Subject and ObjectJohnston and Penny, 1915 - 184 strán (strany) |
Vyhľadávanie v obsahu knihy
Výsledky 1 - 5 z 28.
Strana 3
... denies that it is an unconscious state or action of mind . " It is not a mental state , but a capability of being put into a mental state . When I am not thinking of a thing it is not present to ` mind at all . " ( Exam . Hamilton , II ...
... denies that it is an unconscious state or action of mind . " It is not a mental state , but a capability of being put into a mental state . When I am not thinking of a thing it is not present to ` mind at all . " ( Exam . Hamilton , II ...
Strana 10
... denial of a real connection necessitates the denial of a perceivable relation . Yet , as Hume constantly and confidently affirms the actual cognition of these relations , it be- comes interesting and important to consider how he ...
... denial of a real connection necessitates the denial of a perceivable relation . Yet , as Hume constantly and confidently affirms the actual cognition of these relations , it be- comes interesting and important to consider how he ...
Strana 13
... denied , will at times force itself forward into recognition , compel respect , and accuse and retaliate its unjust exclusion . There was more in Hume's experience of mind than was embraced in his theory ; and his full experience there ...
... denied , will at times force itself forward into recognition , compel respect , and accuse and retaliate its unjust exclusion . There was more in Hume's experience of mind than was embraced in his theory ; and his full experience there ...
Strana 15
... denying it . The something more is in this " I , " this " self , " this permanent , identical , unitary , remembering being , which , as he says , always " stumbles , " etc. , never " ob- serves , " etc .; and must therefore be ...
... denying it . The something more is in this " I , " this " self , " this permanent , identical , unitary , remembering being , which , as he says , always " stumbles , " etc. , never " ob- serves , " etc .; and must therefore be ...
Strana 21
... denying the cogniza- bility and reality of a permanent mental subject or substratum , or in denying at least that such a subject has any scientific value in psychology . But there is an important difference between Hume's conception of ...
... denying the cogniza- bility and reality of a permanent mental subject or substratum , or in denying at least that such a subject has any scientific value in psychology . But there is an important difference between Hume's conception of ...
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Časté výrazy a frázy
activity Agnosticism assert belief Berkeleian Berkeley Berkeley's body causation cause ception certainly cession cognition color conscious modes consciousness contend distinct doctrine edge entirely experience external objects external realities external things external world extra mind F. H. Bradley fact Hume Hume's ideal idealists ideas iden immediate knowledge immediately known independent inference inferential infinitely divisible intellect jects knowl knowledge of external Locke manence material objects matter mediate knowledge memory mind's motions nature ness never passing thought past perceive perishing thoughts permanent and identical permanent possibility personal identity Philonous physical possess present thought primary qualities principle processes produced Professor James psychology pure succession real external relation remarked representations resemblance says sciousness secondary qualities sensations sense sion soul space spatial spirits stream of consciousness stream of thoughts stream-mind subject and object subject-objects substance substratum succession of thoughts supposed termining Reality ternal theory of mind tion true truth unextended unity wholly
Populárne pasáže
Strana 122 - When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it.
Strana 137 - I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.
Strana 142 - But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole...
Strana 115 - There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses.
Strana 127 - They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not — which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter.
Strana 117 - I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves ; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all.
Strana 124 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance.
Strana 122 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Strana 14 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Strana 127 - For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind.