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activity actual admit appears assert attribute belief Berkeley body brain causation cause certainly character cognition color conception connection consciousness consider contend continued correspondence deny dependent distinct division doctrine edge effects elements entirely existence experience extension external objects fact feeling further give ground hold human Hume ideal idealists ideas identity immediate knowledge important impossible impressions independent inference intellect internal jects known Locke Locke's maintained material material objects matter means mediate memory mental mind modes motions namely nature necessary never observed organism original particular passing past perceive perceptions permanent physical positive possess possibility present primary principle processes produced Professor James properties psychology pure qualities question reality reason regarded relation remarked representations representative resemblance respecting says seems sensations sense separately sion sort soul space spirits stream substance succession supposed theory things thinking thought tion true truth unity wholly
Strana 122 - When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it.
Strana 137 - I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.
Strana 142 - But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole...
Strana 115 - There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses.
Strana 127 - They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not — which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter.
Strana 117 - I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves ; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all.
Strana 124 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance.
Strana 122 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Strana 14 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.