THERE is a poetry in eloquence, which is not only rhythmical-having one sound proportioned to another but which possesses that characteristic of which Addison speaks in his Spectator when he says, that though in poetry it be necessary that the unities of time, place, and action should be explained, there is still something that gives a greatness of mind to the reader which few of the critics have considered.

The power of speaking with fluency and eloquence is the viva voce expression of him who thinks in mea-. sure. The poet writes. The orator speaks.

The Lady Anne of Bretagne, passing through the presence of France, says Peacham, and espying Chartier, a famous poet, fast asleep, kissing him, said, "We must honour the mouth whence so many golden poems have proceeded."

There is a painting in cloquence, which represents by delineation and colours, as living and as fresh as ever were presented on the canvass of a Rubens or a Wilkie. Colours, appearances, images, are all brought before you, either as faithful representatives of facts, or as artificial deckings, which cheat but to please you. "This is the very painting of your fear ; This is the air-drawn dagger, which you

said led you to Duncan."

There is a music in eloquence, which proceedeth from a man "who is moved with concord of sweet sounds." It is the "silver sound" of Spenser in his Fairy Queen. It is the chord of Milton, when" of old the sons of morning sang." It is the music of "Pope," which "never swelled too high, nor sunk too low; which fired warriors with animated sounds; and even poured into the lover's bleeding wounds the balm of consolation." It is harmonious, melodious, sweet sounding.

Thus, eloquence is a combination of poetry, painting, and music. But it is more than this.

There is a living sculpture in eloquence, for it is graceful action, since

Shakspeare has said that "action is eloquence," and the real orator presents in his person the thought embodied in the lines of Pope

"Then sculpture and her sister arts revive, Stones leap'd to form, and rocks began to live."

But eloquence is natural. It cannot be artificial. It is the poetry of the soul. It is the painting of the heart. It is the music of the mind. It is the result, not of study, but of endowment. It is the gift, not of man, but of God. "Pata nascitur non fit," is as true of him who speaks with eloquence as of him who rhymes with harmony.

But eloquence has yet higher qualifications. It is the voice of reason and of justice, as well as the harmony of music, the colouring of painting, the rhythm of poetry, and the living marble of grace and action. I cannot understand Seneca when he separates virtue from eloquence. • Elige eum cujus tibi placuit et vita et oratio." Rather, with Quintilian, I look on the truly eloquent man as the apologist for virtue, who excites the best feelings of our nature in compassion for the unfortunate and not for the vicious.

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Præcipua tamen ejus in commovenda miseratione virtus, ut quidam in hac eum parte omnibus ejusdem operis autoribus præferant."

For

Whatever is natural is just. the voice of nature is the voice of order; and order is heaven's first law. The voice of conscience is the voice of nature; and the efforts of genius, as of eloquence, when uncorrupted, are just and rational. If justice and truth, reason and conscience, be separated from eloquence, it is not eloquence, but declamation. It may please the

ear, captivate the imagination, and excite the fancy, but as it springs not from the heart, so it can never reach it.

Thus, true eloquence is upright, incorrupt, honest, accurate, virtuous rightful, regular, exactly proportioned, and administers to every man what is his due.

But its characteristics are not only natural, artial, and moral; they are

likewise intellectual. Not only does the heart speak to the heart, but the mind speaks to the mind. It is the exertion of intelligent power by means of speech. It may be in the form of conversation-for who was more eloquent than Coleridge?—or in the form of public orations and whose speeches can rival those of Berryer? In both cases, however, master minds, as well as noble hearts, were brought to bear upon their attentive and captivated listeners. True eloquence is inseparable from reason, or that power by which one man deduces one proposition from another, or proceeds from premises to consequences.

When Berryer defended the Abbé de la Mennais, in 1826, who was absurdly prosecuted for opinions which he then maintained, but has apparently since renounced, the question of the "divine right of kings" was discussed before the jury; and as the reason and the conscience of Berryer told him that this great maxim, this vast principle was the basis of liberty, of equality, and of right; and that an ungodly and perverse age had ignorantly and impiously confounded the word "absolutism" with "divine right," his reason and his conscience thus eloquently expressed the reasonings of the one and the convictions of the other:

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"A qui osera-t-on faire un crime de vénérer dans son cœur, et dans ses paroles, cette grande puissance spirituelle qui, toujours vigilante pour les rois et pour les peuples, leur fait sans cesse entendre ces nobles enseignements, fondements sacrés de tout ordre, de toute dignité, de toute liberté, dans les états. Peuple obeis à ton roi, il est l'image de Dieu sur la terre; roi, garde toi d'oublier dans les pompes de ta grandeur que le dernier de tes sujets est ton frère.

