therefore out of relation to consciousness, the essential weakness of the argument is at once apparent. What has been shown is that a thing from which all the properties are removed is not thought of as in relation to any other thing; but from the very nature of the argument it is implied that this indefinite "something" is an object of consciousness. But as an object of consciousness, it is in relation to the subject conscious of it. Its relations to the object with which it was at first correlated have been taken away, but not its relation to the self by which it is known. If then the Absolute is in relation to a conscious self, it cannot be identified with "Being in itself, out of relation," and therefore is no longer an Absolute but a Relative. The same conclusion of course follows if, without taking advantage of the admission that the elimination of all definiteness may still leave, as an object of consciousness, an indefinite something that is not anything in particular, we suppose that upon the removal of all relations to another object, there remains no object of consciousness whatever, but a pure blank, the negation of all consciousness. For upon this supposition, the Absolute is not brought within consciousness at all, but is to consciousness pure nothing, and therefore cannot be shown to exist. Thus again we come round to the dilemma: if the Absolute is an object of consciousness, it does not exist; if it does exist, it is not an object of consciousness.

It may perhaps be thought that the second part of the argument cited above affords a way of escape from this dilemma. The reasoning seems to be that it is not necessary to suppose that the Absolute itself is actually an object of consciousness; all that is required is a "dim mode of consciousness," which represents or is symbolical of the Absolute, and which thus gives assurance of the existence of the Absolute, while keeping it outside of consciousness. That this is the correct interpretation of the reasoning is confirmed by the remark immediately following the passage quoted: "Just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations to the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have simultaneously to symbolize the connection between this Ultimate Reality and its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connections among the phenomenal manifestations themselves."* Assuming, then, that the "dim mode of con#Essays, Vol. III., p. 295.

sciousness" has as its object an indefinite "something," which is not the "Ultimate Reality," but is merely representative of it; it is evident that this supposition creates more difficulties than it resolves. If the "something" in consciousness is representative of the unknown Reality, we must suppose that there is some kind of pre-established harmony between the something in consciousness and the something beyond consciousness. But there must be a consciousness of the representative or symbolical character of the something in consciousness, or there can be no consciousness of the something beyond consciousness. This however is but another way of saying that there is a relation between that which is and that which is not known, and hence the unknown something is not out of relation to consciousness, but is brought into relation with it, and is no longer an Absolute but a Relative. Otherwise stated, a mode of consciousness cannot be known to be representative of something else unless a comparison is made between that which is represented and that which is representative; but comparison implies relation; and therefore both terms of the relation must be in consciousness. The Absolute then to be given in a mode of consciousness representative of it, must itself be in consciousnesss; in which case it ceases to be Absolute. Or again, taking the other side of the dilemma, a mode of consciousness is representative of a Reality beyond consciousness, only if such a reality exists. But the existence of it is the very point in dispute, and must not be assumed. It is a manifest seesaw to argue that the unknown Reality exists because a certain mode of consciousness is known to be representative of it, when this mode can only be known to be representative if the unknown Reality exists.

Thus the Absolute, in the sense of that which is out of relation to thought, is banished to the limbo prepared for all bodiless figments of the abstracting understanding; and in the same shadowy realm the phenomenal Relative, the shadow of a shade, must likewise disappear. There being no "Being in itself, out of relation to thought," reality must be sought in Being for itself in relation to thought, and the relativity of knowledge comes to have no other meaning than the knowledge of relations. The Absolute as bound up with thought is coincident with our knowledge of it; it is hidden in no inaccessible sphere. It does not follow that at any given stage in human knowledge, the Absolute has exhaustively revealed itself: but it does follow that in the

highest stage of knowledge arrived at, it is most worthily apprehended. Mr. Spencer, however, blindly seeks it at the lowest stage of knowledge, and is unwilling to allow an open undisguised apprehension of it even in this form, under the misconception that if it is in relation to thought it is not the Absolute at all. The "dim consciousness" in which he seeks it is either the mere negation of all consciousness, or it is the very simplest form under which consciousness can exist. The Absolute as known is thus the blank form of real existence from which all definite attributes have been eliminated by a process of abstraction; it is the mere consciousness of an object that is no object in particular-a vague "something" that can only be defined as that which is not-nothing. Take any complex of relations by which real knowledge is constituted; remove one by one each of the relations making up this complex, until there remains only the abstraction of relation to consciousness, and you have the Spencerian Absolute. And this undoubtedly is the Absolute; but it is the Absolute in its simplest and poorest form. Moreover even in this its initial stage, it is not a Non-relative but a Relative. The nature of the Absolute is thus revealed: it is the synthesis of the correlatives subject and object; not the negation of the subject or the negation of the object, but the unity comprehending both. The Absolute in its simplest form may however, from a different point of view, be called the Relative. It is the real, the true; but it is only the real or true in one form, and a very poor form, and therefore as opposed to other and richer modes of its existence, it may be called the Relative. By the Relative is here to be understood the partial manifestation of the Absolute. And in this sense the Absolute is also the phenomenal; it is an incipient and transitory phase of the noumenal Absolute, the Absolute in its ideal completeness. But the relative or phenomenal Absolute is not incomprehensible, because it is not out of relation to thought; and hence the self-created difficulties that Mr. Spencer dwells upon with so much laborious complacency, are no longer difficulties that need puzzle any one. The relative or phenomenal is also the abstract: the Absolute in its elements or elementary forms. And of all abstractions that upon which Mr. Spencer has fixed is the most abstract; it is the beginning of knowledge, and therefore the Absolute in its simplest phase. This is at once apparent from the way in which it is obtained. The complex relations constituting real knowledge have to be one by one eliminated before it is reached; and as this is simply a way by

which the path of knowledge may be retraced step by step, the supposed goal of knowledge brings us back to its real starting point. When the abstraction "something" has been reached, no further step can be taken without abstraction from consciousness itself, and a descent into complete ignorance. Thus Mr. Spencer's Absolute, which is the feeblest effort of thought, is set up as its greatest triumph, and baptized by the name of the Great Reality. To comprehend the Absolute as thus conceived can only be diffi cult because it is so very easy; there is so little to know about it, that bringing richer categories from a higher phase of knowledge and attempting to force them upon this its lowest phase, we are prone to suppose that the inevitable contradictions that arise are evidence of our own mental imbecility, when in reality they are but an indirect proof of the inability of thought to comprehend the incomprehensible.

The result then of our enquiry is that by the doctrine of relativity, knowledge is so placed in conflict with itself that a struggle between the good and the evil principle inevitably ensues. If with Mr. Spencer we throw in our lot with immediate knowledge, we must be content to see all real knowledge overthrown, and scepticism in undisputed possession of the field. One after another, nature and mind, object and subject, body and soul, and lastly consciousness itself, go down in a vain contest with unsubstantial phantoms invulnerable to the most skillful strokes. But a new and better way has been opened up. Taking our stand upon the mediateness of consciousness itself, the various realms of existence may be reconstructed by an ever widening system of relations that do not destroy but substantiate reality. If Mr. Spencer would but discard the fiction of a knowledge that excludes relations of thought; and if, starting from the true nature of consciousness as a unity of differences, he would follow to its consequences that side of his philosophy which recognizes that knowledge is necessarily mediate: the self-contradictions which have been pointed out would disappear under the potent spell of a knowledge that is absolute in nature without being complete in extent, and real without being exhaustive. This would no doubt necessitate a complete remodelling of his system, but it would leave all that is valuable in it unimpaired. Others at least, who are not so deeply committed to a false theory of knowledge, may perhaps be warned to avoid or reject a method which converts the universe into a kingdom of shadows, and makes knowledge an unmeaning name.