THE

UNIVERSALIST MISCELLANY.

VOL. III.

SEPTEMBER, 1845.

No. 3.

THE NATURE, CONSTITUTION, AND CLAIMS OF VIRTUE.

BY REV. W. M. FERNALD.

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IN regard to a subject so important as subject so important as "doing right, which is more important than all forms and faith, we cannot too closely scrutinize as to first principles. And there is one thing in this contemplation which we have long felt to be so important, and which is yet so unfrequently put, that we are moved to give it a particular consideration. We mean, the claims of virtue, as seen in the various foundations on which moral science is built. Men have frequently felt, when considering the diversity of opinion with regard to what constitutes the foundation of virtue, or what, primarily, it consists in, that there was, in fact, no sure and definite foundation on which all men could agree, and that virtue was a thing of no substance or stability, because men are so at variance with regard to its elementary principles. For instance, one advocate for morals would make virtue to have its origin or foundation in what is termed an innate moral sense, or conscience; another would make it rest upon the will of God; another, upon its utility, or its tendency to promote the general good; a fourth would make all actions virtuous that minister to self-interest, and contend that this is the true foundation of virtue; and a fifth would even argue that the sole foundation of virtue is the love of human praise. And among all these advocates for these different theories of virtue, be it remembered that each will cling to his own test,

to the rejection of all others. For it is that one thing, in their minds, and nothing else, which is sufficient to account for the existence of virtue, and on no other ground can it be upholden or justified at all. And it is, I say, from this singular fact in moral science, that many men of fearful disposition have been led to doubt the real substance and stability of virtue; or to query whether, after all, there was anything in moral actions which gave to them an absolute claim upon the observance of all men. They have so hesitated, and so wavered among the diversities of theories upon this subject, that they have at length come to be shaken almost out of the belief of any primary element into which all virtue could be resolved, and have been unwillingly constrained to view it as a thing of fancy, rather than as a thing of science, having its sure foundations settled in the eternal nature of things. And if not driven to a course of conduct resulting from mere policy, to which many have been, they have not felt that ease in their own minds,-that principle and that sturdy abiding to right doing for its right, which is necessary to their security in good.

In fact, ever "since the publication of the writings of Hobbes, in the 16th century, (says Combe,) there has been a constant series of disputes among philosophers on this subject. Hobbes taught that the laws which the civil magistrate enjoins are the ultimate standards of morality. Cudworth endeavored to show, that the origin of our notions of right and wrong is to be found in a particular faculty of mind which distinguishes truth from falsehood. Mandeville declares that the moral virtues are mere sacrifices of selfinterest, made for the sake of public approbation; and calls virtue the political offspring which flattery begot on pride. Dr. Clarke supposes virtue to consist in acting according to the fitness of things. Mr. Hume endeavored to prove that utility is the constituent or measure of virtue. Dr. Hutcheson maintains that it originates in the dictates of a moral sense. Dr. Paley does not admit such a faculty, but declares virtue to consist in doing to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness. Dr. Adam Smith endeavors to show that sympathy is the source of moral approbation. Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and Dr. Thomas Brown maintain the existence of a moral faculty. Sir James Mackintosh describes conscience to be confounded, and made up of associations. Dr. Ralph Wardlaw, of Glasgow, in a work on ethics, published in 1834, can see nothing in Conscience except Judgment."

Among all this conflict of opinion, I say, with reference to what virtue primarily consists in, or upon what it is founded, there has been, and may yet be, among the simple, a fear lest virtue be in fact anything but a fancy or a policy, to be taken on, or thrown off, or altered, according as circumstances warrant. And it becomes, I say, indispensably necessary that we should understand in what true virtue does consist, that we may be strengthened and encouraged to its performance. But before we advert to this part of our subject, it is well to consider how strongly the claims of virtue are presented to our practice and regard, from the very diversity of foundations upon which moral science has been built. This is a very important, and yet unfrequent consideration connected with this subject. And as we cannot convey our ideas better than by the nicely discriminative and conclusive argument of Dr. Chalmers, we therefore make no apology for quoting him at length.

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'When, then, the conflict of its opposing theories would seem to bring fearful insecurity on moral science, let it not be forgotten, that the very multitude of props and securities by which virtue is upholden, is that which has given rise to the controversy. There is little or no skepticism in regard to the worth or substantive being of morality, but chiefly in regard to its sustaining principle; and it is because of so much to sustain it, or of the many distinct and firm props which it rests upon, that there has been such an amount of ethical controversy in the world. There has been many a combat, and many a combatant,-not because of the baselessness of morality, but because it rests on a basis of so many goodly pillars, and because of such a varied convenience and beauty in the elevation of the noble fabric. The reason of so much controversy is, that each puny controversialist, wedded to his own exclusive view of an edifice too mighty and majestic for his grasp, has either selected but one of the upholding props, and affirmed it to be the only support of the architecture; or attended to but one of its graces and utilities, and affirmed it to be the alone purpose of the magnificent building. The argument of each, whether on the foundation of virtue or on its nature, when beheld aright, will be found a distinct trophy to its worth,—for each can plead some undoubted excellence or good effect of virtue in behalf of his own theory. Each may have so magnified the property which himself had selected,-as that those properties of virtue which others had selected, were thrown into the shade, or, at most, admitted but as humble attendants in the retinue of his own great principle. And so the controversy is not whether morality be a solidly constituted fabric; but what that is which constitutes the solidity, and which should be singled out as the keystone of the fabric. Each of the champions in this warfare has fastened on a different keystone; and each pushes the triumph against his adversary by a demonstration of its firmness. Or, in other words, virtue is compassed about with such a number of securities, and possesses such a superabundance of strength, as to have given room for the question which was raised about Sampson of old,-what that is wherein its great strength lies. It is like the

