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the "window" theory of perception-Projection of sensations
and percepts-The immediate materials of both mental science
and physical science are the same-Mental science and phys-
ical science distinguished-The two worlds, the internal and
the external, and their correspondence Does the knowledge
of self require the knowledge of other selves?-Does the knowl-
edge of physical objects require the knowledge of other per-
sons? The view that "what science finds in Nature is the
mind's own latent wealth"-Dualistic realism since Locke.



Nature of Matter-Reality and nature of atoms-Perception
of matter to be treated with special reference to the Berkeleian
immaterialism-Relation of Berkeley to Locke-Berkeley's rea-
soning against the knowableness and the reality of external
matter-His doctrine of the relation of spatial extension to
the so called Secondary Qualities, as color-His doctrine of
causation within mind-In his teachings respecting subjective
extension and subjective causation, Berkeley states and ad-
vocates principles which constitute a substantial basis for
a true representative knowledge of matter; and which, there-
fore, turn about, so to speak, and serve as means of his
own refutation—Berkeley's place in the historical development
of the science of external perception.





Truth objective and subjective; or truth as fact or reality,
and as correspondence of thought to reality-In this essay
truth is taken as entirely subjective-The correspondence of
thought to its object or to reality-Four sorts of truth or
correspondence of thought: (1) Correspondence to the sub-
stantial mind; (2) to other thought; (3) to past events; (4)
to external objects-Truth and knowledge compared-Antago-
nism of idealists to truth defined as correspondence of thought
to objects external to mind-The same as Berkeley's main
opposition to the doctrine of the representative cognition of
external matter-Possibility of correspondence, and known
correspondence, of thought to external things-Truth a mat-
ter of progression-1. How far do we make truth?—The
"cognitive making" of reality-Reality as determined by our
wishes-The making of truth by our thinking and wishing-


The intellect as conditioned in the making of truth by the
original and indispensable materials and forms given to it-
Nature of the sense-materials supplied to the intellect-De-
pendence of intellect also upon the action of external objects.—
2. Stability of truth-It results from the constancy of the in-
ternal and the external conditions of knowledge-3. Utility as
the criterion of truth-The real as the useful-All things use-
ful to us because of the systematic unity and uniformity of
nature-Neither reality nor truth, though inseparable from
utility, is identical with it; they are more, they have a
primacy-The conception of God considered as beneficial and as
a "working hypothesis"-The truth of our knowledge of God.





"To write a chapter for the purpose of showing that nothing is known, or can be known, of the subject which the title of the chapter indicates, will be thought strange." These are the words with which Mr. H. Spencer opens the chapter in his Psychology on the "Substance of Mind." The present discussion has its occasion in the conviction that the human mind is a permanent entity or substance, which can be and is known; and the primary purpose of the discussion is to expound and defend that conception. This statement is made for the convenience of the reader, that at the very beginning he may know clearly and certainly the point of view and aim of the essay; and it is hoped he will not be repelled by the frank avowal.

But this purpose, it must be admitted, goes against what seems to be the main psychological tendency of the time. It is the contention of many that "the explanation of psychic life demands the complete elimination of the concept of substance"; and that the concept prevails only among "unreflective minds." Some of the most zealous opponents deride mental substance as an "accursed idol."

1 Psychology, I, p. 145.


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