not being an object of sense, the vulgar never think of it; or, if they are taught the use of the word, they mean no more by it but that collection of sensible qualities which they, from finding them conjoined in nature, have been accustomed to call by one name, and to consider as one thing.

Thus he draws the vulgar opinion near to his own; and, that he may meet it half way, he acknowledges, that material things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person: but the question, says he, between the materialist and me, is, Whether they have an absolute existence distinct from their being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds? This, indeed, he says, some heathens and philosophers have affirmed; but whoever entertains notions of the Deity, suitable to the Holy Scripture, will be of another opinion.

But here an objection occurs, which it required all his ingenuity to answer. It is this: The ideas in my mind cannot be the same with the ideas of any other mind; therefore, if the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that the objects I perceive can exist any where, when I do not perceive them; and it is impossible that two or more minds can perceive the same object.

To this Berkeley answers, that this objection presses no less the opinion of the materialist philosopher than his : But the difficulty is, to make his opinion coincide with the notions of the vulgar, who are firmly persuaded, that the very identical objects which they perceive, continue to exist when they do not perceive them; and who are no less firmly persuaded, that when ten men look at the sun or the moon, they all see the same individual object.

To reconcile this repugnancy, he observes, Dial. 3, "That if the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain, (and not at all repugnant to the principles he maintains,) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and since men are used to apply the word same, where no distinction or variety is perceived, and he does not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows, that as men have said before, several saw the same thing; so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase without any deviation, either from propriety of language or the truth of things: But if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this term, (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists,) it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing: But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from

names."

Upon the whole, I apprehend that Berkeley has carried this attempt to reconcile his system to the vulgar opinion further than reason supports him and he was no doubt tempted to do so, from a just apprehension that, in a controversy of this kind, the common sense of mankind is the most formidable antagonist.

Berkeley has employed much pains and ingenuity to show that his system, if received and believed, would not be attended with those bad consequences in the conduct of life which superficial thinkers may be apt to impute to it. His system does not take away or make any alteration upon our pleasures or our pains: Our sensations, whether agreeable or disagreeable, are the same upon his system as upon any other. These are

real things, and the only things that interest us. They are produced in us according to certain laws of nature, by which our conduct will be directed in attaining the one, and avoiding the other: And it is of no moment to us, whether they are produced immediately by the operation of some powerful intelligent being upon our minds, or by the mediation of some inanimate being which we call matter.

The evidence of an all-governing mind, so far from being weakened, seems to appear even in a more striking light upon his hypothesis, than upon the common one. The powers which inanimate matter is supposed to possess, have always been the strong hold of Atheists, to which they had recourse in defence of their system. This fortress of atheism must be most effectually overturned, if there is no such thing as matter in the universe. In all this the bishop reasons justly and acutely. But there is one uncomfortable consequence of his system, which he seems not to have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all possible, to guard it.

The consequence, I mean, is this, that, although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a supreme intelligent mind, it seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves. What I call a father, a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind; and being ideas in my mind, they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine, any more than the pain felt by me can be the individual pain felt by another. I can find no principle in Berkeley's system, which affords me even probable ground to conclude, that there are other intelligent beings, like myself, in the relations of father, brother, friend, or fellow-citizen. I am left alone, as the only creature of God in the universe, in that forlorn state of egoism, into which it is said some of the disciples of Des Cartes were brought by his philosophy.

Of all the opinions that have ever been advanced by philosophers, this of Bishop Berkeley, that there is no material world, seems the strangest, and the most apt to bring philosophy into ridicule with plain men, who are guided by the dictates of nature and common sense. And it will not, I apprehend, be improper to trace this progeny of the doctrine of ideas from its origin, and to observe its gradual progress, till it acquired such strength that a pious and learned bishop had the boldness to usher it into the world, as demonstrable from the principles of philosophy universally received, and as an admirable expedient for the advancement of knowledge, and for the defence of religion.

