important measures, the principle of taking precautions against the preponderance of France, they vitiated to the same extent the whole European system. The real evil was overlooked; and in providing against an imaginary one, which no longer existed, they employed their resources to no purpose; and by thus misapplying them, deprived themselves of means, which might have been highly useful in a different quarter. France was not only stripped of her acquisitions, but subjected to heavy pecuniary contributions. A part of these was intended to defray the charges of the campaign; but a large part was destined to be laid out in erecting an expensive line of fortresses along the French frontier. Hundreds of millions have been wasted, and are now wasting, in heaping these mounds of defence against the memory up of Buonaparte and the revolution. The Duke of Wellington makes an annual visit to the continent; and applauds the activity with which the works are pushed, and the ability with which they are constructed. Meanwhile the troops of Russia, and the allies, that now blindly serve her purposes, are pouring at large over the whole south and west of Europe, under the most frivolous pretences, and without meeting a fort or a soldier to oppose them; and the dangerous monarch of France, against whom all these precautions are necessary, is trembling in his palace with the terror of a Russian invasion.

Besides despoiling France of all her late acquisitions, subjecting her to a heavy contribution, and erecting a double line of military works to bridle her ambition, it was thought expedient to add to all these measures the establishment of a new kingdom on her northern frontier, intended expressly, as we are told, for a check upon this unruly and grasping power. Political writers of some note have pronounced the kingdom of the Netherlands to be one of the happiest creations of the Congress. This is perhaps not very high praise; but such as it is, it can only be given under the influence of the same false feeling which dictated the measure. If, as I have supposed, the greatest possible strength of France, consistent with the rights of other states, instead of being dangerous to the balance of power, is its principal and most important element, then the formation of this kingdom purposely to weaken and embarrass France, was a measure essentially and radically vicious in principle. Had the plan, however, been as judicious as it was ill advised, the employment of such means to effect it, would have argued but a small share of political skill. To suppose that a dangerous and encroaching state can be bridled by surrounding it with feeble neighbours, is a conception which could only be formed by a very feeble statesman. Power must be checked by power, and not by weakness. It is just as reasonable in principle to suppose, that the preponderance of Russia will be neutralized by the republic

of Cracow, as that France can be held in guardianship by the kingdom of the Netherlands. If it had been really necessary to take precautions against the French power, it should have been done by bringing up some other state of equal or superior resources into contact with her frontier. Prussia, for example, should have been augmented by the kingdom of Hanover and the whole territory of the Netherlands, as well as the Duchy of the Rhine, so as to form an imposing mass of force upon the northern border of France, capable of bearing the brunt of an attack, and holding her in check, until a diversion could be made in a different quarter. The creation of the kingdom of the Netherlands was a measure as impotent and ineffectual for its professed objects, as these objects themselves were mistaken and injudicious.

In reality, however, it may well be doubted, as I have intimated in a preceding chapter, how far the creation of this kingdom was really intended to serve any important political purpose. Supposing the statesmen at Vienna to have mistaken the principles of European policy, it would be doing them injustice, as men of acknowledged ability, to attribute to them the intention of neutralizing France, by placing in contact with her a state of the second or third rank. The probability is, that the measure was adopted under the influence of Great Britain, and with the view of opening new channels for the products of her industry. From

the intimate political and family relations between the two governments, the market of the Netherlands is thrown open, almost without reserve, to British manufactures; and this additional demand from a wealthy population of more than five millions, is itself no slight advantage. From the peculiar position of the Netherlands, their existence as a separate state, under the patronage of Great Britain, also serves materially to facilitate the passage of British manufactures into the interior of the continent. The accomplishment of these objects seems to have been the real purpose for which the kingdom was created. It is also generally supposed to have been entirely a British conception; and to have been arranged at London before it was suggested at Vienna.

3. Having thus failed in regard to the two great points of general policy, and having assumed as a leading principle the necessity of weakening and embarrassing France, it was of course impossible for the Congress to keep in view the directly opposite principle which I have stated above as the third in importance. Accordingly, no trace can be found in any of the arrangements of a general intention to weaken the influence of Russia. It is one of the great advantages of this power for extending its influence, that it comes in contact with the west of Europe on a long line of frontier, broken up into a variety of separate states, which may be attacked in succession, and turned by influence

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against each other. Thus, Prussia may at any time be overrun in a single campaign, as it has been repeatedly by France and Russia. In the rear of this power is a cluster of small states, independent only in name, as regards their foreign relations; and whose governments wish nothing better than the opportunity of obtaining a little paltry aggrandizement by selling themselves to the highest bidder. Hence, whenever it may suit the purposes of Russia to extend her power in this direction, she can obtain allies without difficulty, in the heart of the enemy's country, to co-operate with her and assist her progress. Already indeed the preliminary arrangements for this purpose have been made, by family connexions with some of the considerable secondary powers, as Wurtemberg and Baden. To foresee and prevent this danger would have been a thing not unworthy the high vocation of the Congress. To do it effectually, the whole of Germany, including Prussia and Austria, should have been consolidated into one vast empire; a measure the more desirable, inasmuch as it would not only have contributed materially to the political security of the western nations, but was called for loudly and imperiously by the interest of the German people, which is now completely sacrificed to the hereditary pretensions of a few families. To these pretensions it was again sacrificed upon this occasion, and with it, the best arrangement which could have been made in this quarter for the security of Europe.