agreed to by all the Central American republics and Mexico.

Something more than this, however, is needed by the weaker Latin-American states -the good offices of the United States; for the urgent necessity for the Central American peoples, whether united in one state or split up in several states, is stability. A few states seem unable to stand alone. Stability is noticeable by its absence. This is particularly true of Nicaragua, where revolution has been more chronic and more incorrigible than in any other land. Events have shown that in Nicaragua stability can be brought about only by outside help. This help the United States has rendered by putting its bigness and strength at the service of this small and weak neighbor.

NICARAGUAN RISINGS

Three years ago Nicaragua was freed from the worst tyranny it had known-that of President Zelaya. But the relief lasted only a year and a half. It was then menaced by a revolution led by Luis Mena, Secretary of War, who aspired to the Presidency. This revolt was also fomented by notorious professional revolutionists of other parts of Central America, who did their utmost to conquer the country in order to plunder it.

The Mena revolution became the most

alarming Nicaragua had known. It not only imperiled the lives of all Nicaraguans, it also endangered the lives and property of our own citizens in Nicaragua. The American Minister at Managua, the capital, called upon the Nicaraguan Government to protect American lives and property. The Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that Nicaraguan troops were all engaged in putting down the rebellion, and added: "In consequence my Government desires that the Government of the United States guarantee with its forces security for the property of American citizens in Nicaragua, and that they extend this protection to all the inhabitants of the Republic."

This was a large order! But, in the words of President Taft's Message to Congress a year ago, the Nicaraguan Government, "having admitted its inability to protect American life and property against acts of sheer lawlessness on the part of the malcontents, and having requested this Government to assume that office, it became necessary to land over two thousand marines and bluejackets in Nicaragua." These kept the lines of com

munication open on the American owned and operated railway, nearly a hundred and seventy miles long, connecting Corinto, on the Pacific coast, with the important interior towns of Managua, Leon, and Granada.

But this was not all. Our marines even fed the people in many towns, for, by orders from Washington, all persons in need of food and clothing were to be provided for out of the marine stores. Never, so far as we know, has a strong government so well acted the part of a Big Brother to a weak government.

When peace and order were restored, most of the troops were withdrawn, but it was seen that the apparent restoration of peace would soon be endangered if all our forces left the country. This was shown when a minor revolt occurred last March, and also when, in April, President Wilson ordered the release of General Mena, who had been held in the Panama Canal Zone. The return of that revolutionary leader caused instant unrest and the well-grounded fear of another revolution. Indeed, in May martial law was proclaimed in the Republic, and a company of our marines that had been stationed at San Juan since the revolution of 1912 was called upon to exercise extraordinary vigilance to prevent disorder. It is the unanimous opinion of all foreigners and many Nicaraguans that the country would again have been plunged into war but for the presence of American troops.

Moreover, the Nicaraguans have learned. during the months when our marines were in Nicaragua what might be expected in the way of order, happiness, and prosperity under a better rule. As a prominent Nicaraguan said, "The American occupation has been a great blessing. It has shown the people what could be done if law, order, and decency were established here."

A NEW NICARAGUAN TREATY PROPOSED

Hence the Nicaraguan Government proposed a new treaty with the United States which should give us the right to exercise greater power in that country-indeed, it proposed to incorporate for Nicaragua the language of the Platt Amendment in regard to Cuba, adopted in 1901. A treaty drawn on these lines was duly put before the United States Senate. It provides:

(1) That Nicaragua shall declare war only with the consent of the United States;

(2) That no treaties shall be made with

foreign governments tending to destroy Nicaraguan independence or to give foreign countries footholds on Nicaraguan soil;

(3) That no public debt shall be contracted beyond Nicaragua's ordinary revenue;

(4) That the United States Government may intervene (a) to protect Nicaraguan independence, (b) to help carry out the financial obligations of Nicaragua to the extent of supervising the collection of revenues and the disbursement of $3,000,000 which would be paid by the United States Government for an exclusive canal right-of-way across Nicaragua with a ninety-nine-year lease of a naval base in the Bay of Fonseca, and also of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea. Such a policy as above outlined was imme-. diately criticised with some amusement by those who declare it strangely undemocratic and " very jingo." As a matter of fact, it is only a strong pronouncement of the President's attitude as to the maintenance of independence and stability of government in Latin America.