controversy which sometimes arises about a building of perfect symmetry, when sides are taken, and counter-explanations are advanced and argued, about the one characteristic or constituting charm, which hath conferred upon it so much gracefulness. It is even so of morality. Each partizan hath advocated his own system; and each, in doing so, hath more fully exhibited some distinct property or perfection of moral rectitude. Morality is not neutralized by this conflict of testimonies; but rises in statelier pride, and with augmented security, from the foam and the turbulence which play around its base. To her this conflict yields not a balance, but a summation of testimonies; and instead of an impaired, it is a cumulative argument, that may be reared out of the manifold controversies to which she has given rise. For when it is asserted by one party in the strife, that the foundation of all morality is the right of God to the obedience of his creatures,-let God's right be fully conceded to them. And when others reply, that, apart from such right, there is a native and essential rightness in morality, let this be conceded also. There is indeed such a rightness, which, anterior to law, hath had everlasting residence in the character of the Godhead; and which prompted him to a law, all whose enactments bear the impress of purest morality. And when the advocates of the selfish system affirm, that the good of self is the sole aim and principle of virtue; while we refuse their theory, let us at least admit the fact to which all its plausibility is owing,-that nought conduces more surely to happiness, than the strict observation of all the recognized moralities of human conduct. And when a fourth party affirms that nought but the useful is virtuous; and in support of their theory, can state the unvarying tendencies of virtue in the world towards the highest good of the human family,-let it forthwith be granted, that the same God who blends in his own person both the rightness of morality and the right of law, that he hath so devised the economy of things and so directs its processes, as to make peace and prosperity follow in the train of righteousness. And when the position that virtue is its own reward is thrown as another dogma into the whirlpool of debate, let it be fondly allowed, that the God who delights in moral excellence himself, hath made it the direct minister of enjoyment to him, who, formed after his own image, delights in it also. And when others, expatiating on the beauty of virtue, would almost rank it among the objects of taste, rather than of principle,-let this be followed up by the kindred testimony, that, in all its exhibitions, there is indeed a supreme gracefulness; and that God, rich and varied in all the attestations which he has given of his regard to it, hath so endowed his creatures, that, in moral worth, they have the beatitudes of taste as well as the beatitudes of conscience. And should there be philosophers who say of morality that it is wholly founded upon the emotions,-let it at least be granted, that he whose hand did frame our internal mechanism, has attuned it in the most correct and delicate respondency, with all the moralities of which human nature is capable. And should there be other philosophers who affirm that morality hath a real and substantive existence in the nature of things, so as to make it as much an object of judgment distinct from him who judges, as are the eternal and immutable truths of geometry, let it with gratitude be acknowledged, that the mind is so constituted as to have the same firm hold of the moral which it has of the mathematical relations; and if this prove nothing else, it at least proves, that the Author of our constitution hath stamped there, a clear and legible impress on the side of virtue. We should not exclude from

this argument even the degrading systems of Hobbes and Mandeville; the former representing virtue as the creation of human policy, and the latter representing its sole principle to be the love of human praise,for even they tell thus much; the one, that virtue is linked with the well-being of community; the other, that it has an echo in every bosom. We would not dissever all these testimonies; but bind them together into the sum and strength of a cumulative argument. The controversialists have lost themselves, but it is in a wilderness of sweets, out of which the materials might be gathered, of such an incense at the shrine of morality as should be altogether overpowering, Each party hath selected but one of its claims; and in the anxiety to exalt it, would shed a comparative obscurity over all the rest. This is the contest between them, not whether morality be destitute of claims; but what, out of the number that she possesses, is the great and pre-eminent claim on which man should do her homage. This controversy perhaps never may be settled; but to make the cause of virtue suffer on this account would be to make it suffer from the very force and abundance of its recommendations."

This reasoning of the Dr. is certainly cogent, and characteristic of his acuteness. We see, then, something of the strong claims of virtue from the very diversity of theory which has existed with reference to its elementary principles. Whatever doubt, then, may exist in our minds concerning the root or constituent of virtue, what an overwhelming argument have we for its observance ! What can be said of sin, of its advantages and claims, anything like the force and variety which accompany this argument for virtue ? And it is an undesigned argument which is here offered,—not the result of any one theorist, who has undertaken to display and demonstrate all the charms and securities of morality, but of the whole host of speculators who have each been striving to lay its foundation, and whose combined testimonies thus present us with a building so strong, so well fortified, and withal, so beauteous, that, whatever doubt may yet rest upon the nature or origin of virtue, we feel the weight of an overpowering authority upon us for its observance and faithful practice by the men of all generations.

Now, to exhibit in brief our own sentiments with regard to the elementary constituents of virtue, we would say, that, if we examine the various opinions which have been given, we shall find them reducible to these three. First, that all actions are virtuous which conduce to the well-being of moral and intelligent creatures. Second, that all actions are virtuous which are approbated by an innate moral sense or faculty, whose office it is to decide between right and wrong. Third, that all actions are virtuous which are in 10

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