During the reign of the Peripatetic philosophy, men were little disposed to doubt, and much to dogmatize. The existence of the objects of sense was held as a first principle; and the received doctrine was, that the sensible species or idea is the very form of the external object, just separated from the matter of it, and sent into the mind that perceives it; so that we find no appearance of scepticism about the existence of matter under that philosophy.

Des Cartes taught men to doubt even of those things that had been taken for first principles.

He rejected the doctrine of species or ideas coming from objects; but still maintained, that what we immediately perceive is not the external object, but an idea or image of it in our mind. This led some of his disciples into egoism, and to disbelieve the existence of every creature in the universe but themselves and their own ideas.

But Des Cartes himself, either from dread of the censure of the Church, which he took great care not to provoke, or to shun the ridicule of the

world, which might have crushed his system at once, as it did that of the Egoists; or perhaps, from inward conviction, was resolved to support the existence of matter. To do this consistently with his principles, he found himself obliged to have recourse to arguments that are far-fetched, and not very cogent. Sometimes he argues, that our senses are given us by God, who is no deceiver; and therefore we ought to believe their testimony. But this argument is weak; because according to his principles, our senses testify no more but that we have certain ideas: And if we draw conclusions from this testimony, which the premises will not support, we deceive ourselves. To give more force to this weak argument, he sometimes adds, that we have by nature a strong propensity to believe that there is an external world corresponding to our ideas.

Malebranche thought, that this strong propensity is not a sufficient reason for believing the existence of matter; and that it is to be received as an article of faith, not certainly discoverable by reason. He is aware that faith comes by hearing; and that it may be said that prophets, apostles, and miracles, are only ideas in our minds. But to this he answers, That though these things are only ideas, yet faith turns them into realities; and this answer, he hopes, will satisfy those who are not too morose.

It may perhaps seem strange, that Locke, who wrote so much about ideas, should not see those consequences which Berkeley thought so obviously deducible from that doctrine. Mr. Locke surely was not willing that the doctrine of ideas should be thought to be loaded with such consequences. He acknowledges, that the existence of a material world is not to be received as a first principle; nor is it demonstrable; but he offers the best arguments for it he can; and supplies the weakness of his arguments by this observation, that we have such evidence as is sufficient to direct us in pursuing the good, and avoiding the ill we may receive from external things, beyond which we have no concern.

There is, indeed, a single passage in Locke's Essay, which may lead one to conjecture, that he had a glimpse of that system which Berkeley afterwards advanced, but thought it proper to suppress it within his own breast. The passage is in book 4, chap. 10, where having proved the existence of an eternal intelligent mind, he comes to answer those who conceive that matter also must be eternal; because we cannot conceive how it could be made out of nothing: And having observed that the creation of minds requires no less power than the creation of matter, he adds what follows: "Nay, possibly, if we could emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception, how matter might at first be made, and begin to exist by the power of that eternal first being; but to give beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them, or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorise, if the common settled opinion opposes it; especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose."

It appears from this passage, first, That Mr. Locke had some system in his mind, perhaps not fully digested, to which we might be led, by raising our thoughts to a closer contemplation of things, and emancipating them from vulgar notions. Secondly, That this system would lead so far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, that he

thought proper to keep it within his own breast. Thirdly, That it might be doubted whether this system differed so far from the common settled opinion in reality, as it seemed to do in words. Fourthly, By this system, we might possibly be enabled to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to exist; but it would give no aid in conceiving how a spirit might be made. These are the characteristics of that system which Mr. Locke had in his mind, and thought it prudent to suppress. May they not lead to a probable conjecture, that it was the same, or something similar to that of Bishop Berkeley? According to Berkeley's system, God's creating the material world at such a time, means no more but that he decreed from that time to produce ideas in the minds of finite spirits, in that order, and according to those rules, which we call the laws of nature. This, indeed, removes all difficulty, in conceiving how matter was created; and Berkeley does not fail to take notice of the advantage of his system on that account. But his system gives no aid in conceiving how a spirit may be made It appears, therefore, that every particular Mr. Locke has hinted, with regard to that system which he had in his mind, but thought it prudent to suppress, tallies exactly with the system of Berkeley. If we add to this, that Berkeley's system follows from Mr. Locke's, by very obvious consequence, it seems able to conjecture, from the passage now quoted, that he was not unaware of that consequence, but left it to those who should come after him to carry his principles their full length, when they should by time be better established, and able to bear the shock of their opposition to vulgar notions. Mr. Norris, in his Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, published in 1701, observes, that the material world is not an object of sense; because sensation is within us, and has no object. Its existence, therefore, he says, is a collection of reason, and not a very evident one.

