him, that this is another thing. We We agree with agree with him, that inquiry into this thing, except as an object of philosophical curiosity, is a matter of equal importance. We rather lean to the opinion of Adam Smith, that it is a matter of very inferior importance. We are of opinion also, in direct opposition to Sir James, who thinks he has had a master's hand, in establishing the duality of these things, that it never was mistaken, or could be, by any man in his senses. The acts of Nero were acts of a man in Italy, who lived nearly 2,000 years ago; the feelings with which I regard them are the feelings of a man now living in England. Who is capable of taking one of these things for the other? This confusion in the mind of Sir James was wrought, no doubt, by ambiguity of terms. The |