In the first place, there is found a benefit to ourselves as well as to Nicaragua in the fact that, just as in a similar provision with regard to Cuba, we put into definite terms the recognized principle of the Monroe Doctrine, prohibiting foreign nations from securing footholds on the American continent.

A second benefit would accrue from our right of intervention. The history of Cuba during the past dozen years under the Platt Amendment shows that the acknowledgment of this right exercises an influence to prevent the development of a situation calling for intervention. For whenever disorder has been threatened in Cuba a note from our Government, delivered as soon as the situation appeared alarming, has certainly in recent years been sufficient to restore calm. As in the case of Cuba, so in the case of Nicaragua, the possibility of invoking intervention may suffice to prevent hotheads from upsetting law and order; it should also be in Nicaragua, as in Cuba, a satisfaction both to the business interests involved and to all peace-loving and law-abiding people.

Still another benefit would lie in preventing revolution, not only in Nicaragua, but also in the neighboring states of Honduras and Salvador, because of the proposed establishment of a naval base for us in the Gulf of Fonseca. The waters of this gulf wash the shores of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador, and in every one of the revolutions

either in or among those republics the waters of the gulf have carried many a filibustering or revolutionary expedition. Thus our control of the gulf should bring about an international as well as national benefit.

NICARAGUAN FINANCE

A fourth benefit under the proposed treaty is assured in the clauses by which Nicaragua binds herself not to assume any public debt in the discharge of which her ordinary revenues should be inadequate.

Her finances themselves have long needed reorganization. As in the similar case of Santo Domingo, Nicaragua is deeply in debt. Her customs have been inadequately and dishonestly collected. Foreign creditors have long been pressing because there have not been enough funds wherewith to pay the interest on the debts. During the Taft Administration a treaty was proposed by which the United States Government should, as in the case of Santo Domingo, take the collecting of customs from local control (thus removing one of the chief incentives to revo-' lution), and should itself supervise the collection of customs, so that foreign creditors might feel a security of payment of interest on their loans, and also so that the Nicaraguan Republic itself might be freed from any apprehension of intervention by creditor nations. On its part the Nicaraguan Government agreed not to alter the import or export duties during the existence of the loans. The Outlook approved this treaty and asked those who objected to it whether they were really acting progressively. But the treaty did not pass the Senate.

Foreseeing failure in the effort to have this country take charge of its customhouses, Nicaragua voluntarily placed its custom-house administration in the hands of an American. This was nearly two years ago. The American was Colonel Clifford D. Ham, formerly of the Philippine Revenue Service. He was recommended by ex-President Taft. Colonel Ham has, without any change in the rates of duty, more than doubled the receipts -exactly the record made by our administration of the customs in Santo Domingo by the agent appointed under the Roosevelt Administration.

Moreover, the cost of collecting the import duties the chief source of Nicaraguan revenue has been as much as one-third of the amount annually collected! During the past two years, however, it has been reduced to

about one-twentieth of the amount collected. Such a fact is eloquent of what good government can do. Furthermore, the physical condition of some of the Nicaraguan industries has been startlingly changed. Deficiencies have given place to dividends.

The Nicaraguan Government has now obtained from Messrs. Brown Brothers & Co. and Messrs. J. & W. Seligman & Co., bankers of New York City, a loan at six per cent, the loan to be secured by a lien on the customs, subject only to existing liens.

Moreover, these bankers have bought fiftyone per cent of the stock of the National Bank of Nicaragua and a similar amount of the stock of the Pacific Railways of Nicaragua. The Bank has its head office at Managua, the capital, with branches at Bluefields, on the Atlantic, and Granada and Leon, important cities. The bank is the depository of the Government, and its issue department issues bank notes on the Government's behalf. Two members of its Board are nominated by the Nicaraguan Minister of Finance, and the American Secretary of State has the privilege of appointing one.

