rights might perhaps also be trampled upon at other points of the littoral. It will not be denied that Holland is seriously concerned in this matter, and it is therefore expedient to examine it from the Dutch point of view as well as from our own. It will perhaps be urged that Germany has 8 far greater temptation to violate the neutrality of the Netherlands than the United Kingdom has. But is that the case? This is not a question of the absorption of Holland into the German Empire, nor of strategical situations which might arise were Holland a province of that empire. It is a question of the position of Holland ag an independent State at a time when Germany is engaged in hostilities with France and the United Kingdom. Now, it may be suggested that if German armies marched through Luxemburg, the Netherlands, as one of the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of that duchy, would be bound to take up arms. But a country of such limited military and naval resources as Holland could hardly be expected to take action in such an event unless vital national interests were involved-which is not the case. Then, again, it may be suggested that if Germany found it necessary to send her troops through Belgium and Luxemburg, she might also find it expedient to send them through Dutch territory, and this aspect of the question deserves a brief examination. VOL. CLXXXIX,-NO. MCXLV. On the eastern bank of the Meuse a tongue of Holland extends southwards to near Aix-la-Chapelle, and a glance at 8 small scale-map will convey the impression that it might be convenient for German troops to cross this tongue on their way to Belgium. Such a course of action would seemingly permit them to advance on a somewhat broader front, although nothing obviously would be gained unless the troops thus violating Dutch neutrality crossed the Meuse below Liége. Liége and Namur are, however, formidable fortresses, which the invaders could not hope to gain possession of by assault; so that a German contingent thus traversing Dutch territory and crossing the Meuse, would find itself separated from the rest of the army by a formidable line of permanent Belgian defences. The wisdom of a divided advance of this character would be very much open to question in any case; but it has the additional drawback that it might range the Dutch on the side of Germany's enemies, and that it would certainly raise very inconvenient questions with regard to the status of the Netherlands as a neutral Power. Then there is a very important point which is sometimes overlooked in this country. As long as Holland remains independent, it will be for the interests of the German Empire, when opposed to a stronger maritime coalition, that the Dutch should remain strictly 2 E neutral. The fighting re- phalia and Rhenish Prussia SO sources of the Netherlands are not formidable at sea nor yet on land; but they are not so inconsiderable that even powerful a country as Germany could regard them as absolutely negligible, when hostile. If, on the other hand, the Dutch were to throw in their lot with Germany against the Western Powers, then the result would almost inevitably be that their ports from the Scheldt to the Helder would be blockaded, and that Germany would be completely shut off from the sea. Were Holland a portion of Germany, great naval establishments might have sprung up in the estuaries facing East Anglia ready to play a very prominent part in the operations of the contending fleets; but a sudden alliance between the Germans and the Dutch would not create these naval establishments, and from the maritime point of view such an alliance would do Germany nothing but harm. The truth is that a neutral Holland might in the case of a prolonged European struggle almost be the saving of Germany, because Rotterdam and other Dutch ports would remain open to neutral shipping. It is for our interests that the Netherlands should not be involved in a conflict, because that might possibly lead to the absorption of the country into the German Empire. It is for the interest of Germany during a conflict that the Netherlands should not take part in that conflict, because otherwise the avenues of trade which lead from the sea to West would be automatically closed. Both Belgium and the Duchy of Luxemburg stand in a very different position from Holland, in that a powerful neighbour-as has been shown in an earlier paragraph-has a very strong inducement to despatch military forces through their territory in case of a great war. The neutrality of both States is guaranteed by other Powers. Luxemburg is, on paper, the better off, because Italy and Holland have undertaken responsibilities with regard to it, in addition to the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, which made themselves sponsors for Belgium. But recent events in the Near East have shown how much such treaties are worth, and nations dwelling afar off are not likely to intervene in defence of two minor States whose welfare concerns them only indirectly. Belgium can, however, fairly calculate upon assistance from the United Kingdom, because British interests are seriously involved in the maintenance of the status quo in the Low Countries, and it has been freely assumed by some writers in the Press that, were Belgian neutrality to be infringed, our troops would, as a matter of course, proceed to Antwerp. Such a course might conceivably commend itself to our Government, even in spite of the difficulty as to the Scheldt, were Belgium to be attacked by Germany, or by France, or by Holland, and were no other Power to intervene. But that is not a state of things that peditionary force elected to seems likely to arise. The disembark in Belgium, the eventuality that we and the almost inevitable result would Belgians have to be prepared be to convert practically the for is an invasion of Belgian whole of Belgium into a theatre territory by German troops of active war. That consumin the course of a cam- mation would in all probability paign in which Germany and be avoided if our troops were France are in conflict, and based on French ports in the under such conditions the Channel, and if they united virtues of Antwerp as a base with the French armies on the for our expeditionary force Meuse. It will be seen, theredisappear. The United King- fore, that the strategical condom will then be acting