spoken of, and with ten times the intensity of applause. Imitation, and Custom, are the great masters of the human mind. It is matter of necessity that men, habituated to this narrow circle of ideas, should have poor and inadequate conceptions of morality.

The man, whom his education or other fortunate circumstances have habituated to ideas of the good of one of the larger communities of men, a nation; and to consider the interests of small societies, and of individuals, as subordinate to the interests in which each and all of the other individuals and societies composing the great communities participate; the man, who has learned to fix his esteem upon the actions which y promote these great interests, and in whom the motives to the performance of such actions overpower all other motives, is the only man who has reached the elevation of true morality. The other moralities are not only infinitely inferior to this in kind; but, when they are not retained in a perfect state of subordination to it, they are the most efficient causes of the corruption of the moral sentiments of mankind. Little has ever yet been done in the world, to cultivate the enlarged principle of morality; whereas the narrow principles, generated by the feelings of interest, in individuals, and little societies, have never been without constant and powerful incentives. It is obvious, therefore, how the great morality

F

has, to this hour, had so feeble an influence in the affairs of mankind; the narrow morality an influence so great; and how the happiness of the human race has been kept at so low an ebb.

To call the man, who puts forth these doctrines, with a flood of light, and bends all his endeavour to show, how the high and comprehensive principle of morality may be made to bear that sway in the affairs of men, which the low and narrow principles have hitherto so unhappily usurped, "the low and loose moralist of the vain, the selfish, and the sensual," looks like madness. It is but ignorance, and servility. It is a case of prostitution to the interest of a little confederacy, not reconcileable with that of the whole, whereof it is a part.

A few sentences, hastily picked out of the work De l'Esprit, will show the tone as well as principles, of the morality of Helvetius. The 14th chapter of the second discourse is entitled, "Des vertus de préjugé, et des vraies vertus." The chapter begins, "Je donne le nom des vertus de préjugé à toutes celles dont l'observation exacte ne contribue en rien au bonheur public. Ces fausses vertus sont, dans la plupart des nations, plus honorées que les vraies vertus, et ceux qui les pratiquent en plus grande veneration que les bons citoyens." In contradistinction to these, he gives the name "vraies, à celles qui, sans

cesse, ajoutent à la felicité publique, et sans lesquelles les sociétés ne peuvent subsister."

In the beginning of the 11th chapter of the same Discourse, he says, "Ce n'est plus de la probité par rapport à un particulier ou une petite société, mais de la vraie probité, de la probité considerée par rapport au public, dont il s'agit dans ce chapitre. Cette espece de probité est la seule, qui réellement en mérite, et qui en obtient generalement le nom. Ce n'est qu'en considerant la probité sous ce point de vué, qu'on peut se former des idées nettes de l'honnêteté, et trouver un guide à la vertu."

In the 23rd chapter of the same Discourse, where his object is to unfold the causes which hitherto have retarded the progress of morality, he says, "Pour hâter les progrès d'une science, il ne suffit pas que cette science soit utile au public; il faut que chacun des citoyens, qui composent une nation, trouve quelque avantage à la perfectionner. Or, dans la revolution, qu'ont éprouvé tous les peuples de la terre, l'intérêt public, c'est à dire, celui du plus grand nombre, sur lequel doivent toujours être appuyés les principes d'une bonne morale, ne s'étant pas toujours trouvé conforme à l'interêt du plus puissant, ce dernier, indifférent au progrès des autres sciences, a dû s'opposer efficacement à ceux de la morale."

I shall quote but one other passage. It is in the 23rd chapter of the Third Discourse. "Ce

n'est donc point sur le terrein du luxe, et des richesses, mais sur celui de la pauvreté, que croissent les sublimes vertus; rien de si rare que de rencontrer des ames élevées dans les empires opulens, les citoyens y contractent trop de besoins. Quiconque les a multipliés a donné à la tyrannie des ôtages de sa bassesse et de sa lâcheté. La vertu qui se contente de peu est la seule qui soit à l'abri de la corruption."

And this is the man whom, in England, a writer, with a philosophical reputation, was found to call the "low and loose moralist of the vain, the selfish, and the sensual!"

SECTION III.

Sir James on Bishop Butler.

SIR JAMES glories in heaping praise on Butler. He takes what Butler has said, as a foundation on which to build. Butler, and Mackintosh, the joint authors of a new and true theory of ethics; to one of whom we owe the foundation, to the other the glorious superstructure: what an item in a future eulogium!

Passing by the flourishes of vague and general praise, let us take the sentence which comes nearest the matter. "In those deep, and sometimes dark dissertations," says Sir James, "which Butler preached at the Chapel of the Rolls, and which contain his ethical discussions, he has taught truths, more capable of being exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally connected with each other, and therefore more worthy of the name of discovery than any with which we are acquainted."

It is curious that, bestowing so many epithets upon the truths of Butler, Sir James abstains