part of other nations to avoid a measure of distrust. At any rate, Great Britain's popularity has not, as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, been greatly enhanced. This is a fact which friends as well as foes of Great Britain recognize. It is a fact that may be deplored, but a fact nevertheless.

Nor has the situation been improved by Great Britain's attitude. Admiration for the successes of British diplomacy is perfectly consistent with irritation because of it. Of all the nations of the world to-day there is none whose diplomacy has proved on the whole quite so successful as Britain's. Her course has almost invariably been "correct." Whatever purposes may be ascribed to certain British politicians and diplomatists, Great Britain, on the face of the record, went into the war in defense of international law and the rights of a small nation. I can testify that the face of the record correctly interprets the spirit of the British people, for I was in England at the time. It is therefore the more creditable to Great Britain that she made her good purpose plain in the records of her action. Thus skill in the diplomatic game has brought her advantages which she has not perhaps well earned. She'succeeded, for instance, in making a treaty with the United States which is so phrased that she can claim it limits the American Government's control over its own coastwise vessels. It is not likely that British diplomats would have contracted a treaty which permitted America to have control over British coastwise traffic. All that is to the credit of Great Britain; but it does not increase the affection of other peoples for her. The boy at school who is always right is not necessarily always popular. Great Britain is almost always right diplomatically, and she has the capacity for combining idealism with profit. In the dispute over Fiume it was the idealists that did the talking on behalf of the rights of the new Jugoslav nation, but the commercial and marine interests of Great Britain were concerned with Jugoslav success. The doctrine expressed in Hebrew literature that the righteous shall flourish seems to be vindicated by Britain's experience. The British Liberal seems to have the instinct of idealizing the British commercial interests. In this I do not wish to imply that the British deliberately camouflage a profitable enterprise with preachments; but there are many people in the world who think the British do. A German has characterized this trait in the British. Dr. E. Daniels, who is a German political essayist, has written concerning this trait:

In waging war the English have at all times been accustomed to repre

sent the interests for which they have fought as universal interests. It is not necessary to impute to them hypocrisy in this. In any case they have done it quite as much for their own inspiration as for that of others.'

unless our plans are changed, will be unbalanced, lacking certain elements necessary for modern warfare which the British navy will have. Nevertheless in the matter of sheer fighting power the

are undertaking now to build, will have in three years a navy inferior to ours. If, therefore, suspicion of a country is justi. fied because of the size and power of its navy, it does not seem quite good sense for Americans to suspect the British.

course

Thus, apart from Irish-American prejudice against the English and the "ancient grudge" of the Yankee against the Redcoat, there is in the minds of many Americans some distrust of Britain. When the British delegates come to Washington, though they will receive a cordial welcome and will be regarded of as the envoys of a friendly Power, they will encounter some suspicion because of the British navy, because of the gains which Britain had from the war, because of the uniform success of British diplomacy, because of the curious skill of the British in combining profits with idealism, and because of the apparent willingness of the British to forget their friends in concern for their enemies.

Much of the suspicion of Britain in America would be allayed if all the facts were taken into consideration.

It is true that the British navy is bigger and better balanced than our own or that of any other country in the world. It is estimated, however, that by 1924 capital ships of the British navy will be surpassed in numbers by ours, and greatly surpassed in fighting efficiency. The "Scientific American" for November presents, in an article by J. Bernard Walker, figures which seem to demonstrate that, measured by displacement efficiency (by which there is taken into account not only size but also age, defensive armor, and gun power), the tonnage of capital ships in the United States navy will in 1924 be 815,467 as against that of the British navy of 447,469 and that of Japan of 400,806-the American navy thus equaling (so far as capital ships carrying guns of more than twelve-inch caliber are concerned) that of Great Britain and Japan combined. It is pointed out in that article that this is not the only test, and that our navy,

1 Quoted by William Harbutt Dawson "Problems of the Peace."

in

The British navy, moreover, is not a navy of a single nation; it is a navy of the five nations of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, besides serving as the navy of Egypt, of that immense group of principalities known as India, and of other provinces and colonies and islands, with a population of 450,000,000 people.

