sounded the notes which bid the soldier rest.

These people of America who thus honored their soldiers are the same who hate war. Does their Government understand them? Can it interpret them? Was it right in calling a Conference to limit armaments? If so, did it err in ushering it in with honors paid to a soldier alike by the great commanders of allied forces and by the plain people?

The answer, I think, may be given in the words of President Harding. Before the body of the Unknown he said:

We do not know the eminence of his birth, but we do know the glory of his death. He died for his country, and greater devotion hath no man than this.... As a typical soldier of this representative democracy, he fought and died, believing in the indisputable justice of his country's cause.... Perhaps he believed his to be a service destined to change the tide of human affairs. . . . This American soldier went forth to battle with no hatred for any people in the world, but hating war and hating the purpose of even war for conquest. There have been a thousand defenses justly and patriotically made; a thousand offenses which reason and rightcousness ought to have stayed.

And again, standing before the delegates of the Conference, the President reinterpreted the spirit of the people:

Here is a meeting, I can well believe, which is an earnest of the awakened conscience of twentiethcentury civilization. It is not a convention of remorse, nor a session of sorrow. It is not the conference of victors to define terms of settlement. Nor is it a council of nations seeking to remake humankind. It is rather a coming together from all parts of the earth to apply the better attributes of mankind to minimize the faults in our international relationships. . . All of us demand liberty and justice. Inherent rights are of God, and the tragedies of the world originate in their attempted denial. The world to-day is infringing their enjoyment by arming to defend or deny, when simple sanity calls for their recognition through common understanding. Gentlemen of the Conference, the United States welcomes you with unselfish hands. We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve. There can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us, but by all of us. I do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations. Our Republic would no more ask for these than it would give. . . . Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. Sure in our own minds that we harbor no unworthy designs, we accredit the world with the same good intent. In all simplicity, in all honesty, and all honor, there may be written here the avowals of a world conscience refined by the consuming fires of war, and made more sensitive by the anxious aftermath. I hope for that understanding which will emphasize the guaranties of peace, and for commitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the world. It is in the light of this introduction

...

by ceremony and by the words of the President that the statesmanlike proposal of the American Government made by Mr. Hughes before the delegates to the Armament Conference on Saturday, November 12, is to be considered.

The hall in which the delegates assembled in Washington is in marked contrast to the ornate Clock Hall in which the Peace Conference at Paris was held. I noted the colors. There are no gorgeous red hangings, and gilt ornamentation, and sportive cupids in effigy, or profusion of sparkling glass. It is all simple white except for the green of the floor covering and the tabletops, and the mahogany of the hand rail around the balcony and of the backs of the seats. The Memorial Continental Hall belongs to the Daughters of the American Revolution; and it may be considered significant by some that the public sessions of this Conference are held in a building supplied for the purpose by women. But that was not the only contrast between this and the last great Conference. In Paris the room occupied by the delegates and their advisers and assistants was open to no one else; and the representatives of the public, who were limited to the representatives of the press, most of them standing on tables or chairs, peeked through open doorways and over shoulders as best they could. Here the representatives of the press are supplied with seats from which they can see and hear everything; and in the gallery are seated Senators and Representatives, and on the floor are many others who have secured admission.

The great contrast, however, is in the manner in which the Conference has begun. In Paris there were only formal speeches with some discussion as to procedure; but here, no sooner was the Conference organized than Secretary Hughes, speaking as the chief delegate of the United States, definitely and explicitly stated the policy of the Nation on one of the two chief subjects to be discussed and settled.

Of the fact that the United States would offer its programme for the limitation of armaments the delegates had been apprised, but that it would offer it publicly at the first session and in such explicit terms no one had anticipated. I do not believe that a half-dozen men even in the United States Navy knew in advance the terms of the proposal. It was as dramatic as it was statesmanlike. First, what it is not:

It is not a proposal of disarmament. It is not a proposal to settle the question of armament first before the question of policy in the Far East.

It is not a proposal primarily to reduce armament.

Now as to what it is:

It is a proposal so to limit naval armaments as to stop the ruinous competition in producing them.

It is a proposal to consider the question of armaments at the same time with the question of policy in the Far East.

It is a proposal to Britain and Japan alone, and therefore is subject to a later addition.

It is a proposal to these two nations to join in a common sacrifice of plans already made.

It is a proposal for very definite and specific action.

It is a proposal to scrap sixty-six capi-sh tal fighting ships, with a total tonnage i of 1,878,043 (nearly two million).

It is a proposal to stop building new ships except according to a definite plan mutually agreed upon.