reason

From this detail we may learn, that the doctrine of ideas, as it was newmodelled by Des Cartes, looked with an unfriendly aspect upon the material world; and although philosophers were very unwilling to give up either, they found it a very difficult task to reconcile them to each other. In this state of things, Berkeley, I think, is reputed the first who had the daring resolution to give up the material world altogether, as a sacrifice to the received philosophy of ideas.

But we ought not in this historical sketch to omit an author of far inferior name, Arthur Collier, rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum. He published a book in 1713, which he calls Clavis Universalis; or, a New Enquiry after Truth; being a demonstration of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world. His arguments are the same in substance with Berkeley's: and he appears to understand the whole strength of his cause. Though he is not deficient in metaphysical acuteness, his style is disagreeable, being full of conceits, of new coined words, scholastic terms, and perplexed sentences. He appears to be well acquainted with Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Norris, as well as with Aristotle and the schoolmen But, what is very strange, it does not appear that he had ever heard of Locke's Essay, which had been published twenty-four years, or of Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, which had been published three years.

He says, he had been ten years firmly convinced of the non-existence of an external world, before he ventured to publish his book. He is far from thinking, as Berkeley does, that the vulgar are of his opinion. If his book should make any converts to his system, (of which be expresses little hope, though he has supported it by nine demonstrations,) he takes pains to

show that his disciples, notwithstanding their opinion, may, with the unenlightened, speak of material things in the common style. He himself had scruples of conscience about this for some time; and if he had not got over them, he must have shut his lips for ever: But he considered, that God himself has used this style in speaking to men in the Holy Scripture, and has thereby sanctified it to all the faithful; and that to the pure all things are pure. He thinks his opinion may be of great use, especially in religion; and applies it, in particular, to put an end to the controversy about Christ's presence in the sacrament.

I have taken the liberty to give this short account of Collier's book, because I believe it is rare, and little known. I have only seen one copy of it, which is in the University Library of Glasgow.

CHAPTER XI.

BISHOP BERKELEY'S SENTIMENTS OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

I PASS over the sentiments of Bishop Berkeley, with respect to abstract ideas, and with respect to space and time, as things which may more properly be considered in another place. But I must take notice of one part of his system, wherein he seems to have deviated from the common opinion about ideas.

Though he sets out in his principles of knowledge by telling us, that it is evident the objects of human knowledge are ideas, and builds his whole system upon this principle; yet in the progress of it, he finds that there are certain objects of human knowledge that are not ideas, but things which have a permanent existence. The objects of knowledge, of which we have no ideas, are our own minds, and their various operations, other finite minds, and the Supreme Mind. The reason why there can be no ideas of spirits and their operations, the author informs us is this, That ideas are passive, inert, unthinking beings; they cannot therefore be the image or likeness of things that have thought, and will, and active power ; we have notions of minds, and of their operations, but not ideas: We know what we mean by thinking, willing and perceiving; we can reason about beings endowed with those powers, but we have no ideas of them. A spirit or mind is the only substance or support wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas, should itself be an idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd.

He observes further, Princip. sect. 142, that "all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations of habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern; yet it conduces to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish things very different by different names."

This is an important part of Berkeley's system, and deserves attention. We are led by it to divide the objects of human knowledge into two kinds: The first is ideas, which we have by our five senses; they have no existence when they are not perceived, and exist only in the minds of those who perceive them. The second kind of objects comprehends spirits, their acts, and the relations and habitudes of things. Of these we have notions, but no ideas. No idea can represent them, or have any similitude to them: Yet we understand what they mean, and we can speak with understanding, and reason about them, without ideas.