But

The law of nature must therefore mean the laws prescribed by man's nature. But the laws prescribed by man's nature are, of course, the laws tending to human good, whether they be laws actually fixed by any society for its own use, or not. The law of nature therefore in this case, and the principle of utility, are the same. what can be meant by Sir James, when he talks of the principles of this law! This law is the principle of all other law. What can he mean, when he says the "great philosopher" (proprio nomine Leibnitz) considered benevolence or fear to be the first principles of this principle; i. e. the first principles of the principle of utility?

But whatever Sir James gives us to do in finding out his meaning, it is very easy to see what the author spoken of by Leibnitz designated by his principium juris. He meant by its principium, that to which it owed its origin, that on account of which it was brought into being.That on account of which, according to some, it was brought into being, was the guardianship of human society. To that society, men were led, according to Grotius, by their expectation of good from one another; according to Hobbes, by their fear of harm from one another; but in whatso ever way they were led to it, they did value its preservation, and seeing the necessity of law for that end, gave existence to law accordingly. And these opinions assuredly both Grotius and Hobbes

might hold, without believing, as Sir James would have it, that "benevolence or fear are the first principles of the law of nature." Sir James adds; "in the same sense in which the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community may be so regarded." Let us try to find, if we can, a meaning for this. The sentence put toge→ ther stands thus: Leibnitz "considered benevo lence or fear the first principles of the law of nature in the same sense in which the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community may be so regarded." There are here two subjects, and one predicate. The predicate is, "regarded as the first principles of the law of nature." The first of the two subjects is, "benevolence or fear;" the second is, "the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community." Of both, Sir James says, it may be predicated, that they are the first principles of the law of nature. "In the same sense," Sir James says. But what is it that must be in the same sense? The phrase must of necessity be construed either with the subjects, or the predicate. If with the subjects, the sense will be, that benevolence or fear, and the tendency of actions, are the same thing; if with the predicate, he declares that if the words "first principles of the laws of nature," be understood both times in the same sense, they may be predicated, according to Leibnitz, both of "benevolence or fear,"

and also of "the beneficial tendency of actions."

Sir James did not understand the passage. Among the questions discussed by the anonymous author, one, says Leibnitz, was, whether the safeguard of society, meaning a care for its safety, was the origin of law, or that to which law owed its principium? This opinion he denied, says Leibnitz,-in opposition to Grotius, who maintained the sociability of men-and to Hobbes, who maintained the fears men have of one another. The expressions are elliptical. Grotius ascribed the origin of human society to the social dispositions of men, Hobbes to their fears. But whether men valued society for their loves or their fears, in either case they would seek the preservation of that which they valued; and therefore would establish laws. Benevolence, according to Grotius; fear, according to Hobbes, was the principium societatis humana; and the custodia societatis humanæ, i.e. the desire of that custodia, and the knowledge of what was required for it, was the principium juris, or the cause why it began

to exist.

It is strange that Sir James saw in this any thing like a confusion of the ideas of a moral action, and of the state of mind of him who contemplates it.

Sir James never omits an opportunity which he either finds, or can make, of panegyric on a popular name.

C

"The confusion," says Sir James, "was common to him (Leibnitz) with many, as it even now is with most" (what an assertion!) “The comprehensive view was his own." In the first place, there was no confusion, on the part of any body. In the next place, there is no view of Leibnitz here at all, whether comprehensive or contracted; another man's sentiments, and not his, being alone represented. And in the third place, where is the comprehension of the view; when, speaking of a controversy on a single point, Leibnitz does nothing but mention three names of those who maintained one of the sides in the controversy? But Sir James knew, that the term, "a comprehensive view," was a panegyrical term; he knew also that the name of Leibnitz was a name of repute. That was enough for Sir James to put the two together.

SECTION II.

Sir James on Hobbes.

HOBBES is a great name in philosophy; on account both of the value of what he taught, and the extraordinary impulse which he communicated to the spirit of free inquiry in Europe.

The controversies roused by the daring attack of Luther on the established religion had deeply, for a considerable time, engaged the minds of men, on the great questions relating to the Creator, and his revelations to mankind. Philosophy, physical, mental, or political, was hardly an object of attention. A series of dogmas, handed down by authority, were passively received; and the very idea of inquiring into the foundation of them, seemed to have passed away from the minds of men. Even the great effort of Bacon, to point the views of men to the proper object of physical inquiry, and to make them ardent in the pursuit, had not yet produced any considerable effects. With respect to the mental, and physical sciences, they were hardly regarded as objects of inquiry. The opinions of Aristotle were taught, as a branch of education; and the possession of them in the