It is a proposal that

America scrap six battle-cruisers and seven battleships on the ways and building and two battleships launched and all old battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota.

Great Britain stop building four new battleships and scrap nineteen capital ships (some already scrapped) up to, but not including, the King George class.

Japan abandon its plan to build four battleships and four battlecruisers and scrap three battleships partly built (one launched) and the material for four other battle-cruisers, and all old battleships up to, but not including, the Settsu.

If the plan is accepted, the capital ships of the three nations will be as follows:

Japan

Great Britain Royal Sovereign Nagato, 1920 Royal Oak

Hinga, 1917 Ise, 1917

Yamashino, 1915 Fu-So

New Mexico, 1918Queen Elizabeth Settsu Arizona

Kirishima

Haruna

Hi-Yel

Kongo

NOTE. The modern ships are indicated by the dates when they were completed.

The proposal includes a limitation of certain other armament, such as light cruisers and submarines.

This plan proves America's good faith, for she proposes to make a greater sacri fice than the others. It obviously puts the number of our capital ships below England's (though there is some compensation in the fact that some of our ships are more modern than any of hers and ultimately through replacements her tonnage and ours would become the same). It reduces somewhat our Su periority over Japan because every re duction in offensive power leaves each nation stronger in home waters, and it is in Japan's home waters that some of our possessions lie. It deprives us of all battle-cruisers, while leaving England with six and Japan with four-a most important consideration in the view of many naval authorities, especially as affecting conditions in the Pacific. Most important of all, it is on America's part a voluntary relinquishment of a race in which, if we chose, we could certainly win; for our resources can stand the

side

means to carry that will out. Naval

nen themselves are the readiest to recoghize that fact. "It is absurd and useless o build warships except for definite purDoses," says Lieutenant T. B. Kittredge, who was formerly archivist and statistiian in the United States Naval War College, and in his book "Naval Lessons alabf the Great War" he continues: "These urposes can only be determined by a onsideration of the use to which the avy would be put. This, in turn, deSends upon international relations."

This armament question, therefore, vershadowing as it appears to be now, s not the chief question here, but rather vhat these nations here want of one anther, how they propose to get along with one another, how they plan to deal with one another. And, as these nations re neighbors by virtue of their interests

ca's sincerity, of the fact that, as the President said, we harbor no fears and have no sordid ends to serve.

Second, it places behind the Conference the support of public opinion necessary to its success, that moral force that is the only ultimate sanction which will carry any plan through.

Third, it focuses attention on a simple plan that everybody can understand and/ lets the more important but more com plicated question of the Far East subside into temporary obscurity where it can be discussed with least danger of friction.

Fourth, and perhaps most important of all, it starts the Conference not with a theory, or a doctrine about some future organization or league or association or entente or consortium, but with a present concrete fact. An attempt was made at Paris to let the facts wait upon

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a theory; here the theories have been left to wait upon the facts.

I

At the first session of the Conference Mr. Balfour, the Chief of the British delegation, chose three words from President Harding's speech to stand as the motto for the nations deliberating here-Simplicity, Honesty, Honor. There are some observers here who, experienced in following the negotiations of diplomats, are disposed to be cynical and to attribute to the diplomats here no purpose but to play a deep and foxy game. think there is ground for a less theatrical, less romantic, more human view. While I believe the delegates here value astuteness, I think they are men much like other men, capable of recognizing what is simple, honest, and honorable, and sensitive to the spirit of their peoples, who are more than ever impatient of subtleties and pretenses and more than ever insistent that their Governments shall serve their real welfare. The beginning of this Conference has given good reason to believe that simplicity, honesty, and honor are to be more highly valued and more characteristic of the proceedings here than in any former council of nations.

T

HE note of which the following is a part was handed by Count Mouravieff, the Russian Foreign Minis

er, to all the foreign representatives at he Court of St. Petersburg on August 2, 1898:

In conviction that this lofty object agrees entirely with the most essential interests and the most rightful desires of all the Powers, the Imperial Government believes that the present time is very favorable for seeking, through the method of an international conference, the most effective means of assuring to all nations the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and of placing before all the question of ending the progressive development of existing armaments. . . . Impressed with this sentiment, his Majesty the Emperor has deigned to command me to propose to all the Governments who have duly accredited representatives at the Imperial Court the holding of a conference to consider this grave problem. This note marked the first great movement of modern times to reduce the Oppressive burden of increasing armaments. That the initiative was taken by the head of what was at that time the most autocratic and despotic Government of Europe to insure to his people peace and a lightening of the heavy expense of armament, while the heads of the present Russian Government, who call themselves proletarian dictators and pretend to represent completely the common people, are straining every nerve to

BY OWEN STREET

augment their army through conscription and increase its power of destruction, is significant of the vicissitudes of human life.

The result of the Czar's circular note was an international conference which was held the following year at The Hague. Although the prime purpose of the Conference was to come to an agreement on limitation of armaments, this objective soon fell into the background and nothing was done about it. The report made to the Secretary of State, July 3, 1899, by the American delegates gives the attitude of the Conference on the armament question:

While much interest was shown in the discussions of the first great committee of the Conference, and still more in those of the second, the main interest of the whole body centered more and more in the third. It was felt that a provision for arbitration and its cognate subjects is the logical precursor of the limitation of standing armies and budgets, and that the true logical order is first arbitration and then disarmament.

Since the First Hague Conference nothing of practical effect has so far been accomplished in the cutting down of armaments. At last, however, it would appear that the world has learned a lesson through the sufferings of the most devastating war in history. There is now an almost universal demand for definite action in this regard, the actuating motives being a desire to reduce

national expenditure and a hope to diminish the likelihood of war. Although the first motive is probably the most pressing one in the popular mind, it is the second which is the most vitally important, and, as the accomplishment of the second purpose will likewise bring about the consummation of the first, we need only consider the matter from the standpoint of international peace.

A realization of the importance of reduced armaments as related to the peacefulness of the world caused the framers of the Peace Treaty to include a provision for it in the form of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This article, although leaving the matter of details to be settled by the Council of the League of Nations, recognizes the principle that such limitation can be made only in accordance with the safety and special conditions surrounding each nation concerned. This fundamental doctrine is laid down as follows:

The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank in

formation as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

Although the Council of the League has so far accomplished nothing in the direction of disarmament, the importance of this provision in the Covenant is the recognition by the Great Powers of the fact that each nation must really decide what reductions it can make in view of its individual problems, and to arrive at that end each nation must enter the discussion in a spirit of free and frank co-operation, and, as a corollary, that, because of the essential difference in these national problems, armaments when reduced can no more be equal than they are under the present régime of expanded armaments. Another fundamental principle enunciated is that sufficient forces must be maintained to enforce international obligations where necessary through common action; and to this must be added that sufficient force must be held by each nation to insure its internal peace.

With these principles as a basis, the Conference called by President Harding will have to examine into the individual problems of each of the six Powers taking part, and by frank discussion, compromise, and co-operation arrive at a point where the movement can be started toward the ultimate goal of world peace. It is not the purpose here to deal with the military features of this question; they are entirely a matter of detail which must be settled by the discussion of military experts after the fundamental political problems have been solved.

Let us enumerate briefly the main international problem of each of the great Powers who are to take part, and then pick from them those which are most likely to lead to international conflict, and examine the most practical method of insuring against such conflict.

Of the six Powers invited to confer, five-the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy-hold absolutely the preponderance of the world's military power, and with it the ability to enforce regulations governing intercourse between the members of the Society of Nations. Therefore it is essential that any action toward bringing a régime of peace to the world must be initiated by these five nations, and it is also essential that at least the most powerful three of these five come to a complete accord and give reciprocal and positive guaranties of unity of purpose in order that such a régime may be truly effective. China occupies a peculiar situation in that she cannot be classed as one of the Great Powers from a military standpoint. She has been bidden to the Conference because of her importance as a Far Eastern nation, and because the settlement of Far Eastern questions is considered as an essential part of a programme for limited arma

ments. In view of these facts it will be necessary to take into consideration the political situation of only the five Great Powers.

The following may be considered the outstanding factors in the international policies of each:

United States:

1. The safeguarding of the Monroe Doctrine.

2. The maintenance of equal opportunity or the "Open Door" in China and those territories liberated from the sway of the Central Powers as a result of the war.

Great Britain:

1. The assurance of open sea lanes to the British Isles, so that supplies for the population cannot be cut off. 2. Safeguarding the component parts of the Empire.

3. Protection of her world-wide commerce.

France:

Assurance against German aggression and revenge. Japan:

Assurance of her free economic expansion in the Far East, according to the requirements of her national policy.

Italy:

Assurance of her economic expansion in the Adriatic, Egean, and Mediterranean according to her national policy.

We will now examine each one of these policies in turn, and see which of them are danger spots in the peaceful equilibrium of the world and must therefore receive special provision in any plan for international restriction of armaments.

