pity and revengefulness, 'optative,' but of the desire to know there is a peculiar expression, called 'interrogative,' as 'what is it'? 'when shall it'? 'how is it done'? and 'why so'? Other language of the passions I find none; for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like, do not signify as speech, but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our passions; but certain signs they be not, because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them have such passions or not. The best signs of passions present are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call 'apparent' or 'seeming good.' And, contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the whole is 'apparent' or 'seeming evil,' so that he who hath by experience, or reason, the greatest and surest prospect of consequences, deliberates best himself, and is able, when he will, to give the best counsel unto others.

'Continual success' in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say continual prospering, is that men call 'felicity'-I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here, because life itself is but motion, and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys that now are as incomprehensible as the word of schoolmen 'beatifical vision' is unintelligible.

The form of speech whereby men signify their opinion of the goodness of anything is 'praise.' That whereby they signify the power and greatness of anything is 'magnifying.' And that whereby they signify the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the

Greeks called μaкapioμós for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the 'passions.'

CHAPTER VII

OF THE ENDS, OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE

Of all 'discourse,' governed by desire of knowledge there is at last an 'end,' either by attaining or by giving over. And in the chain of discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an end for that time.

If the discourse be merely mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of 'it will be,' or 'it will not be,' or ‘it has been,' or 'has not been.' All which is 'opinion.' And that which is alternate appetite in deliberating concerning good and evil, the same is alternate opinion in the enquiry of the truth of 'past' and 'future.' And as the last appetite in deliberation is called the 'will,' so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future is called the 'judgment' or 'resolute' and 'final sentence' of him that 'discourseth.' And as the whole chain of appetites alternate, in the question of good or bad, is called 'deliberation,' so the whole chain of opinions alternate, in the question of true or false, is called 'doubt.' No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as for the knowledge of fact, it is originally sense; and ever after, memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is called science, it is not absolute, but conditional. No man can know by discourse that this or that is, has been, or will be-which is to know absolutely; but only that if this be, that is; if this has been, that has been, if this shall be, that shall be-which is to know conditionally and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing to another name of the same thing.

And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connection of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms, the

end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called 'science.' But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again ‘opinion' namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words, without possibility of being understood. When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be 'conscious,' of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another or of a third, it was, and ever will be, reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his 'conscience,' or to corrupt or force another so to do: insomuch that the plea of conscience has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And, last of all, men vehemently in love with their own opinions, though never so absurd, and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or speak against them, and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most but that they think so.

When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth and of whose honesty in not deceiving he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing as the person; and the resolution is called 'belief,' and 'faith'-'faith' in the man, 'belief' both of the man and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. To 'have faith in' or 'trust to' or 'believe a man' signify the same thing, namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man; but to believe what is said' signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, 'I believe in,' as also the Latin credo in, and the Greek TLOTév els are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of

them in other writings are put 'I believe him,' 'I trust him,' ‘I have faith in him,' 'I rely on him,' and in Latin credo illi, fido illi; and in Greek TLσTév ȧUT; and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.

But by 'believing in,' as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person, but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians but all manner of men do so believe in God as to hold all for truth they hear Him say, whether they understand it or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever; but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.

From whence we may infer that, when we believe any saying whatsoever it be to be true, from arguments taken not from the thing itself, or from the principles of natural reason, but from the authority and good opinion we have of him that hath said it, then is the speaker, or person we believe in or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith, and the honour done in believing is done to him only. And consequently when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God Himself, our belief, faith, and trust, is in the Church, whose word we take and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of God take the word of the prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true or a false prophet. And so it is also with all other history. For if I should not believe all that is written by historians of the glorious acts of Alexander or Cæsar, I do not think the ghost of Alexander or Cæsar had any just cause to be offended, or anybody else but the historian. If Livy say the gods made once a cow speak, and we believe it not, we distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only, and their writings, whether they be sent from God or not, is faith in men only.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THE VIRTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL, AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS

VIRTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence, and consisteth in comparison. For, if all things were equal in all men, nothing would be prized. And by 'virtues intellectual' are always understood such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves, and go commonly under the name of a 'good wit,' though the same word 'wit' be used also to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

These 'virtues' are of two sorts, 'natural' and 'acquired.' By natural I mean not that which a man hath from his birth; for that is nothing else but sense, wherein men differ so little one from another and from brute beasts as it is not to be reckoned amongst virtues. But I mean that 'wit' which is gotten by use only and experience; without method, culture, or instruction. This 'natural wit' consisteth principally in two things, 'celerity of imagining,' that is, swift succession of one thought to another, and steady direction to some approved end. On the contrary, a slow imagination maketh that defect or fault of the mind which is commonly called 'dulness,' 'stupidity,' and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quickness is caused by the difference of men's passions, that love and dislike, some one thing, some another; and therefore some men's thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to and observe differently the things that pass through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be 'like one another,' or in what they be 'unlike,' or 'what they serve for,' or 'how they serve to such a purpose;' those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are said to have a 'good wit,' by which in this occasion is meant a 'good fancy.' But they that observe their differences and dissimilitudes, which is called 'distinguishing' and 'discerning' and 'judging' between thing and thing, in case such discerning be not