This navy, furthermore, is not the arm of a despotic Power. It is rather the tool of a commonwealth of free people who themselves are intolerant of tyr anny. The history of the British navy has been one of incalculable benefit to the world. Americans are prone to forget that even in 1812, when we had a just grievance against England's naval methods, the British navy was employed in curtailing the power of Napoleon I, who was endeavoring to dominate the world much as the Kaiser attempted to do in our own time. In particular, the service of the British navy in this past war ought to be fresh enough in the minds of Americans to need no justifica tion. We know well enough that the American navy will never be used as an instrument of domination, and the spirit of the American navy was so much like that of the spirit of the British navy that when our fleet worked with the British Grand Fleet and our destroyers were placed under the command of a British admiral the co-operation was as perfect as if the two navies were the joint navy of a common country. The spirit of that navy is well exemplified by a fact expressed by the English "Outlook" as follows: "It is the Admiralty, and not Downing Street, that is working hard and faithfully to bring to fruition the American limitation of armament scheme. The First Lord, who will go to Washington with his staff, is in earnest, and is determined that nothing shall be done or left undone by his experts to jeopardize the chances of an agreement that, if reached, will lift an intolerable burden from this country and from the world."

It is well, too, to remember that the British navy is necessary for the exist ence of an island nation which is the head of a far-flung Empire. To Great Britain shipping is vital. How vital it is the submarine piracy of Germany dur

ing the war proved. It is not greed but self-preservation that is the motive power behind British foreign trade. A correspondent of the London "Spectator" points out that before the war British shipping as compared with American shipping was eighteen to one. That means that so far as her trade was concerned Britain had eighteen times the need for a navy that America had.

In the war, therefore, Great Britain risked more than any other country. She was vulnerable at more points than any other country. Colossal as the de feat of Germany has been, it is as nothing compared with the ruin that would have befallen Great Britain if the victory had gone the other way. It is perhaps, therefore, not altogether unreasonable that Great Britain should have gained greatly by the war. Having proved herself a competent colonial Power, capable of defending an Empire extending into all parts of the world, Britain may have some excuse for thinking she has proved herself most capable of administering the territories that have fallen to her and enjoying what seems almost like a monopoly of the ocean-carrying business. It has been said that those who have been faithful over a few things are to be made rulers over many, and that to every one that hath shall be given. If the British apply this to themselves, we have no business to throw stones at them, for we have taken to ourselves some credit for our own service to the world and are not far behind the British in self-righteousness. We have only to read American bespeeches and editorials printed during the Conference in Paris to be reminded that American appreciation of American motives is quite as keen as the British appreciation of British motives.

20

If we are irritated by the success (generally justified) of British diplomacy, we may at least take satisfaction in the fact that whatever Britain has gained in that manner has been by straight diplomacy and not by the admixture of British hyphenism. It has been estimated by the United States Census that over fifty million Americans -can trace their origin back to England, Scotland, and Wales. But these people have not created any hyphenate problem in this country. If in the ClaytonBulwer and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaties England got the better of the bargain, it was not because the English-Americans used their influence in that direction; it was because the British diplomats were a little keener than the

ain there is no question that Japan has fulfilled her obligations. She has been, so far as any facts are publicly known, Britain's loyal ally. It is not to be expected that Britain would wantonly affront an ally such as that. The British possessions in China, her islands in the Pacific, her trade routes, her Dominions in and upon the Pacific, make it necessary for Britain to be on her guard against any disturbance in the Far East and to maintain as far as possible good relations with the greatest of the Oriental Powers. In any rivalry with Japan the United States would have the sympathy of Australia and New Zealand. But that fact hardly warrants Great Britain in discarding Japan like an old shoe. There is nothing unfriendly in bringing a terminable treaty to a termination; and there is good reason for thinking that Great Britain might well have terminated, or to have served notice on Japan that at the end of the year she would not renew, the alliance. But the fact that Great Britain has not done so is no reason for regarding her attitude toward the United States as anything but friendly.

In fact, no probable situation can array Great Britain against the United States. Before the war Britain's object was to retain a position which would enable her to turn the balance of power in Europe in the direction of peace. Today it is not the balance of power in Europe that is the question; it is the balance of power in the world. Heretofore the United States could remain to one side, for her interests were not European. To-day that is impossible. Whether Americans wish it or not, the United States is a factor in this world balance; and in regard to that world balance the interests of America are identical with those of Great Britain.

