upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner in which we are affected by them for a continuance. It It supposes a more deliberate predilection and aversion, in consequence of the continued influence of some prevailing quality. This distinguishes it from the transient impulse of Passion. Nor is it intimately connected with any external signs; which distinguishes it from Emotions. The affections sometimes succeed to passions and emotions, because these may have been excited by something which becomes permanently interesting; or they may be gradually inspired, by a deliberate attention to the good or bad qualities of their objects. In this philosophic sense of the word, Affection is applicable to an unpleasant as well as a pleasant state of the mind, when impressed by any object or quality. It may be produced by whatever torments or corrodes the heart, as well as that which charms and delights it. Usage, however, chiefly applies the word to the kindly and beneficent affections. When we remark that a person has an affectionate heart, we mean to applaud his being under the influence of the best affections, of a social and relative nature. With other Writers on the Passions, we shall always use the term in the philosophical sense; and apply it equally to whatever produces more permanent feelings in the mind, whether they be pleasing or painful, of a benevolent or malevolent character. As in Passions and Emotions, thus in the Affections, several gradations of influence are observable. Some affections indicate themselves so strongly, that they approach to emotions; some may require a penetrating eye to discover them; -some may be powerfully indulged with such self command, that they shall elude the most critical observation;-and some have such an equal and uniform influence, as to blend, as it were, with the temper, and almost lose the name of affection; as generosity, fortitude, humility, patience, resignation. When there is a propensity to indulge one particular affection, or class of affections more than another, arising from peculiarity of temperament, education, connections, habits, &c. we consider this propensity as an indication of Temper or habitual Disposition. Thus we speak of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, revengeful temper. These characters do not imply, that the subject is perpetually under the influence of the particular affection, but they mark his propensity towards it. The Affections therefore refer to the actual impression made upon the mind by certain qualities, real or supposed; and the Temper or Disposition is that particular cast of mind, which renders the perception of certain qualities capable of making a more prompt, or a more durable impression upon one person than upon another. We deem that man to be irascible, who is disposed to be angry at trifles; and him we praise as humane, who is always disposed to commiserate sufferings. It is hoped that the above explanations of the terms, Passions, Emotions, and Affections, will obtain the approbation of philosophic Readers, since they were suggested to the Author by an attention to the workings of the human mind. If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, as they will serve to indicate both mutual relations and characteristic differences, in the impressions which surrounding objects, or ideas concerning them, make upon us; and although an attention to these minute distinctions, may not always be necessary in common language, and would sometimes be absurd, yet the want of precision has always been severely felt in philosophical investigations, and is a principal cause of the obscurities in which they are too frequently involved. It will be allowed by every ́attentive observer, that the process which we have characterized by the above terms, does take place in the human mind, when exposed to the sudden and powerful influence of particularly interesting objects. Such objects are irresistibly forced upon his attention, independent of a will or determination of his own; they often produce great agitations both of mind and body; and when these agitations have subsided, the mind retains some degree of predilection or aversion for them. As these distinctions are clearly and satisfactorily expressed, by the particular terms we have given to each, this is a full indication that they are the most appropriate. (See Note B. The above observations are not confined to a simple process, which takes place from more simple causes. After we have supposed a passion, indicated by an emotion, to be succeeded by some correspondent affection, we may still consider this affection as the parent of new passions, emotions, and affections, according to the variety of circumstances connected with it. It may inspire fear, as when the object of our affection is in a perilous state; it may excite earnest desire, or sanguine hope. Some of these new passions and affections will arouse to action; as when the strong sense of an injury excites to revenge: others chill and depress the spirits, as sorrow and despair. Yet in the midst of all these diversities, the characteristic differences between Passions, Emotions, and Affections, are equally obvious. Confining ourselves, therefore, to what we deem the genuine import of the words, in opposition to the irregularities of custom, we shall, as often as it may be necessary to observe distinctions, uniformly apply the term Passion, to the violent impression made upon our minds, by the perception of something very striking and apparently interesting; Emotion, to the external marks, or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passion upon the corporeal system; and Affections, to the less violent, more deliberate, and more permanent impressions, by causes which appear sufficiently interesting. The range of affection, may be from those stronger feelings which are proximate to emotions, to the mildest sensations of pleasure or displeasure we can possibly perceive. Most Writers on the Pathology of the mind, agree to distinguish between Appetites and Passions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire; and the indulgence of this desire is termed Gratification. The latter they ascribe immediately to the Mind. In this the Moderns differ from the Ancients. The word Appetitus, from which |