of the true philosophy of external perception. He suggests, still in entire self-contravention, the principles and mode for the construction of a complete and genuine theory of the empirical cognition of the material world; a theory which should be superior to and should supersede the speculations of the idealists regarding the reality and perceivability of external matter, and also the hypotheses of the apriorists.

CHAPTER IV

TRUTH

Among the philosophical subjects most earnestly considered at the present day is that of the Nature of Truth. There are two common conceptions or definitions of Truth. First, Truth is often made identical with fact, reality, actuality. Secondly, it is often defined as "agreement of idea with reality" or "correspondence of thought to its object." 1 But it should be remarked that while many unite in these latter definitions and others of like import, yet this does not imply unity among them of doctrine; for, with concurrence in definitions, there are very notable divergences in meanings respecting both the character of reality and object and the character of agreement or correspondence. In the present discussion, truth will be taken in the second sense, as correspondence or agreement of thought, idea, belief, with its object or with reality. The special understanding had of reality and of correspondence will be exhibited hereafter. Truth is thus supposed to be an entirely subjective or mental attribute a property of our thought.

Note may be made of four sorts of truth or correspondence of thought, answering to four kinds of ex

1 This difference of connotation has been thus stated: "Truth may be understood in two ways-in an objective and in a subjective sense. Objectively, truth is being itself: it is the necessary and essential relation of things, which would continue to be what it is even if I were not present to form a thought of it. Subjectively, truth is the conformity of the thought to its object." (Janet, Theory of Moral Science, p. 107.)

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istences: first, correspondence of thought to the permanent substantial mind to which it belongs or of which it is a transitory experience; second, correspondence of thought to other thought; third, correspondence of thought to past events (yet this might be regarded as involved in the second); fourth, correspondence of thought to external or extra-mental reality.

The first mode of correspondence here mentioned, that of thought to mind, is of course no fact, if there be no substantial mind, no permanent mental reality (and there are enough to say there is none). Very naturally it has no recognition at all from those psychologists who hold that the only mind is the pure stream of thoughts. But it has received no attention, or very little, from those who believe in the existence of real mind. Kant supported real mind or mental noumenon in coexistence with mental phenomena, though as unknowable; but instead of maintaining agreement of phenomenon or thought with noumenon, he rather maintained total disagreement. This is one of the gravest errors of the Kantian psychology. One instance of the presumed disagreement respects time. The time of phenomena or thoughts has no agreement with an attribute or with the nature of noumenon; for, as supposed, the latter in itself is timeless. Contrary to this view, as we have argued in a different connection, the fact is not disagreement or opposition, but agreement. The time of phenomena or experiences is an expression or revelation of the time of real mind. We remark incidentally, that it would be interesting to be told what correspondence there might be, if any, in a mode of consciousness to the hypothetical antecedent non-substantial "permanent possibility.”

The only mode of truth, or correspondence of

thought, recognized by many idealistic psychologists, is the second in our list, correspondence of thought to other thought. The only reality they acknowledge is psychical fact, pure mental or subjective experience; they admit no reality outside of mind or independent of sensation or thought; and, therefore, when they define truth as correspondence of thought to its object, or agreement of idea with reality, they mean agreement of idea with idea, or of thought with thought, or of a thought with the context or system of our thoughts; they mean the congruence of a portion of experience with another portion or with the antecedent sum of experience. All is purely subjective; all is between mental fact and mental fact.1 A feature not creditable to many of their discussions, one always more or less confusing and disconcerting to readers, is the employment of dualistic phraseology instead of the unitarian phraseology that is proper to them and obligatory.

In the present discussion, the mode of truth, or correspondence of thought, which shall be the main concern, which shall receive chief attention, will be the fourth specified, namely, correspondence of thought to

1 "Truth means, according to humanism, the relation of less fixed parts of experience (predicates) to other relatively more fixed parts (subjects); and we are not required to seek it in a relation of experience as such to anything beyond itself." (James, Meaning of Truth, p. 70.)

"If a novel experience, conceptual or sensible, contradict too emphatically our pre-existent system of beliefs, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it is treated as false. Only when the older and the newer experiences are congruous enough to mutually apperceive and modify each other, does what we treat as an advance in truth result. In no case, however, need truth consist in a relation between our experiences and something archetypal or trans-experiential." (Ib., p. 134.)

"Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience." (James, Pragmatism, p. 58.)

Other descriptions of similar import have been given of truth; as that truth is "consistency," "systematic coherence," "unity."

external reality. We accept the definition that truth is the correspondence of thought to its object, with the understanding here that object is an object-object, that is, an object outside and independent of mind and consciousness. This manner of procedure will be in accord with the more popular and general conception of truth. In the various definitions of truth as the correspondence, or agreement, or harmony, or conformity, of thought or idea with reality, the conformity of inside idea with outside object has been with most men more usually in mind. It should yet be remarked in particular of the assumed correspondence of thought to material objects, that thought is supposed to be especially representative of their spatial extension, or shape and magnitude, and their motions.

But it must be observed that truth regarded as correspondence of thought to external object can hardly be treated by itself alone, or without its bringing into consideration at times especially the correspondence of thought to thought. This ensues from the fact that our knowledge of external things is entirely mediate. We know them not immediately, but only mediately through the modes, the ideas, of the mind. Hence, all comparison of things as known at the present with the same things as known in the past, and all comparison of external things with one another, inevitably involves cognizance of the correspondence of thought to thought. Further, it is obtrusive that harmony of outside related objects produces harmony of inside representations. There is manifest "adjustment of internal relations to external." And an idea may have at once the two known correspondences,-(1) to an external object and (2) to another idea.

Here an important question arises and calls for mo