President Harding in his speech last week at Yorktown, Va., the scene of Cornwallis's surrender, expressed something more than a commonplace when he said:

We must not claim for the New World, certainly not for our colonies alone, all the liberal thought of a century and a half ago. There were liberal views and attending sympathy in England and a passionate devotion to more liberal tendencies in France. The triumph of freedom in the American colonies greatly strengthened liberal views in the Old World. Inevitably this liberal public opinion, deliberate and grown dominant, brought Great Britain and America to a policy of accommodation and pacific adjustment for all our differences. There has been honorable and unbroken peace for more than a century, we came to common sacrifice and ensanguined association in the World War, and a future breach of our peaceful and friendly relations is unthinkable. In the trusteeship of preserving civilization we were naturally

arrayed together, and the convictions of a civilization worthy of that costly preservation will exalt peace and warn against conflict for all time to come.

In spite of the incidental friction between the United States and Great Britain (which is one of the consequences of the manner in which peace after the World War was constructed), the rea. sons for Anglo-American co-operation are conclusive. With such co-operation Great Britain could be left free to police the Atlantic, provided our navy were used for policing the Pacific. The combined navies thus used would render it needless for either to be as big as it otherwise would have to be. Before the war Great Britain had an understanding with France by which Great Britain's navy was withdrawn from the Mediterranean for the purpose of concentrating its strength in the North, while the Mediterranean was left under the guardianship of France. That arrangement proved to be the salvation of both Great Britain and France when Germany broke loose. similar arrangement between America and Great Britain may be the salvation of both nations. In the second place, America's interests and Great Britain's are virtually identical in the Far East. Neither has land hunger. Both would profit by the maintenance and observance of the "Open Door." In principles of domestic common law the two countries are at one; for the same reason they are at one in understanding the general principles of international law. Most important of all is that the two nations have essentially the same object in government-the defense of the institutions of free government.

If ever the balance of the world should be disturbed by such an alliance as Professor Kuno, the Japanese professor whose letter is printed in this issue, and Mr. Julian Street, the American authority on Japan, whose letter follows Professor Kuno's, both anticipate as possible, the association of Great Britain and the United States would be imperative. Nothing should be done at this time to render such an association in the future difficult.

It has been suggested that possibly Great Britain can render a service to the United States by bringing about a better understanding with Japan. That seems to be Mr. P. W. Wilson's idea as expressed in his article on another page. If this is so, conversely the United States may serve Great Britain in this Conference by bringing about a better understanding between her and France. This may be one of the ways by which the two English-speaking nations may put into practice their common aim of co-operation.

ERNEST HAMLIN ABBOTT.

AVING recently crossed the ocean and visited both London and Washington, I am able, perhaps, to offer an estimate of the British attitude towards the momentous Conference about to be held at the invitation of the United States. In view of the grave issues involved, I may be forgiven if I avoid mere propaganda, so sternly condemned by President Harding in his letter to the pressmen gathered at Honolulu, and deal with what I believe to be the cold and inescapable truth. It will be realized, I am sure, that Britain is to-day much preoccupied with her domestic troubles, and especially with strikes, unemployment, and Ireland, and that her people have been able as yet to devote only half their minds to the real meaning of the assemblage for which Washington is preparing her hospitality. If you were to ask the man in the street on the other side what he thinks of the matter, he would answer probably that he knows nothing about American politics and has never understood why the United States, if she really wants smaller armaments and an effective voice in the future of mandated territories, does not join the League of Nations and make her wishes known and her great influence felt at Geneva. This is roughly the view, expressed of course with a more suitable tact, which would be advanced by supporters of the League like Viscount Grey, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, or Mr. Newton Rowell of Canada. And to such an opinion the man in the street is now adding day by day a suspicion, gleaned from his morning paper, that the United States and Japan have divergent policies in the Pacific Ocean and that something sometime will have to be done about it. Over inner Mongolia and the island of Yap, however, the average Englishman is not yet excited. He has endured five years of war and three years of armistice, and Vladivostok seems to him still a long way off Poplar, where the unemployed are becoming riotous, and from the football fields, where they sometimes forget about it. About communities there is usually a restraining inertia which has its value when international differences threaten to become acute.

It is, however, in no casual spirit that the statesmen and diplomatists of the British Commonwealth approach their deliberations on this Conference. They know well what are the issues involved in its success or failure, and they do not attempt to conceal their solicitude. They have learned too much of the Senate to suppose that the United States will enter the League of Nations-at any rate, until other and more urgent prob

lems are settled. That proposal could be revived only if and when the Conference has proved that Far Eastern problems can be solved by negotiation. There is a good deal of doubt over what President Harding means by an association as distinct from a league of nations. If the idea is similar to that brought forward at Geneva by M. Benes, of Czechoslovakia-namely, that each continent should have its association and that the associations, European, American, Asiatic, and so on, should form the leaguethen Britain, with her Empire already decentralized, would not have any strong reason for objecting; it would be giving to each continent a Monroe Doctrine. But one may be forgiven for asking whether an association of this kind for Asia would not be tantamount to handing over to Japan just that influence over China to which objection is taken at Washington. Is it not a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East that Japan is seeking and that the United States does not see her way to concede?

It is said that armaments will be limited only when three preliminary objects have been secured by diplomacy. These are: first, a safe frontier for France; secondly, assured trade routes for Britain; and, thirdly, a place in the sun for Japan. Responsible opinion in Britain does not believe that France is in danger to-day from attack by Germany or that in the near future any such danger will develop unless Germany is driven to desperation. At the same time, our statesmen made it clear at Paris that if a guaranty of the frontier would enable France to abolish conscription and reduce her army and her taxes, such a treaty would be signed-as, indeed, it has been in London-provided that the other guarantor were the United States. This Anglo-American guaranty fell through with the other arrangements made for the United States by President Wilson at Paris, but there is no reason to believe that Britain would fail to abide by her share of the bargain if French persuasions in this country lead the Administration and the Senate to accept the same joint liability. This is not, however, a matter in which Britain entertains any illusions. We have been spectators of the mission undertaken earlier this year by M. Viviani. It did not seem to us to be fruitful of results. It is obviously a serious matter for the free democracies of the New World to underwrite an apparently unending series of next wars in the Old World. As spokesmen for the Dominions, the British Foreign Office has had to use plain language to France, which has not been and could not have been palatable

to that nation. It would cause us surprise, therefore, if France were to receive her guaranty at Washington, whether on its merits or as the price of proffered support to the United States in her discussions with Japan.

The fact is that, in our opinion, neither the French frontier nor the 15 British trade routes present the immediate case with which the Conference must deal. It is in the Far East that the real issues clamor for adjustment. The Power which to-day is out of touch with democracy is, not Germany any longer, but Japan. And the attitude of Britain towards Japan becomes, therefore, a matter of critical importance. In past years there were men in England of perilously defective eyesight who confessedly valued the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a makeweight against what they considered to be the growing milit tary and economic predominance of the United States. Happily, that madness has been eliminated from the counsels of the British Commonwealth by the outspoken comments of the Imperial Con ference-especially of General Smuts and Mr. Meighen. There is not, nor ought there ever to have been-if, in- 27 deed, there ever was-any question of playing off Japan against an Englishspeaking Power. If to-day there are two views held by the British in respect of the Alliance, it is because of far other considerations. One assumes of course that by the Alliance would be meant a treaty so amended as to leave Britain free to act at all times with the United States, and, if necessary, against Japan in her differences with the United States, whether in peace or war. The only question is therefore whether a treaty so modified should or should not be continued beyond its present term. Those who desire this argue that the treaty could not involve us in trouble with the United States, while it would form a useful link between the East and the West, so likely otherwise to drift apart. They also use the argument that the treaty prevents Japan from threatening India with internal propaganda and Australia and New Zealand with actual aggression, which explains doubtless why Australia and New Zealand, exposed to the Pacific, support the Alliance on certain conditions.

On the other side, it is urged that the treaty, so far from restraining the militarists of Japan, has been used by them as a weapon in their dealings with China and with Korea; that, so far from bringing East and West into friendly contact, it has alienated China and Korea from Britain, and that as for India, while she entertains nationalist

th

aims, she will never "kill King Charles to make his ally, Prince James, the King." In other words, India would like nothing worse than to exchange England for Japan as suzerain. There remains one reason, and only one reason, for the present brief and nominal extension of the treaty. Japan is in fact taking part in the Conference. She has in fact accepted the agenda as proposed by the United States. She has refrained from raising the thorny questions of race equality and immigration into Englishspeaking but thinly populated territories. She declares her willingness to come to terms over Shantung and eastern Siberia. She professes zeal for a limitation of armaments. On paper her behavior is thus strictly correct, and it ris maintained by her that no objection can be taken to it on diplomatic grounds. Her cause is therefore sub judice. Like every defendant, she is entitled to a fair hearing. The brusque denunciation of the treaty in advance of the Conference might so bitterly exacerbate Japanese sentiment as to make it impossible for her delegates to meet the Powers with reason and moderation. The aim of the Conference, as Britain understands it, is not to antagonize Japan-antagonisms are already only too evident-but to win her confidence, and with it her assent to an equitable settlement in Asia.

The attitude of the Administration is, as we see it, firm on main issues but considerate of Japanese susceptibilities. At the receptions granted by the President and his Ministers to newspaper correspondents Japanese journalists are invited to attend, and they hear all that is said. No conspiracy against their country could be fomented without their knowing it. And it is obvious that, in actual fact, there is no such conspiracy. The latest reports seem to indicate, however, that Japanese opinion has been somewhat inflamed and that the task before the Conference is hardly likely to be an easy one. Mr. Asquith once quoted in my hearing the remark of William Pitt, that the supreme virtue of a statesman is patience. The British are fully reconciled to the idea of a long Conference, and they will, I am convinced, do all they can to prevent the Conference breaking up or breaking down unless and until its task of securing the peace of the world has been accomplished. In our judgment, for the Conference, having been thus called, to separate without result would be a world-wide disaster, the very bankruptcy of wisdom in civilized counsels.

Questions have been raised by the United States which, so raised, must go forward to a decision, whether by negotiation or otherwise. That is why the mere calling of a Conference like this is an event of such far-reaching significance. It is a step from which there can be no return to the previous situation. It means that after the Conference things must be either very much better or very much worse. They can never be the same as they were before the Conference. The position is one which should

sober all who have to deal with it.

For any country to play politics with it is for that country to play the criminal to all mankind. If it were to come to a dispute between the United States and Japan, the whole world would suffer, as the whole world is suffering to-day and will suffer for many a long day from the failure of statesmanship in the year 1914.

The only interest that Britain has in this matter, or at least the interest that for her absorbs every other, is thisthat peace should be preserved. Her uneasiness over the Conference is due to the fear that peace may be dependent on its results. That is the real reason and the only reason why she has learned with surprise of the recent vote in the Senate over the Panama Tolls Bill. She has her own view of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty; but, assuming that her view is wrong, is this quite the time to complicate a diplomatic situation which should send every statesman concerned to his knees before the God of Battles and the Prince of Peace? We in Britain have drunk to the dregs the meaning of modern war and we have learned the emptiness of victory. We have formed the conclusion that for our friends, often our kith and kin in the United States, there has never dawned and there never will dawn a day fraught with more solemn meaning than Armistice Day, November 11, now at hand. It is not the Unknown Soldier from French soil alone who will be buried-the fate of countless Unknown Soldiers in years to come will be decided.

This is a business which for neutrals, and especially for the British Commonwealth, has a profound meaning. If there were to be trouble in the Pacific, the delicate fabric of British influence in Egypt and in India would be subjected to new strains, just when there is a hope of developing within those countries the sound traditions of constitutional liberty. India's small army would have to be largely increased by drafts from England, where the people think that they have had their share of modern military service. The navy would have to be on active duty in Australasian waters. In addition to all this, there would arise the far-reaching question whether the British Commonwealth, with its numerous elements, divided by race and distance and color, should enter the conflict as a belligerent. Such belligerency, if entered into, could be only on the side of the United States. But we might feel none the less that the "Open Door" in China is not a cause which for us would be worth so terrible a sacrifice. If, however, we remained neutral, we should not escape the general and world-wide chaos which a struggle between the United States and Japan would inevitably bring upon all mankind. Our manufacturers would be asked to supply munitions to both sides. That would doubtless restore our sterling exchange and enable us rapidly to repay our debt to the United States, where of course taxation for the next

fifty years would be doubled by a successful war against Japan, just as our taxation has been multiplied fivefold by a successful war against Germany. Commercially, therefore, we should enjoy through the war this gain, if so it may be called, over the United States. But there would be for us, as there was for the United States in the years 1914, 1915, and 1916, a grave and increasing anxiety on the ocean. It would be on the high seas that the conflict would develop. Not only would our ships be sunk, but our sailors would be killed. We could not export munitions to the belligerents, which-failing blockade— would be our right as a neutral, without causing deep anger, which would be answered by our own emotions over unrestricted warfare on our trade routes. If a case for so appalling an arbitrament is made out, we must submit to whatever comes; but, with other nations not less vitally interested, we do feel that this is not a matter in which the public opinion of the world should be left out of account, either by the United States or by Japan, with whom lies the decision.