United States:

1. The Monroe Doctrine has been a factor in the foreign policy of the United States for nearly a century, and has so far not been the cause of war. As it is political in its scope, insuring only the status quo as regards existing governments and territories in this hemisphere, it in no way hinders the economic expansion of other nations. It may therefore be considered as unlikely to cause war and no real obstacle to reduction of armaments.

2. The principle of the "Open Door" or equal opportunity is so eminently just and unselfish that it should in no case lead to war unless it should run counter to the policy of some other nation which, because it is seeking exclusive advantages in territories outside its own jurisdiction, may be described as unjust and selfish. At the present time the United States has at issue under this principle the questions of Mesopotamia with Great Britain and France, of international cables with all the four Great Powers, and of the island of Yap with Japan. The last question is the only one in which an uncompromising stand has apparently been assumed by any of these nations.

Great Britain:

1: It is generally recognized as essential to the very existence of the people of the British Isles that sea communications be assured them; therefore this policy is merely the

right of self-preservation, and is not dangerous to world peace.

2. That the different parts of the Empire should be assured protection is recognized as essential to its integrity, and therefore this policy cannot be considered an obstacle to reduction of armaments.

3. Protection of her commerce also a justifiable national right, and cannot be considered as a menace to the safety and growth of other nations.

The outstanding motive in French foreign policy is the building up of protection against the future when a regenerated and powerful Germany will again be a significant factor in European politics. That no true regret for commencing the war has ever been expressed by the German people, that they have tried by all kinds of subterfuges to avoid their just obligations under the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Peace, and, lastly, their conduct of the trials of German war criminals may be interpreted as a rather ominous sign of their attitude in the future when they will again have become a strong nation. Here we have indeed a situation which may lead to war, and consequently against which special provision must be made in any plan for reduced armaments. Japan:

Certainly every nation has a right to free economic expansion, provided that it does not try to obtain that expansion at the expense of the rights of other nations. The Japanese, like the English, have been confronted with the problem of a large and growing population confined to the restricted territory of a few islands. In consequence the Japanese have expanded and acquired large areas in Formosa, Korea, and Saghalien. That they are not satisfied and wish more territory under their political control has been proved by their attitude in regard to Shantung and Manchuria, their Twenty-one Demands on China when the rest of the world was at war, and their continued occupation of Siberia. For the Japanese to claim that their attitude toward China and Siberia is the same as that of the United States 'toward Latin America has not been borne out by their actions. The United States has never made an attempt in Latin America to gain control of a foreign government as Japan has done in the Far East with regard to China. The United States has never used the Monroe Doctrine to obtain exclusive economic advantages over territories belonging to other peoples, as Japan has done and is doing in Shantung, Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. The "Open Door" in the Far East is the concern not only of the United States but of all the other Great Powers, and especially of Great Britain and France. Therefore in the degree that Japan runs counter to this principle is she a danger to international peace, which must have special consideration in any agreement on limited armaments. Italy:

As a result of the territorial settlements of the war, Italia Irridenta has become a thing of the past. The

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Italian people, however, have certain aspirations for expansion along the shores and among the islands washed by the three seas bordering the coasts of Italy. These aspirations are the cause of and are caused by jealousies between Italy and Jugoslavia and Greece. These are minor Powers, however, and there is too much dissension between them and the various states of the Balkans for them to become a real menace to Italy, particularly in view of the moral prestige she has as a member of the Big Five group.

Thus of the principal foreign policies of the five Great Powers we see that there are only two which really endanger international peace and are therefore an obstacle in the way of reduced armaments. They are:

1. The future menace of Germany to the safety of France.

2. Japan's policy of acquiring exclusive economic advantages through political control in China and Siberia.

In addition to these there is another factor of the greatest importance in the political situation of the world, and one which bears a menace to its peace-the situation in Russia and the world-wide 2 revolutionary propaganda of the Bolshneviki. Let us now consider the most effective means of insuring against the outbreak of international war from these three danger spots-means which will at the same time permit of a progressive curtailment of armaments, thus diminishing the likelihood of war and lightening the financial burdens of the world.

