Philosophy is to teach them to do their duty in life, it is for this that they need philosophy: they do not do their duty from a free necessity, but as subjects of a notion which science suggests. On every hand science is to serve them in planting their fields, in perfecting trade, or in rebuilding their dissipated powers. They call geometry a beautiful science, not indeed because it is the purest species of proof, the most objective expression of reason itself, but because it teaches how to survey fields and build houses, or makes possible the voyages of merchant ships; for since it is also of use in war, its value is diminished, because of course war is opposed to universal philanthropy. Philosophy is of no value for the first of these uses, and in the latter it can at most make war against shallow brains and the apostles of utility in science -hence it must be on the whole highly objectionable.

Those who do not comprehend the unity of knowing and action, bring forward such popular objections as this: that if knowing and action were one, then the latter would always follow from the former-whereas one can know the right very well without doing it. They are quite correct in saying that action does not result from knowing, and they thus declare that knowing is not a means to action. They are only wrong in expecting such a result. They do not understand the relations between absolutes, how each particular can be unconditioned in itself, and in placing one in the relation of means and the other in the relation of end to each other, make both dependent.

Knowing and action can never be in true harmony except through their equal absoluteness. As there can be no true knowing which is not mediately or immediately the expression of primordial knowing, so there can be no true action, no matter through how many interposing links, which does not express the primitive action, and in it the divine essence. That freedom which is looked for and believed to exist in empirical action, is as little freedom and as much an illusion as the truth in empirical knowing. There is no true freedom except in absolute necessity, and there is the same relation between freedom and necessity that there is between absolute knowing and absolute action.

C

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

In the present volume of the JOURNAL [1877] we hope in our "Notes" to give much information as to the actual condition of Philosophic Studies in America: what is done at the Universities, Colleges, and Theological Seminaries, and what is done in societies or clubs organized for furthering the study of Philosophy. We specially invite from Presidents or from the Philosophic faculties of such institutions, brief statements of the scope and contents of the Philosophical studies taken up in their respective departments. The Secretaries of the Philosophical Associations will do much to make our "Notes and Discussions" of interest if they will give historical information regarding their societies, and summaries of the discussions that transpire.

EDITOR.

What is Truth?

A correspondent in the January (1876) issue of J. S. P. discusses in an interesting manner, the problem, "What is Truth?"

The fact that the question mainly inspires the intellect of mankind in all ages, implies, at least as possible, a satisfactory, comprehensive solution thereof: for, it can hardly be supposed that universal intuitions of the human mind can be delusive and misleading. And yet the intellect is somewhat puzzled over the affirmation that it can grasp and amply know as to what is truth. For, assuming that such attainment of knowledge is possible, the thought arises that there thus comes a limit to human knowledge, and consequently a cessation of intellectual activity; which is a conception intolerably shocking.

Assuming, therefore, the right of the intellect to the fullest knowledge, as to what is truth, and also its equal right to unlimited activities according to its essential nature, how are we to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable paradox? How may we know "the truth as the whole truth and nothing but the truth," and yet not experience intellectual stagnation or death? By coming to a clear Science of Being as the sure science of existence-a knowledge of the underived as a ground of knowledge to all our quests of the derived-by which the intellect is not only fully empowered in the absolute truth, but is divinely inspired and actuated in all its activities. The problems and interests of life and experience are inexhaustible. The ceaseless revolutions of the good, true and beautiful, in the realm of

human experience, can never fail to duly motive the human affections and intellect. The only want is the recognition of a central, immutable Sun, by whose lumen all observations and explorations of the blessed providences may be assured as charming ministries to our experience. This want is duly provided for in the destined attainment of the human intellect to that comprehensive realm of science above indicated. Human vision and power, however enlarged, multiplied and led into new fields, must constantly behold and operate solely by this Central Sun; and this is THE TRUTH; knowable, and constantly sufficient for all intellectual needs when known. And which, being thus known, proves its amplitude and efficiency at the same time that it invests with exhaustless energy and power.

My position is, that the essential truths of BEING, which, known, make a science of the Absolute, are available to the intellect of man as an infallible lumen to all the facts of existence-existence being derived in, and dependent upon, Being. And I further hold that when thus made available as science-anchoring the intellect in eternal truth-instead of depleting and paralyzing the intellect, it impletes and enfranchises it, furnishing a sure clew to the solution of the problems perpetually opening to the mind, so enabling it to displace opinion or mere empiricism, with knowledge or positive science. The conception thus advanced may be illustrated by the truth of a special science, in the realm of rational cognition. Take, for instance, the science of mathematics. The immutable laws which rule this theme constitute the primary truth of mathematics. The intellect which fully fathoms those laws becomes thus master of the science-knows the essential truth of mathematics-and by such knowledge becomes, not stupefied or paralyzed, but empowered to master all problems that may arise, in whatever direction, though there will be found no limit to the fields opening before him to invite his lordly footsteps.

Thus the truth of the Absolute-of Being, of God, -that dimly impresses the human intellect, from the first, and prompts it ever to strive for its attainment as a comprehensive reality in practical experience, is no mere fiction, put forth to beguile the human soul and mock its struggles; but, on the contrary, is the dominant motor power of all history, and the crowning "Light of the World." As such, it is susceptible of formal scientific discrimination and use to determine the problems of life and destiny, as clearly as is the truth of any special science available in its sphere.

I thus affirm a theory of "the truth" which is in fullest accordance with the claims of all divine revelation; though, for the present, I attempt no scientific formulation competent to embody and verify what is involved in the conception. I affirm the practicability of a scientific Theology as a comprehensive answer to the question: What is Truth? And I further affirm that such attainment will verify every claim of the Christian Gospel, showing that this Gospel itself exemplifies the supreme lumen of such a science.

THERON GRAY.

Brahma's Cup.

I lift the cup of Brahma high !—
The cup and liquor both are his;
That flowing draught is perfect rest,
For Brahma's self the liquor is.

Let endless kalpas still revolve,

Who quaffs, no grief shall e'er befall;
For he shall dream the dream of God,
And never know he dreams at all.

My transmigrating days are o'er;
God's hand presents the sacred cup:
I eager grasp the chalice now,

And drink the Godhead's liquor up.

And while the sacred wine I quaff,
Two souls are mingled on the brim :
I drink of Brahma in the cup,

And he receives me into him.

FREDERIC R. MARVIN.

Philosophy at the Massachusetts School of Technology.

A school of Industrial Science-an institution founded and planned for the cultivation par excellence of the physical sciences-is hardly the place in which one would look for an elaborate course in pure philosophy. The emergencies of instruction at the school whose title heads this note, however, have brought into existence a department devoted to that subject, the scheme of study in which is probably as extended and minute as any other on the same topic in the country. Some account of the doings in this department will doubtless be interesting to the readers of the JOURNAL.

The department has now been in operation four years, and presented its first graduates last June. The course of study covers four years, the first of which, like that of all the other departments of the Institute, is devoted to studies of a general character, pursued by all students of the Institute together, as forming a necessary preparation for any department the individual student may select. The mass of time in this first year is spent upon French, Mathematics, General Chemistry, Rhetoric, and the rudiments of Formal Logic. In the remaining three years, in addition to side-studies in modern languages (namely German and French), Mathematics through the theoretical part of the Calculus, Physics, Chemistry, History, English

Literature, and the Science of Language, a minute course is taken in the history and criticism of the whole of Modern Philosophy, beginning with Descartes and ending with Hegel.

This course is directly upon the central works of the leading philosophers, and not merely about them. In the case of the students recently graduated, it has included the writings subjoined:

Descartes; the Method and the Meditations entire, and selections from the Principles of Philosophy.

Spinoza: the Ethics in outline, with such of his letters as bear upon the controverted points.

Leibnitz the Monadology, the New System of Nature, the Nature of the Soul, and the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit.

Locke; the most important part of the Essay, with Cousin's Critique of the same.

Berkeley: the Principles of Human Knowledge.

Hume: the first eight sections of the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Kant: the "Esthetic," "Analytic," and "Dialectic," from the Critique of Pure Reason; the two former with very minute criticism. Hegel about half of the Lesser Logic.

Besides this work upon the leading texts, the corresponding portion of "Schwegler's History," with Stirling's notes upon them, have been carefully studied, and compared with the parallel parts of Ueberweg. In this part of the work, especial attention was given to the developments of Cartesianism by Geulinex and Malebranche, the relations and contrasts between Malebranche's "Vision in God" and Berkeley's "Communication of Ideas," the reassertion of Cartesianism by the Scottish Philosophy, the significance of Fichte as the truth of Kant, and the contributions toward Hegel by Jacob Böhme, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Malebranche. The class have also read Hamilton's "Metaphysics," (Bowen's edition), Fraser's "Introduction to Berkeley," Krauth's "Prolegomena and Notes," and Ueberweg's "Notes on Berkeley's Principles," Mahaffy's rescript of "Kant's Esthetic and Analytic," Wallace's "Prologomena to Hegel's Logic," and the "Struggle to Hegel," in Stirling's "Secret." One member of the class has made, besides, an extended study of Fichte, including the Wissenschaftslehre and Rechtslehre (both in Kroeger's translations), the Bestimmung des Menschen (translated by Smith), the whole series of minor illustrative pieces translated in the JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, the Leben und Briefe by J. H. von Fichte, and the essay on Fichte's life and writings, by Dr. William Smith. Another has read the essay on Kant's Philosophy by Cousin (translated by Henderson), and, in the French original, the essay on Kant's system by Armand Saintes; and, later, has made a careful study of Stirling's Secret of Hegel," as part of the preparation for an essay of his own upon the "Derivation of Hegel's Logik from the Critique of Pure Reason." A third has produced a noticeable rescript of Kant's "Esthetic," in which some new points of criticism appear to be raised.