it must be absurd in idea, since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd or impossible."

I acknowledge it to be impossible, that a triangle should really exist which has no precise proportion of sides and angles; and impossible that any being should exist which is not an individual being; for, I think, a being and an individual being mean the same thing: but that there can be no attributes common to many individuals, I do not acknowledge. Thus, to many figures that really exist, it may be common that they are triangles; and to many bodies that exist, it may be common that they are fluid. Triangle and fluid are not beings, they are attributes of beings.

As to the principle here assumed, that nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd or impossible, I refer to what was said upon it, Chap. III, Essay 4. It is evident, that in every mathematical demonstration ad absurdum, of which kind almost one half of mathematics consists, we are required to suppose, and consequently to conceive a thing that is impossible. From that supposition we reason, until we come to a conclusion that is not only impossible but absurd. From this we infer, that the proposition supposed at first is impossible, and therefore that its contradictory is true.

As this is the nature of all demonstrations ad absurdum, it is evident, (I do not say that we can have a clear and distinct idea, but) that we can clearly and distinctly conceive things impossible.

The rest of Mr. Hume's discourse upon this subject is employed in explaining how an individual idea, annexed to a general term, may serve all the purposes in reasoning, which have been ascribed to abstract general

ideas.

"When we have found a resemblance among several objects that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it, with all its circumstances and proportions." But along with this idea, there is a readiness to survey any other of the individuals to which the name belongs, and to observe, that no conclusion be formed contrary to any of them. If any such conclusion is formed, those individual ideas which contradict it, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falsehood of the proposition. If the mind suggest not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties; and such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry.

This is in substance the way in which he accounts for what he calls "the foregoing paradox, that some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation." Upon this account I shall make some

remarks.

1. He allows that we find a resemblance among several objects, and such a resemblance as leads us to apply the same name to all of them. This concession is sufficient to show that we have general conceptions. There can be no resemblance in objects that have no common attribute; and if there be attributes belonging in common to several objects, and in man a faculty to observe and conceive these, and to give names to them, this is to have general conceptions.

I believe indeed we may have an indistinct perception of resemblance, without knowing wherein it lies. Thus, I may see a resemblance between one face and another, when I cannot distinctly say in what feature they

resemble but by analysing the two faces, and comparing feature with feature, I may form a distinct notion of that which is common to both. A painter being accustomed to an analysis of this kind, would have formed a distinct notion of this resemblance at first sight; to another man it may require some attention.

There is therefore an indistinct notion of resemblance when we compare the objects only in gross; and this I believe brute animals may have. There is also a distinct notion of resemblance, when we analyse the objects into their different attributes, and perceive them to agree in some, while they differ in others. It is in this case only that we give a name to the attributes wherein they agree, which must be a common name, because the thing signified by it is common. Thus, when I compare cubes of different matter, I perceive them to have this attribute in common, that they are comprehended under six equal squares; and this attribute only, is signified by applying the name of cube to them all. When I compare clean linen with snow, I perceive them to agree in colour; and when I apply the name of white to both, this name signifies neither snow nor clean linen, but the attribute which is common to both.

2. The author says, that when we have found a resemblance among several objects, we apply the same name to all of them.

It must be here observed, that there are two kinds of names which the author seems to confound, though they are very different in nature and in the power they have in language. There are proper names, and there are` common names or appellatives. The first are the names of individuals. The same proper name is never applied to several individuals on account of their similitude, because the very intention of a proper name is to distinguish one individual from all others; and hence it is a maxim in grammar, that proper names have no plural number. A proper name signifies nothing but the individual whose name it is; and when we apply it to the individual, we neither affirm nor deny any thing concerning him.

A common name or appellative is not the name of any individual, but a general term, signifying something that is or may be common to several individuals. Common names therefore signify common attributes. Thus, when I apply the name of son or brother to several persons, this signifies and affirms that this attribute is common to all of them.

From this it is evident, that the applying the same name to several individuals, on account of their resemblance, can, in consistence with grammar and common sense, mean nothing else than the expressing by a general term something that is common to those individuals, and which therefore may be truly affirmed of them all.

3. The author says, "It is certain that we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term. The word raises up an individual idea, and makes the imagination conceive it, with all its particular circumstances and proportions."

This fact he takes a great deal of pains to account for, from the effect of

custom.

one

But the fact should be ascertained before we take pains to account for it. I can see no reason to believe the fact; and I think a farmer can talk of his sheep, and his black cattle, without conceiving in his imagination individual, with all its circumstances and proportions. If this be true, the whole of his theory of general ideas falls to the ground. To me it appears, that when a general term is well understood, it is only by accident if it suggest some individual of the kind; but this effect is by

constant.

no means

I understand perfectly what mathematicians call a line of the fifth order; yet I never conceived in my imagination any one of the kind in all its circumstances and proportions. Sir Isaac Newton first formed a distinct general conception of lines of the third order; and afterwards, by great labour and deep penetration, found out and described the particular species comprehended under that general term. According to Mr. Hume's theory, he must first have been acquainted with the particulars, and then have learned by custom to apply one general name to all of them.

The author observes, "That the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inch perpendicular, may serve us in talking of a figure, a rectilinear figure, a regular figure, a triangle, and an equilateral triangle."

I answer, The man that uses these general terms, either understands their meaning, or he does not. If he does not understand their meaning, all his talk about them will be found only without sense, and the particular idea mentioned cannot enable him to speak of them with understanding. If he understands the meaning of the general terms, he will find no use for the particular idea.

4. He tells us gravely, "That in a globe of white marble the figure and the colour are undistinguishable, and are in effect the same." How foolish have mankind been to give different names, in all ages and in all languages, to things undistinguishable, and in effect the same? Henceforth, in all books of science and of entertainment, we may substitute figure for colour, and colour for figure. By this we shall make numberless curious discoveries, without danger of error.

ESSAY VI.

OF JUDGMENT.

CHAPTER I.

OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL.

JUDGING is an operation of the mind so familiar to every man who hath understanding, and its name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no definition.

As it is impossible by a definition to give a notion of colour to a man who never saw colours; so it is impossible by any definition to give a distinct notion of judgment to a man who has not often judged, and who is not capable of reflecting attentively upon this act of his mind. The best use of a definition is to prompt him to that reflection; and without it the best definition will be apt to mislead him.

The definition commonly given of judgment, by the more ancient writers in logic, was, that it is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another. I believe this is as good a definition of it as can be given. Why I prefer it to some later definitions will afterwards appear. Without pretending to give any other, I shall make two remarks upon it, and then offer some general observations on this subject.

1. It is true, that it is by affirmation or denial that we express our judgments; but there may be judgment which is not expressed. It is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit, and not expressed. Nay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they affirm or deny; the definition therefore must be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is only another name for judgment.

2. Affirmation and denial is very often the expression of testimony, which is a different act of the mind, and ought to be distinguished from judgment.

A judge asks of a witness what he knows of such a matter to which he was an eye or ear witness. He answers, by affirming or denying something. But his answer does not express his judgment; it is his testimony. Again, I ask a man his opinion in a matter of science or of criticism. His answer is not testimony; it is the expression of his judgment.

Testimony is a social act, and it is essential to it to be expressed by words or signs. A tacit testimony is a contradiction: but there is no contradiction in a tacit judgment; it is complete without being expressed.

In testimony a man pledges his veracity for what he affirms; so that a false testimony is a lie: but a wrong judgment is not a lie; it is only an

error.

I believe, in all languages, testimony and judgment are expressed by the same form of speech. A proposition affirmative or negative, with a verb in what is called the indicative mood, expresses both. To distinguish them by the form of speech, it would be necessary that verbs should have

two indicative moods, one for testimony, and another to express judgment. I know not that this is found in any language. And the reason is, (not surely that the vulgar cannot distinguish the two, for every man knows the difference between a lie and an error of judgment), but that, from the matter and circumstances, we can easily see whether a man intends to give his testimony, or barely to express his judgment.

Although men must have judged in many cases before tribunals of justice were erected, yet it is very probable that there were tribunals before men began to speculate about judgment, and that the word may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge, after taking the proper evidence, passes sentence in a cause, and that sentence is called his judgment; so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or false, passes sentence, or determines according to the evidence that appears. Some kinds of evidence leave no room for doubt. Sentence is passed immediately, without seeking or hearing any contrary evidence, because the thing is certain and notorious. In other cases, there is room for weighing evidence on both sides before sentence is passed. The analogy between a tribunal of justice and this inward tribunal of the mind, is too obvious to escape the notice of any man who ever appeared before a judge. And it is probable, that the word judgment, as well as many other words we use in speaking of this operation of mind, are grounded on this analogy.

Having premised these things, that it may be clearly understood what I mean by judgment, I proceed to make some general observations concerning it.

First, Judgment is an act of the mind specifically different from simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing. It would be unnecessary to observe this, if some philosophers had not been led by their theories to a contrary opinion.

Although there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be expressed by a word or words, which make no complete sentence. When simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend a proposition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or false.

It is self-evident, that every judgment must be either true or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false, as was shown before.

One judgment may be contradictory to another; and it is impossible for a man to have two judgments at the same time, which he perceives to be contradictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth, and that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory propositions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the meaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true at the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be false. For these reasons, I hold it to be certain, that judgment and simple apprehension are acts of the mind specifically different.

Secondly, There are notions or ideas that ought to be referred to the faculty of judgment as their source; because, if we had not that faculty, they could not enter into our minds; and to those that have that faculty, and are capable of reflecting upon its operations, they are obvious and familiar.