on account of Christ's obedience, he is treated more favorably than is correspondent to his personal character. But the same is true, if he be pardoned on account of Christ's sufferings. If it be said, that in the one case, Christ suffers, as the substitute of the sinner; I answer, in the other case he obeys as the substitute of the sinner. In the one case, Christ has by his sufferings made it consistent with the general good, to pardon the sinner; in the other case, he has made the same thing consistent with the general good, by his obedience. And if this circumstance, that the pardon of the sinner is consistent with the general good, abolishes grace from his pardon in the one case, the same circumstance is productive of the same effect, in the other. The truth is, that in both cases, the whole grace of pardon consists in this, and this only, that the sinner is treated infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character.

Again; according to this scheme of the atonement, the pardon of the sinner, is as wholly an act of grace, as if he had been pardoned without any atonement at all. If the sinner had been pardoned without any atonement, he would have been treated more favorably than is correspondent to his own character; and so he is, when pardoned through the atonement of Christ. In the former case, he would be pardoned, without a payment of his debt; so he is in the latter. If the measures taken by God, to secure the public good, those measures consisting neither in any personal doing or suffering of the sinner, nor in the payment of debt, be inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the sinner, in the one case; doubtless whatever measures are taken by God, to secure the public good in the other case, are equally inconsistent with grace in pardon. And no man will pretend, that if God do pardon the sinner without an atonement, he will pardon him in a way which is inconsistent with the public good. In this view of the objection, either the bare circumstance that the pardon of the sinner is consistent with the public good, is that which abolishes the grace of pardon; or it is the particular mode, in which the consistence of pardon and the public good, is brought about. If the bare circumstance of the consistence of pardon and the public good, be that which abolishes the grace of pardon; then it seems, that in order that any pardon may be gracious, it must be inconsistent with the public good; and therefore the pardon of the sinner without any atonement, being by the concession of the objector a gracious act, is inconsistent with the general good of the universe, and with the glory and perfections of God, and therefore can never be granted by God, as long as he is possessed of infinite perfection and goodness, whereby he is necessarily disposed to seek the good of the universal system, or of his own kingdom.

Or if it be said, that it is the particular mode, in which the consistence between pardon and the public good is brought about, which abolishes the grace of pardon; in this case it is incumbent on the objector, to point out what there is in the mode, which is opposed to grace in pardon. He cannot pretend, that in this mode, the debt of the sinner is paid, or that in repentance the sinner's personal character is so altered, that he now deserves no punishment. If this were the case, there would certainly be no grace in his pardon. It is no grace, and no pardon, not to punish a man who deserves no punishment. If the objector were to hold, that the personal character of the sinner is so altered by repentance, that he no longer deserves punishment, he would at once confute his own scheme of gracious pardon.

Neither can it be pretended, by the advocates for pardon without atonement, that there is any grace in pardon, in any other view than this, that the sinner is treated more favorably, than is correspondent to his personal character. And pardon on such an atonement as Christ hath made, is, in the same view, an act of grace. So that if the true idea of grace, with respect to this subject be, a treatment of a sinner more favorable than is correspondent to his personal character; the pardon of the sinner through the atonement of Christ, is an act of pure grace. If this be not the true idea of grace, let a better be given, and I am willing to examine it; and I presume that on the most thorough examination of the matter, it will be found, that there is as much grace in the pardon of the sinner, through the atonement of Christ, as without any atonement at all. Surely it will not be pleaded, that it is no act of grace to treat a sinner more favorably than is correspondent to his own personal character; if such treatment be not more favorable than is correspondent to the personal character of some other man, or some other being; and that it is no act of grace in a prince to pardon a criminal, from respect to the merits of the criminal's father; or that if one nobleman had been the murderer of another, there would have been no grace exercised in the pardon of the former, from respect to the intercession of some powerful court.

On every other hypothesis concerning the mode or condition of pardon, it must be allowed, that God dispenses pardon, from regard to some circumstance, or juncture of circumstances, which renders the pardon both consistent with the general good, and subservient to it; and whatever this be, whether the death of Christ, or anything else, provided it be not the payment of money, and provided the personal character of the sinner be the same, it is equally consistent or inconsistent with grace in pardon.

In short, the whole strength of this objection, in which the Socinians have so much triumphed, that complete atonement is inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the sinner, depends on the supposition, that the atonement of Christ consists in the literal payment of a debt which we owed to God; and this groundless supposition being set aside, the objection itself appears equally groundless, and vanishes like dew before the sun.