On June 28, 1919, there was signed at to Versailles a treaty between the United States and France and a treaty between Great Britain and France by which these two nations agreed to come to the aid of France in case she should be the subject of an unprovoked attack by Germany. The two treaties were so worded that each could come into force only on the ratification of the other. The British treaty has been ratified by the House of Commons, but the American treaty was rejected by the Senate; therefore France is left without this guaranty of protection. As a consequence, France is obliged to maintain a large standing army, a great part of which she keeps on German soil. At a time when France needs every ounce of human energy to recover from the destruction of the war she must maintain at least eight hundred thousand men under arms-eight hundred thousand men who consume but do not produce. The German population is nearly twice that of the population of France; therefore the only hope of France for the future is to try to keep Germany weak and to build around her a ring of defensive alliances such as she has or hopes to have with Poland, the Little Entente, Hungary, Belgium, and eventually with Russia. It is easy to see that with her enormously greater population, which is continually increasing while that of France is decreasing, her great industrial and commercial energy, and her deep feeling of hatred

and revenge, Germany will as the years go by become, not only a greater menace, but a positive danger to the safety of France, and therefore to the peace of Europe and the world.

If we face the facts squarely, we re alize that there is a definite possibility of the same danger a generation hence as that which overwhelmed Europe in August, 1914. There are only two ways by which this danger may be avoided: either by a complete change in the national sentiments and aspirations of the German people, or by effectual guaranties by the Great Powers to go to the aid of France in case she is attacked. Certainly neither the conduct of the Germans before the peace nor afterward has given anybody a right to believe that there is likelihood of a fundamental change in the Teutonic character. Therefore this way of avoiding a future German attack may be considered as a highly problematical and indefinite factor, while the treaties of guaranty offer a very positive and definite factor in avoiding such a danger. It is safe to assume that if such guaranties had existed in 1914 between France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States the Serbian trouble would have remained entirely a local affair.

Since the wise pronouncements of George Washington regarding entangling foreign alliances it has been our policy to remain aloof. We were so strongly imbued with the far-sightedness of this great principle that we remained aloof from the war for nearly three years in spite of repeated insults and aggressions on the part of Germany. At last we were forced to go in if we would continue to claim any self-respect and national honor. The same fundamental reasons that drew us into a European war in 1917 exist to-day in Europe, and in every other part of the world where war between great nations is possible. Therefore, if we believe in doing away with international war, we must support our belief by our influence backed by our force.

The American people rejected Article 10 of the League of Nations because they felt that it held them liable to participation in a war in which they had no vital interest. To guarantee France against Germany can by no means be put in the same category as Article 10; because it is definite, because we know that if on account of it we are called on to fight we will be fighting in a war which is of vital interest to us. It is not the balance of power by which peace is assured, as the history of the world has repeatedly proved, but the over-balance, the preponderance of power so long as those possessing this preponderance of power believe in peace and uphold it. This is the fundamental truth on which our National, State, and county governments rest, that the preponderance of power lies on the side of those who believe in peace and have agreed to enforce it. By reason of this mutual guaranty of peace-loving citizens we are enabled

to go around unarmed with faith in our security. Our police force is effective because it stands for peace and is backed by the alliance of the majority of the population.

The principles which govern human relations within nations govern to a greater degree the human relations between nations. To insure peace between nations by international alliances does not preclude a reduction of armaments; on the contrary, it allows of an even greater reduction than if no such alliance existed. Therefore to obtain most effective assurance against war springing from the three danger spots previously indicated they should be provided for on the principle of international guaranties.

The guaranty of peace between France and Germany has already been provided for, and awaits only the action of the United States. With regard to the Far East, China and Siberia are somewhat in the position of France-they should be guaranteed against aggression. Siberia should be regarded in the light of a trust to be guarded by the Great Powers until Russia can again take her place among them and protect her own dominions. It should be possible for Japan to see the justice of this principle and that it is for her best interest to enter freely with the other Great Powers in guaranteeing the principle of equal opportunity in the Far East. She has already realized the truth of this principle in finally entering the Chinese Banking Consortium on the same terms as the United States, Great Britain, and France. Details of such an agreement can be arranged by negotiation in such a way as to accord Japan full justice in the light of her geographical position and the money she has invested.

As regards Russia, it is not armed aggression that the Powers need to combine against so much as the subtle poison of revolutionary propaganda. Probably the best way to meet it is by a counter-propaganda, a propaganda which will enlighten the great mass of the population as to the true viciousness of the so-called proletariat Government, which is draining away the life of the Russian nation.

The participants in the First Hague Conference recognized that in order to make a limitation of armaments effectual there must be faith, and that in order to have faith there must be provision for the settlement of disputes between nations by means of arbitration. There has long been an International Tribunal at The Hague, but now it is proposed by the League of Nations to establish an International Court of Justice which will have greater scope and power than the Hague Tribunal. With the assurance of mutual guaranties and a court of justice for adjudicating international quarrels, it should be possible for the Great Powers to start the progressive reduction of armaments, and thus diminish the likelihood of war in the world.