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Hence death announces itself to the senses as the negation of life. Now follows however also likewise from this negation the further negation which death has in itself; and this further negation, the negation of death, is the renewal of life, the new life, which now verifies itself as imperishable, for it arises from the absolute negation with which death is overcome. This is the negation which according to its own essence inflicts upon itself what it has in itself. The conception, and with the conception the reality of persistence depends upon this. The first ground in Plato's Phædo which Socrates renders prominent for proving immortality, in the course of his conversation shortly before his own death, also depends upon this. Everything originates from its contrary and from what it is not. From the negation of life proceeds the opposite of this negation. As death arises from life, so life again comes from death. Contraria fiunt e contrariis. Life affirms itself; death negates itself. Death moreover affirms life, since death negates itself. It transforms the nay of death into the yea of life.

This proof also draws support from language: we express it unconsciously. In the first place language itself cannot forbear ascribing to the past an essential being. Language also shows itself in this respect as the utterance of spirit, which thinks for us, and before we are conscious of it. From this circumstance are explained the many attempts to develop, in a methodical manner out of language, thought and the entire content of philosophy, or truth in the system of its particular elements.

The expressive emblem in the sphere of this proof is the Phœnix, which from its own ashes rises again. So we read especially in the Christian Platonic Dialogue which Æneas of Gaza wrote on the subject of immortality. The bird Phoenix is said to live five hundred years, and then dying and wholly decaying it returns to life.

Moreover the name of the proof is self-evident: it is in its essence the logical, more definitely the ontological, because it vindicates to the logical its reality. Likewise it is clear that it corresponds to the ontological proof for the existence of God, since from the necessary conception of persistence is deduced its reality, from the concept of negation, which is death, the negation of this negation is deduced, or from the contrary of persistence, the contrary of the contrary is deduced, from nothing to the nothing of death, to the nothing which is not, in unceasing progress.

It remains that we pursue further the conception of persistence, in order to learn how this third proof unites in itself the two preceding proofs, since these proofs become in it transparent toward each other. The persistence or the imperishableness, from the conception of which the third proof proceeds, is in respect to the soul, of which it is predicated, or to which it is transferred, to be apprehended as the persistence of self-consciousSelf-consciousness however was the foundation of the first proof, to which the conception of persistence as self-consciousness developed itself in its necessity. The necessity of persistence has its ground in the very essence of self-consciousness, which at first was apprehended as simple, and now has become adequate to the ideal.

ness.

The persistence of self-consciousness is in the next place further defined in relation to God as personal imperishableness. The conception of personal imperishableness accordingly has its deepest ground in the conception of absolute personality, which, as the consciousness of God indwelling in the soul was the foundation of the second proof for immortality, and through this the conception of a personal persistence gets its final substantiation, its irrefutable necessity. Hence the conception of personal imperishableness is necessary, since the conception of absolute personality is necessary. Man cannot fail of personal imperishableness, since he cannot free himself from absolute eternity, from God. In the sphere of the third proof, both these sides, which shape first both spheres of proof, are united and concentrated. The concrete conception of persistence mediates the double relation of the soul to itself and to God. Hence in the first place the ontological proof for the personal persistence of the soul comes forth in its deepest signification, as in its innermost relation to the theological sphere, particularly to the ontological proof for the existence of God. This last proof shows itself identical with the first. It vindicates the conception of an eternal essence, and in the next place in relation to the finite spirit, the idea of imperishableness, and the reality of personal imperishableness.

In proving the necessity of imperishableness, personal imperishableness for self-consciousness is also proved as necessary, for there is no other imperishableness for self-consciousness than the personal. The ontological proof, which belongs to the theological province, comes generally first through its relation to the

finite spirit, hence in the psychological sphere, to its complete content. The meaning is this: the finite spirit which thinks God, and ascribes to this thought of God in its essential content, the necessary reality belonging to it, finds itself by means of this thought in a thinking, i. e., a self-conscious relation to the eternal essence, whose reality is hereby warranted. The reality of this relation to the eternal essence of God consists moreover essentially in the imperishableness of the self-conscious knowledge of God, upon which the ontological proof for personal immortality, since it harmonizes both the foregoing proofs, rests in its last analysis. Personal immortality is to be verbally translated as self-conscious knowledge of God in the finite spirit. The onto logical proof, as its name would indicate, proceeds from thinking, to which it attributes being. Thought is: hence moreover its existence is thereby expressed. Its actuality consists, according to its essence, in the infinity reflected into itself. This is the first. The second is that thinking itself relates just as well to God.

Since in this his self-consciousness widens into God-consciousness, it presupposes the inner union with its object upon which the third proof rests. Thinking consists essentially in this inner union, through which it is purified as well as preserved. Hence Marsilius Ficinus says: "The human soul is immortal, because it cleaves to the divine." And Cardan confesses: "I have known the immortality of the human soul not now first but always, for I feel sometimes that the intellect is so possessed of God, that we see that we are again one with him." As often as we feel or perceive our innermost soul in its sensual relation to God and to itself, just so often do we feel or perceive also its imperishableness.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

Recent English Thought in Ethics.

In the recent (fourth) edition of his Hand-book of Moral Philosophy*, Dr. Henry Calderwood, Prof. Univ. Edinb., successor of Dugald Stewart and Dr. Thomas Brown, devotes a portion of a new appendix (pp. 271-274) to the question, "Can Conscience be Educated?" His original statement in the hand-book was, "Conscience is a faculty which, from its very nature, cannot be educated." As well propose to teach the eye how and what to see; and the ear how and what to hear; as to teach reason how to perceive the self-evident, and what truths are of this nature. All these have been provided for in the human constitution. Moral training is something different from education of conscience. Two things need here to be distinguished: (a) Personal experience in the application of conSince all knowledge begins in experience, though it does not all arise from experience, (v. Introd. to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason), the application of moral law becomes known in personal experience, according as the forms of activity admit of it. But application of law presupposes the knowledge of it, and knowledge of moral law is not gathered from experience. (Handb. Div. I., c. iii., Sec. 3, p. 31 seq). (b) Personal attainment in the practical subordination of other powers to the authority of conscience. This is of the very essence of moral training which is dependent upon the sovereign authority of conscience." (Div. I., c. iv., Sec. 6, pp. 81, 82).

These statements apply both to the instruction and training of conscience, i. e., they deny education to it in both the accepted significations of the word 'education.' Abundant adverse criticism on Dr. Calderwood's position has called out his new appendix. His points in defense are: (1) the supremacy of conscience forbids the possibil ity of its being educated; (2) the distinction between 'judgments on moral questions (ambiguous) and intuitive perceptions of moral law' allows of the education or training of something else than conscience, while denying education to conscience itself. This is essential to his theory of morals. That conscience intuitively recognizes moral law that it is supreme in its authority; and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions which hang or fall together." p. 272.

The first of these three last propositions carries with it the other two if they refer to precisely the same subject matter. But is it the recognition of moral law that is supreme in its authority' or moral law itself? Whatever may be meant by moral law, an intuitive recognition of it, or of anything else, has a certain supremacy; but it is a supremacy in thought, an intellectual one, such as the three accepted criteria of intuitions can impart,-necessity, originality, and universality. Certain ideas are certainly supreme in a sense over other ideas, as the federal government is over all inferior ones on the same domain.

"London: Macmillan & Co.

Dr. Calderwood in his chapter on moral judgments affirms that these 'are not distinguished by moral quality, as right or wrong, but by intellectual quality, as true or false, correct or incorrect;' he distinguishes a principle, a general truth, a self-evident, i. e., intuitive, element in moral judgments from the judgments themselves; he affirms that such general truths or intuitive principles are laws as well as truths, as they are of the nature of absolute truth, so are they absolute law, involving a categorical imperative,' to use the renowned expression of Kant; but he asserts that viewed simply as a form of knowledge, KNOWLEDGE of first principles is distinguished by intellectual quality, not by ethics!. (p. 39). Every thinker discriminates between a principle and the individual mind which forms a concept of it. A general principle of any kind has validity which does not belong to the products or faculties of an individual mind. If Dr. Calderwood uses the word conscience both for the intellectual power of recognizing moral law, and for moral law itself, then he means that the same supremacy attaches to the one as to the other, and that neither can moral law be educated (which is unintelligible) nor the power of recognizing it. He probably passes from conscience itself to moral law without noticing the transition of thought. He would hardly say that there is no such thing as being educated to the exercise of supremacy, and he would probably admit that conscience recognizes moral law, in some sense of it, as supreme, rather than itself.

Those who make conscience, or the moral faculty, a single faculty of mind, and also maintain its supremacy-as perhaps Bishop Butler did-leave the authority of conscience to the same doubts as surround the authority of any other single faculty, e. g., that of reasoning over imagination. But a moral law asserting its own authority is not so open to question. If it was agreed that conscience is complex, the question of its supremacy and the question of its education would change form at once. The problem would then be to find among the faculties whose complex action is entitled the Moral Faculty, one or more to which authority over others psychologically attaches, and also capacity of mistake and training or the contrary.

In making a distinction between 'judgments on moral questions and intuitive perceptions of moral law,' it is intended to designate by the former phrase, decisions on the moral character of individual actions. But the word 'questions' is ambiguous, being often used for classes of actions,-cases involving acts of the same sort. These decisions, or judgments, are ascribed to the reasoning power. They are 'conclusions,' i. e., deductive inferences, and the sumptions from which they are drawn are the 'intuitive perceptions,' so-called. For example, syllogistically-This act is truthful; truthfulness is right; ergo, this act is right. "Moral judgment," says Dr. Calderwood, "does not result from the comparison of individual objects (actions) but from the comparison of a particular act with a general truth." (p. 28). The author does not entertain the question whether these general truths may not be the result of generalization of particular truths, or judgments of particular acts, does not recognize, indeed,

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