The currency system of Nicaragua has long been in chaos, but with the operation of the Bank of Nicaragua the currency has been put on a gold basis.

To maintain the gold standard an exchange fund is kept. To insure the permanent maintenance of this fund it is provided that whenever it is depleted below a certain point onefourth of the customs revenue is to be applied to it month by month until it is again replen- . ished. Each time this process becomes effective it will by so much permanently The plan of monetary strengthen the fund. reform was largely the work of the well-known expert Mr. Charles A. Conant, of New York. The proceeds arising from the sale of the bank and railway stock and the treasury bills issued by reason of the American loan have been applied to strengthening the currency fund.

Thus, with the credit facilities afforded by the National Bank, and the currency, which underlies credit, established on a firm basis, the most serious evils in the finances both of the Government and of the country have been remedied.

Should our Senate ratify the pending treaty with Nicaragua, the proposed payment of $3,000,000, as provided in that treaty, would put the Nicaraguan Government in a position where it could liquidate the greater part of

its local debts and claims and pay a steady and assured interest on its foreign debts.

As an indication of the opposition among some of the people of Salvador to any such treaty as that now proposed with Nicaragua, we may state that The Outlook has received what appears to be a circular letter from Federico Cenado "in behalf of the Salvadorian Committee of the National Central American Association." In this letter the writer asserts that the treaty is iniquitous, and that "the people of Nicaragua and of whole Central America are solidly opposed," and charges that the loans made by American banks are nothing more than the mere turning over to the Nicaraguan Government of the moneys previously collected in the Nicaraguan custom-houses, for which a rate of six per cent per annum is charged by the lenders of the loan."

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THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The subject of the foreign debts of LatinAmerican states has to do with the Monroe Doctrine. If we are going to maintain that Doctrine as we always have done and as we always shall do we must see that financial order is also maintained in the Latin-American states. We say in the Monroe Doctrine that European powers must not colonize or take land on the American continent. We cannot take this position unless we are prepared also to say to them that we will see that the rights of their citizens or subjects are protected in the countries affected by the Monroe Doctrine. In other words, we cannot sustain that Doctrine and play the part of the dog in the manger. We must maintain the independence and stability of government in the American republics.

Yet only recently, in contrast with the comment of other papers, the London "Standard" declared that the Monroe Doctrine was "" "device being elaborated into a by which foreign financial and commercial enterprise in Central and South American countries may be attacked, and that "this latest development of the American policy as announced does not harmonize with the principle of equality of commercial opportunity." This was in rejoinder to a speech the night before by our Ambassador to England, Mr. Page, who has said: "No sort of financial control can, with the consent of the United States, be obtained ever those weaker nations which would, in effect, control their government." There was in this no threat to English or

A CENTRAL AMERICAN PROTECTORATE?

Certain newspapers have jumped at the conclusion that our Government intends to force a protectorate on all Central American countries. This has been denied, first, by the Government itself. It declares that no treaties similar to the proposed Nicaraguan treaty are under consideration or have ever been suggested in connection with any other Central American country. The newspaper assumption has also been repudiated by the Ministers at Washington of those countries supposed to be next to Nicaragua in our proposed absorption "-namely, Honduras and Salvador. The Ministers deny that the State Department has ever placed this idea before them.

In President Wilson's Mobile address he took pains to say what every American echoes that we have no wish to gain an additional foot of territory. In trying to help our weak neighbors we have no thought of territorial gain. Material gain will, it is true, accrue both to them and to us if our help is efficient, but the gain to us is entirely incidental, and has nothing to do with territory.

Nor do we wish, without increasing any territory, to govern other peoples. We have enough problems of that sort on our hands now without getting any more.

There is a far higher and finer help to be given by us than any help connected with land covetousness or political ambition. That help, in the case of Nicaragua, has already been given. It is a strictly moral help. It is that of the big neighbor state, which would help the small neighbor state to secure for itself a strong government and hence justice, which would help the small neighbor state to secure for itself a democratic government and hence liberty.