In 1914 things were hurried to their final disaster with diabolical secrecies and insane impetuosity. At Washington there is no ultimatum and no time limit and no essential concealment. Statesmen and newspapers can look at the tremendous alternatives with a full sense of responsibility. It has been held by Mr. Woodrow Wilson that the late war would never have broken out if there had been time for the nations to learn the truth. To-day peace has time on her side. It will be for the United States, as we think, to prove to Japan that there is in the doctrine of the "Open Door" nothing that will injure her industrial progress or deprive her of raw materials, of metals, and of a market for finished products, and that political penetration of a reluctant China can never be permanent. It will be for Japanese militarists, as we think, to recall and engrave upon their consciences the words uttered by Sir Edward Grey to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador on July 23, 1914, when he Isaid that a war then mentioned in chancelleries

would involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that [such] a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things would be entirely swept away.

The Elder Statesmen of Austria-Hungary would not listen, nor would their Emperor. Divine right did not save the Emperor and his successor from ignominious nemesis nor the Elder Statesmen from irretrievable ruin. Both Elder Statesmen and Emperor have been swept off the map. Would that they had been wiser before the event!

TH

JAPANESE EMBASSY

Washington

October 19, 1921.

To the Editors, The Outlook,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.
Attention: Mr. Harold T. Pulsifer.
Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of the 7th October, giving me the opportunity to see the editorial "Japan at the Conference," by Mr. Abbott.

So thorough an understanding of the state of mind in America as it affects the relations between your country and mine cannot fail to do good when it is set forth clearly, as in this editorial.

It reveals an open mind, and I venture, therefore, to think that it might be helpful to you to have a direct indication of the Japanese point of view, and I shall try to give it to you.

America's fear that Japan is to present a policy of aggressiveness, backed by consciousness of her fighting strength, I will be set at rest when the country learns that Japan entertains no ambitions conflicting in any way with the policies of the "Open Door" and the maintenance of territorial integrity in China. To this policy all of the Great Powers, including Japan, are committed: witness the Anglo-Japanese Alli

ance.

It is a great pity that so little is known here of the China policy adopted and repeatedly affirmed by Japan. The history of it is public property, but the American public-even that part of it the business of which is writing on matters of political importance-does not seem to have used it fully. This history will again be set before the world at the Conference, and Japan has no doubt that if it is read and digested America and the other friendly Powers will indorse the Japanese position as marked by both justice and generosity.

Japan, in."emerging from a period of isolation and a system of feudalism into close contact with a Western world governed by a system of industrialism," has

Bain

BARON SHIDEHARA

necessarily had a great deal to learn. Her teachers of Western manners and systems have been those nations with whom she is now dealing, and if Japan is beginning to realize that some of the lessons she learned so painstakingly must now be unlearned, she is surely deserving rather sympathy than censure.

The spirit, however, that animates Japan is human. She is sensitive and resents injustice. She is proud of her progress, which has been won through her own efforts and perseverance, at heavy cost and sacrifice. She is shy, and has not yet overcome her natural reluctance to advertise her good deeds. Most humanly she desires the good opinion of the other progressive nations. In other words, she has no desire to place herself in opposition to those nations in matters of principle nor to court their disapproval and suspicion by adopting a position inimical to the general welfare.

From the economic point of view Japan knows fully as well as any other nation the dreadful weight of war, and, with a close knowledge of her own economic limitations, she is not so foolish as to desire to shoulder such a burden.

Perhaps matters would be helped and some of the distrust and uncertainty would be dissipated that now poison the feeling toward Japan if America could recognize the fact that Japan has not finished progressing. She is still learning and developing. As she advances in knowledge and the practice of interna tional affairs, the chances will diminish of her repeating such blunders as she may have made in the past.

Our feeling is that mutual understanding is the best defense against conflict. We wish to learn more-all that we can learn-of America and of her dominant motives, and we wish America to know -all about us. For the accomplishment of this desire we welcome the forthcoming Conference as a first-class school, where we can all, if the pace is set, speak our minds frankly.

The peace of the world needs us all, and God knows that the world, including Japan, needs peace.

Japan is not seeking conquest. She feels that she has reached the place among modern nations where she can do her part to help backward nations. But Japan is seeking the right to live-on a basis of free interchange of ideas, so that the best may be available to herself and to the other nations. This, of course, cannot be unless a clear understanding of each by the others removes all matter of suspicion and all idea that any nation may force or bully any other.

As your editorial so justly points out, no one can expect "Japan to abandon means necessary for her preservation as an independent sovereign Power."

When we know one another well, there will be an end to that fear of the unfamiliar which is common to us all. Very sincerely yours,

K. SHIDEHARA.