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ditions of memory-of the elements and motion-paths of the brain. But this seems to be a fundamental error. It is opposed to the priority and greater nearness and certainty of the knowledge of the mind over the knowledge of everything else.

Our knowledge of mind may be compared with our ordinary knowledge of a material object—as this rubber ball; but, as preliminary to the comparison, a question of the first consequence to be considered is, What do we really know of such an object? We certainly know the magnitude and shape of the ball. We certainly know its permanence and sameness. But we have very little knowledge indeed of its ultimate elements and innermost structure. If the ball were divided to its last particles, we know not what these particles would be found in essence to be, whether ethereal, or electrical, or of some other sort. Something like this is true also of our knowledge of mind. We know the succession, permanent identity, power, unity and ownership, of the mind,-very much more than could ever be known of the mind of the pure succession of thoughts, the streammind, or than the stream-mind could ever know of itself, and very much more than mere abstract activity,-but we cognize not the lowest depths of mind, its final essence, its innermost formation. But this ignorance no more proves that we do not know the permanent identity and power of the mind, than ignorance of the final elements of a material object proves that we do not know the object's permanence and extension.

We remark in general, and in conclusion, that the knowledge the mind has of itself is its supreme knowledge; supreme in the sense of being its most direct and certain knowledge, and the ground and the means of the

knowledge of all other reality. The only immediate knowledge the mind has is its knowledge of itself. It certainly has much other knowledge; it knows many things which are not present in time and space; it has knowledge of objects that are greater than itself,objects of longer duration, larger extension, and of superiority in every attribute;-but only by a mode of cognition less direct and less certain. The mind has immediate and most certain knowledge of itself because the thing known and the knowing are in the closest possible relationship; the thing known is in the knowing; the knowing is in the thing known. But such knowledge the mind has solely of itself; all other things are known only mediately, by inference and representation. No other thing whatever has so close relation to the knowing act or state as the mind itself; everything except the mind is severed from the cognition of itself by an ontological breach, or by separation in time and space. The division, which is of the highest significance, of immediate and mediate knowledge, corresponds to and indicates a division of reality—a division between soul and body, or between soul and every other object animate and inanimate. It may be remarked further explicitly, that the mind always, if not necessarily, knows itself in comparison and contrast with other realities, especially other finite realities. But the comparison in every instance is based upon, or made possible by, the combination of two modes of knowledge-the immediate knowledge of self, and the mediate or inferential knowledge of the not-self.

The means of our knowledge of outer realities, it should be expressly noted, are not media distinct from the mind, are not third things coming in between the mind and the outer objects, but the pure conscious

modes of the mind itself. These modes are the grounds for inference; they are the means of representation and depicture. Therefore the mind has, in the same cognitive modes, both an immediate knowledge of itself and a mediate knowledge of other things; just as, but in a different manner, it has, in the same present mode, a knowledge of both the present and the past. Our mediate or inferential knowledge, which constitutes the great bulk of our knowledge, thus stands upon the narrow foundation of our immediate knowledge of mind. This foundation is indeed narrow; but it is yet altogether firm, safe and sufficient, because it is a direct knowledge and therefore also certain, and because, though contracted, it is still in itself rich.



One of the most common and important topics in psychology is that of the correlation in existence and knowledge of Subject and Object. Subject is usually defined as the thinker, the knower; and Object, as the thing thought of, the thing known. But, unfortunately, many discussions of this great topic are notable for indefiniteness and vagueness. This is true especially of the discussions of idealists. There is frequent failure to describe clearly the characters of Subject and Object; to show what either is as distinguished from the other, and the real nature of their relation to one another.

In treating of subject and object it is of the first moment to consider that there are two primary kinds of objects, and that these kinds are very different. The one kind is of objects that are internal, within the mind or consciousness, mental objects, very properly called subject-objects. The other is of objects outside the mind and independent of it, quite fitly called objectobjects. In their treatment of the objects of thought, idealists altogether neglect and ignore object-objects. This is consistent for them; since their greatest denial is, that objects external to and independent of the mind or consciousness do not exist.

Many distinguish subject and object in this wise: object is the aggregate of the vivid states of consciousness; and subject the aggregate of the faint states. The difference between the vivid and the faint states


of consciousness, between presentations and representations, is manifest and permanent; but while the two sorts of states generally differ clearly in vivacity, they are yet, at the same time, alike in being entirely subjective, pure subject-objects, pure states of the one real subject. A percept in itself is no more objective, and no less subjective, than a memory or any faint state of consciousness. To divide them as if they were not both alike wholly subjective, and as if the one was objective as the other was not, is a great error in discrimination, and a grave misuse of language.

Subject and object are distinguished by many others as coördinates resulting from the differentiation of a unit-of one idea or thought or experience. Object is, by a mode of negativity, set over in opposition to subject. But the antithesis is yet really only appearance. Subject and object are both in fact absolutely subjective. There is but an apparent division of what is always really one and indivisible; or an apparent objectivization of what is never else than subjective.1

1 Here follow from several authors illustrative passages; which will serve also for reflection hereafter:

"That though, within certain limits, we oppose the subject to the object, the consciousness to that of which it is conscious, yet that from a higher point of view this antagonism is within consciousness," etc. "The self exists as one self only as it opposes itself, as object, to itself, as subject, and immediately denies and transcends that opposition." (Caird, Hegel, p. 123 and p. 169.)

"Since subject and object only exist in the unity of experience, the one is not determined by the other, but with the other." (Baillie, Idealistic Construction of Experience, p. 198.)

"All is indeed one life, one being, one thought, which only exists as it opposes itself within itself, sets itself apart from itself. . . and yet retains and carries out the power of reuniting itself." (Wallace, Logic of Hegel, 2nd ed., p. 165.)

"The reality of everything lies in its pointing beyond itself to something else; in other words, the real is always something which is itself and not itself in one, a unity in difference, or differentiated unity." (Nettleship for T. H. Green, Memoir, p. 110.)

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