Whatever hypothesis we adopt concerning the pardon of the sinner, whether we suppose it to be granted on account of the death of Christ; or on account of the obedience of Christ; or absolutely without any atonement; all will agree in this, that it is granted in such a way, or on such conditions only, as are consistent with the general good of the moral system, and from a regard to some event or circumstance, or juncture of circumstances, which causes pardon to be consistent with the general good. And that circumstance or juncture of circumstances, may as well be called the price of pardon, the ransom of the sinner, etc. as the death of Christ. And whereas it is objected, that if God grant a pardon from respect to the atonement of Christ, we are under no obligation to God for the grace of pardon ; I answer that whenever God grants a pardon, from respect to the circumstance or juncture of circumstances before mentioned, it may as well be pleaded, that the sinner so pardoned, is under no obligations of gratitude to God, on account of his pardon; for that it was granted from regard to the general good, or to that circumstance which rendered it consistent with the general good, and not from any gracious regard to him; or that if he be under any obligation to God, it is to him as the author of that circumstance or juncture of circumstances, which renders his pardon consistent with the general good, and not to him, as the dispenser of his pardon; as it is objected, that if, on the scheme of pardon through the atonement of Christ, we be under any obligation to God at all, it is merely on account of the provision of the atonement, and not on account of pardon itself.

Perhaps some, unwilling to relinquish this objection, may say, Though it be true, that the pardon of the sinner, on account of the atonement of Christ, be a real act of grace; would it not have been an act of greater grace, to pardon absolutely, without an atonement? This question is capable of a twofold construction. If the meaning be, Whether there would not have been more grace manifested towards the sinner, if his pardon had been granted without any atonement? I answer, by no means; because to put the question in this sense, is the same as

to ask, Whether the favor of pardon granted without an atonement, would not be greater in comparison with the sinner's personal character, than it is when granted on account of the atonement of Christ. Or whether there would not have been a greater distance between the good of pardon, and the demerit of the sinner's personal character, if his pardon had been granted without an atonement, than if it be granted on account of the atonement of Christ. But the good, the safety, the indemnity of pardon, or of deliverance from condemnation, is the very same, in whatever way it be granted, whether through an atonement or not, whether in a way of grace or in a way of debt, whether from a regard to the merits of Christ, or the merits of the sinner himself. Again, the personal character of the sinner is also the same, whether he be pardoned through an atonement or not. If his pardon be granted without an atonement, it makes not the demerit of his personal character and conduct the greater; or if it be granted on account of the atonement of Christ, it makes not the demerit of his personal character the less. Therefore as the good of pardon is the same, in whatever way it be granted, and the personal character of the sinner pardoned is the same; the distance between the good of pardon, and the demerit of the sinner's character is also the same, whether he be pardoned on account of the atonement of Christ, or absolutely, without any atonement. Of course the pardon of the sinner is not an act of greater grace to him personally, if granted without regard to any atonement, than if granted from regard to the atonement of Christ.

But perhaps the meaning of the question stated above, is, Whether, if the sinner had been pardoned, without an atonement, it would not have exhibited greater grace, in the divine mind, or greater goodness in God; and whether in this mode of pardon, greater good would not have accrued to the universe. The answer to this question, wholly depends on the necessity of an atonement, which I have endeavored briefly to show, in the preceding discourse. If an atonement be necessary to support the authority of the law and of the moral government of God, it is doubtless necessary to the public good of the moral system, or to the general good of the universe and to the divine glory. This being granted or established, the question just now stated, comes to this simply, whether it exhibits greater grace and goodness in the divine mind, and secures greater good to the universe, to pardon sin in such a mode, as is consistent with the general good of the universe; or in such a mode as is inconsistent with that important object;-a question which no man, from regard to his own reputation, would choose to propose.

SERMON III.

EPHESIANS 1:7.—In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace.

Having in the preceding discourses, considered the particulars at first proposed, which were, That we can obtain forgiveness, in no other way, than through the redemption of Christ-the reason or ground of this mode of forgiveness-and the consistency between the complete atonement of Christ, and free grace in forgiveness; the way is prepared for the following inferences and reflections.

1. If the atonement of Christ be a substitute for the punishment of the sinner according to the divine law, and be designed to support the authority of that law, equally as the punishment of hell; then we may infer, that the atonement of Christ does not consist in showing, that the divine law is just. With regard to this, I venture to assert two things: That the obedience and death of Christ do not prove, that the divine law is just. That if they did prove this, still merely by that circumstance, they would make no atonement.

(1) The obedience and death of Christ do not prove, that the divine law is a just law. The sufferings of Christ no more prove this, than the punishment of the damned proves it. The former are the substitute of the latter, and were designed for substance to prove and exhibit the same truths, and to answer the same ends. But who will say that the torments of the damned prove the justice of the divine law? No more is this proved by the sufferings of Christ. If the justice of the divine law be called in question, the justice and moral perfection of God is of course equally called in question. This being the case, whatever he can do, whether by obedience or suffering, to testify the justice of the law, must be considered as the testimony of a party in his own cause; and also as the testimony of a being whose integrity is as much disputed, as the justice of the law. It cannot therefore be received as proof in the case. The testimony of God, whether given in obedience or suffering, so long as his character is disputed, as it will be, so long as the justice of his law is disputed; proves neither that the law is just, in reality, nor that it is so in his own estimation. A being of a disputed character may be supposed to testify, both contrary to reality, and contrary to his own knowledge. And as the character of