"L'absolutisme et le droit divin! étrange et criminel rapprochement des principes les plus opposés! Le droit divin! Mais c'est la liberté, c'est l'égalité entre les hommes, c'est l'éternelle loi qui les appelle à vivre en société, mais qui n'a point réglé les formes variables des sociétés politiques, dicté leurs constitutions, leurs lois intérieures ; qui n'a attribué à aucun homme une autorité propre et personnelle sur les semblables. Républiques ou monarchies; tous ces états, tant qu'a subsiste au fond des consciences, une au

torité plus grande que celle des lois mêmes, plus puissante que le pouvoir humain, ont pu mettre sous la garde de la religion les lois fondamentales, les lois sanctionnées par une longue expérience par les suffrages des sièQue le Dieu Terme fût placé aux

cles.

limites des champs, que la statue de la Concorde s'élevât sur les places publiques-qu'une cérémonie sainte ait consacré le prince appélé au trône par les lois antiques du pays, ces garanties sacrées des droits sociaux n'en étaient point le principe."

The reason, the conscience, the understanding, the heart-all here are speaking in the language of nature ;as musical as the morning note of that lark which swims in ether, or rises to the pearly gates of the sun ;-as poetical as the Elegy of Gray-as living a perfection of sculptured beauty as the production of Canova ;-and coloured with all the purity and chasteness of a Titian, and yet the force and energy of a Raphael.

There is still another word which must be added to conscience and reason-it is knowledge. The "blast Tartarian, which makes the house tremble, as its notes are spread," "Tartareus intendit vocem, qua protinus omnis contremuit domus,'

is by no means a necessary characteristic of eloquence. It may be an harangue-a set speech-an appeal to the passions and may even border on rhetoric-but a declaimer and an orator are not more widely separated than knowledge and ignorance-volubility and eloquence. When Garnier Pagès addresses the French deputies, he is not speaking to them, but to the crowd without. His specches suit the mob, and they toss high their caps and cry, "Vive Garnier Pagès!"- "But how can they be wise, whose talk is of bullocks?" When Guizot speaks to France, he speaks to the world-for the examinations of philosophy, the criticisms of the schools, and the investigations of political science, he courts and why? Because he knows that which he believes-and his knowledge is at his fingers' ends.

Thus, Berryer has a certain perception, an indubitable apprehension of truth; and, as this is the highest degree of the speculative faculties-he possesses it to an astonishing degree. Hence the vivacity of his replies to those who interrupt him. When, during the discussion in the session of 1834, of the address of the Chamber of Deputies to the King; in reply to the opening speech, M. Berryer pointed out (in one of his most admirable orations, which lasted two hours, and which, through the inspiration of the moment, captivated, and even exta

sied an assembly, in which he was the only one of his opinion) the disastrous effects of the doctrine, or dogma of "the sovereignty of the people"-the Keeper of the Seals, unable to resist the influence produced upon his reason, as well as the contending passions of his heart, exclaimed, Avec les conséquences que vous donnez à la souveranété du peuple tout gouvernment est impossible!'' And what said Berryer? Why, his knowledge-his certain perception-his indubitable apprehension was then to reply-and instantly he answered

"Et qui vous dit le contraire!" The reply was sublime. The victory was accomplished. Berryer had convinced the Carbonaro, and the Propagandist Minister of Justice, that if the dogma, or the doctrine of the sove reignty of the people, were carried out into operation, as ought to be the case, where the government was founded upon that principle, or dogma, that "no government could exist, that its existence would be impossible. The

triumph was achieved by the simple phrase, "Et qui vous dit le contraire!" From that moment, both the throne and its counsellors have abjured this doctrine, remembering the words of M. Guizot, in his work on the Government of France :

"Ainsi, fermement persuadé que la légi

timité des trônes est une institution excellente et que, pour être cette institution, le légitimité doit être ancienne, car autrement elle n'est pas-Je me demande par quelle malheur la révolution serait condamnée à méconnaitre et à repousser un tel bien;" and remembering the words of Count d'Argout, now governor of the bank of France, in his letter to the Mayors of the department of Gard, written in March 1817, "Sans la doctrine sacrée de la légitimité, il ne peut y avoir ni repos ni bonheur pour la France, et l'existence même de notre patrie est intimement liée à ce principe ;" and above all, remembering the words of Louis Philippe d'Orleans, now King of the French, in the solemn declaration made by the Princes of the House of Bourbon, when in 1803 Bonaparte proposed certain conditions to Louis XVIII. to induce him to renounce his rights to the crown of France: "Si l'injuste emploi d'une force parvenait (ce que à Dieu ne plaise), à placer de fait, et jamais de droit, sur le trône de France, tout autre que notre roi legitime, nous suivrons avec autant de confiance que de fidélité, la voix de l'honneur, qui nous prescrit d'en appeler

jusqu'à notre dernier soupir à Dieu, aux Français, et à notre épée."

ap

The knowledge of M. Berryer-his certain perception-his indubitable prehension, replying, in one phrase, to the minister of Justice-thus gave the last blow to that dogma which had for four years involved France in continuous insurrection. The doctrine of popular sovereignty has now been abandoned. Montesquieu is now preferred to Lafayette-and the language of the 221 Deputies of France, in March, 1830, has triumphed, not over the acts, but over the principles of the Deputies, who made a king in the succeeding month of July. For what says Montesquieu?" It is not for the reigning family that the order of succession is established, but because it is the interest of the state that there should be one reigning family. The law which regulates the succession of private families is a civil law, which has for its object the interest of private individuals. That which regulates the succession to the monarchy is a political law, which has for its object the welfare and the preservation of the state." And what was even the language of the 221 Deputies who voted that fatal address, which, whilst it acknowledged the "sacred principles of legitimacy," and even the "sacred rights of the Crown, as the surest guarantee for the liberties of the people," yet dictated to the reigning prince the choice which he ought, according to them, to make of his responsible ministers?

"C'est un objet digne de la sollicitude de votre majesté que de mettre un terme aux maux qui affligent le Portugal, sans porter atteinte au principe sacré de la legitimité, inviolable pour les rois, non moins que pour les peuples...... La raison de peuple, marie par l'expérience et par la liberté des discussions, lui dit que c'est surtout en matière d'autorité, que l'antiquité de la possession est le plus saint de tous les titres... Sa conviction s'accorde donc avec son devoir, pour lui presenter, les droits sacrés de votre couronne, comme la plus sûre garantie de ses libertés."

But there is a final characteristic, or ingredient, in true eloquence, to which I must briefly refer: and that is literary acquirements, or learned attainments, as in opposition to the gifts of nature. When the endowments of nature are enriched and enlarged by

acquirements, then the mind, as an intelligent power, and as an intellectual capacity, supplies the orator with those materials and facts which his knowledge appreciates, his conscience repels or adopts, and his imagination converts into poetry, painting, music, and sculpture. He is a finished orator. How beautiful an assemblage is this of virtue, wisdom, and talent of that which is artial, with that which is natural-and of judgment, rectitude, feeling, and taste! Such models are most rare. Yet, in my conscience, I believe that Berryer is one. His well stored mind-rich in classic lore, in the wisdom of ages, and in the progress of human attainments :-replete with facts not crude and undigested, a mass of unarranged and unselected, because unappreciated materials-but filled with moral and social facts, identified with the history of man, and with the ways of God-comprehensive as the subjects of his research, and as the widely expansive character of his benevolence and heart; not limited to one school or to one language, to one age, or to one system, but though orderly as the cells of wax in which the bee stores her honey; yet filled, as in the honey-comb, with the varied sweets of many an intellectual flower and shrub, blossom, and tree;-this mind of his, thus enriched,-these acquirements of his, thus arranged; this knowledge of his, perceiving and apprehending all;-this conscience of his, the fond and devoted, nay, the passionate love of truth and justice, are all brought to the aid of his fertile fancy, his playful wit, and of that poet's tongue," which, as imagination bodies forth the forms of things unknown, turns them to shape-and gives to airy nothings a local habitation and

a name.

I have thus introduced BERRYER to your notice; and I have done so in this manner, because Eloquence might be represented by his statue or his bust; and because it is well to distinguish between things which differ and which are yet oft confounded. It is well, as it appears to me at least, to separate what is styled "Eloquent" by the ignorant, the violent and the wanton, from the real eloquence which has a sacredness about it, and of which Isaiah spoke when, describing the confusion and misery created by sin and error, he said, "God taketh away in

VOL. XLII. NO. CCLXI.

consequence from Jerusalem and from Judah, the captain of fifty and the honourable man, the counsellor and the ELOQUENT ORATOR." In one word, it is well that stupidity and knowledge, learning and ignorance, dignity and passion, honest conviction and affected energy, as opposed to the meretricious display of a voluble declaimer, and the unprincipled energy of a mere political partisan; differing as they do in their characteristics and in their objects; in the source of their influence and in their design and end-should be kept perfectly distinct in the minds of men. Real eloquence is entitled to the homage, the love, the admiration, the gratitude, and I will add, to the convictions and consciences of men-for it is intellectual superiority, vast acquirements and industry, and even moral virtue! Its influence on individuals, or on masses, should excite no surprise. It is the triumph of mind over nature, of application over indolence, of knowledge over confusion, of all that is just and honest, or a prejudice and vice, of reason, of fancy, of imagination, of poetry, of painting, of the playful innocence of childhood, as well as of the strength of a giant; of conscience and of nature; and when he, who spoke as never man spoke, opened his lips of love, and said, "Let not your hearts be troubled-ye believe in God-believe also in me-peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you; not as the world giveth, give I unto you;"-who can wonder at the enthusiasm of Simon Peter, who, having a sword, drew it, and smote the high priest's servant, and cut off his right ear, when in a garden by the side of the brook Cedron, a band of officers and chief priests arrived to arrest his Lord? The result of true eloquence must be proportioned to its character, as effects must correspond with their causes. He who hushed the stormy wind and the tempest said, "Peace! be still,". but his voice was the voice of God.

BERRYER was born in the French metropolis on the 3d of January, 1790. He is the son of one of the most celebrated advocates of the Paris bar, and ever found in his father a guide, a counsellor, and a model. At the College of Juilly he received his education, and was prepared for the bar by the directions, skill, and constant assistance of his parent. His education

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