in ditions which seem likely to conjunction with France, and arise in case of a conflict if the allies are to gain the where France and the United upper hand on land, it will be Kingdom are ranged against imperative that their armies the German Empire, reduce to shall operate in concert. There moderate proportions the imcan therefore be no question portance of the question of sending transports to the whether Flushing is fortified Scheldt, even supposing that or not. Dutch neutrality were not involved. If our troops land in Belgium at all, they will presumably land as near to the French frontier as possible, so as to ensure their being able to join hands with the French host in Champagne and Lorraine; but with a number of excellent harbours extending from Dunkirk to Cherbourg available, it is difficult to see what military object would be gained by selecting Zeebrugge or Ostend as disembarking places, even granting that those ports offer the necessary technical facilities. The best way to defend Belgium in the supposed case will be to overthrow the armies of the nation which has violated Belgian neutrality, and to achieve that purpose the allied forces must be concentrated, and not divided. It may be added that if the British ex The Dutch are now taking steps to diminish the chances that the neutrality of their country will be infringed. But what are the Belgians doing, seeing that their neutrality is so much more likely to be set at naught? Because a triangle of national territory happens to be thrust in like a wedge between France and Germany, the integrity of Belgium is gravely endangered. Something has undoubtedly been done to diminish the attractions which a march across this triangle offers to either belligerent should those ancient antagonists engage in war. For the line of the Belgian Meuse has been efficiently fortified. But this line only represents the base of the triangle. The rest of the triangle mainly consists of the broken, wooded region of the Ardennes, a region where roads are none too plentiful, and where in consequence a number of localities of minor strategical importance are to be found. Money has no doubt been poured out freely on the defences of Antwerp; but if some of this outlay had been diverted to the construction of barrier forts in the part of the country which may otherwise well form an arena of combat for foreign armies before many years have passed, there would be less prospect of an enemy within the gate. Belgium is one of the most prosperous countries in Europe, and the kingdom has a not inconsiderable population. But there is scarcely a nation on the Continent upon which the burden of national service falls more lightly, and there is scarcely a single civilised State where so small a proportion of the country's wealth is devoted to defensive purposes. The strategical position in the Low Countries presents many features of undoubted complexity. Still, certain points in connection with it are well defined. The independence of Belgium and of Holland, which are political factors of such vital importance to the United Kingdom, hinge to a great extent upon the question whether those States will be able to maintain their neutrality in case of a European war; and it is for us to do what we can to aid them in maintaining that neutrality. To raise lamentations because the Dutch contemplate placing batteries at the mouth of the Scheldt, is to hint that we should not hesitate to infringe the neutrality of the Netherlands ourselves, if it suited us. That is an attitude which a people with whom we ought to maintain the best of relations are justified in strongly resenting. Instead of uttering protests because they are doing something to protect themselves, we ought to utter protests because the Belgians are doing so little in the same direction. REFORM OR REVOLUTION? THE first session of the new Parliament was opened on the 6th of February, and meagre as the King's speech might appear to be, its very brevity only brought into stronger relief the one object to which it was practically devoted. If we do not indulge in any conventional expressions of alarm or indignation at the prospect which lies before us, it is not because they would be inadequate, but because they would be superfluous. In the midst of a common calamity or a common peril, men do not indulge in loud lamentations. We must take the first paragraph of the speech as it now stands, with the Parliament Bill in our hands, and consider what it means, if passed into law in its present shape, which we are bound to suppose is what its authors intend. It may turn out that this is not so, and that the Bill may ultimately be more or less modified. But what we have to deal with at the present moment is the precise measure which the speech from the Throne invites us to accept. That is our first concern. On a later page we may consider what the chances are that the Government may be willing to take something less. We are told in the speech that a measure will be proposed for "settling the relations between the two Houses, and securing the more effective working of the Constitution." But these relations have been settled for centuries; and the Parliament Bill, so far from securing the effective working of the Constitution, entirely ignores the foundation on which it is based. The language used in the speech from the Throne requires us to believe that the British Constitution is not Government by the three estates of the Realm, as it has existed for eight hundred years, but something else which has never existed at all. The Reform Bill of 1832 was really an amendment of the Constitution, repairing the machinery as we clean the works of a watch, but leaving its springs and wheels untouched. As the removal of any essential organ stops the watch, so the removal of the Veto manifestly stops the Constitution. The Parliament Bill is no amendment. To call it by that name is an absurdity. Yet the fallacy invoked in this use of the word Constitution will no doubt be played for all it is worth in the coming struggle, in hopes of disguising the real nature of the transaction embodied in the Government Bill. The Government say that they must fix the power of the House of Lords before reconstructing it. The Opposition answer is, "No; we must see the whole scheme at once." In the Reform Bill of 1884 Mr Gladstone wanted to separate |