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should hereafter, in the event of Cadiz being captured, wish to retain a connection with that city, when under French dominion, the universal voice of the people would frustrate their views, and probably visit them with all the severity of popular vengeance.

The part which Great Britain should act in this critical situation is, of all others, the most difficult to point out. The Creoles are the avowed friends of British intercourse, and look to this country for support and protection: the Europeans, without any hostile feelings, are probably more solicitous to preserve their superior privileges than to cultivate an intercourse with us, and, perhaps, the anxiety discovered by the Creoles for British connection, may make their opponents more averse to it. If we interfere prematurely, we may produce incalculable mischief to the cause of the Peninsula; and if we delay too long, we shall be the means of increasing and prolonging the sufferings of America. It requires the utmost consideration, and the coolest judgement, to give a right impulse to the affairs of Spanish America; and I trust those whose duty it is to direct the impulse, will act in such a manner as to lead to the tranquillity of that country, to healing its divisions, and to a lasting and beneficial connection with Great Britain.

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APPENDIX.

Copy of a Letter from Sir A. WELLESLEY to the Marquis WELLESLEY.

MY LORD,

Merida, August 24th, 1809.

I HAD the honour of receiving last night, at Medellin, your Excellency's dispatch dated the 22d instant.

From all that I have heard of the state of the Government at Seville, I am not surprised that they should have been astonished and alarmed when they heard that I had at last determined to adopt the measure which I had so frequently informed them I should adopt.

Although I was desirous to avoid as long as possible to withdraw into Portugal, and certainly remained in the position upon the Tagus as long as it was practicable, and longer probably than was consistent with the anxiety which I have always felt for the welfare and comfort of the troops placed under my command, I am of opinion that, having been compelled to withdraw, it becomes a question for serious consideration, whether any circumstances should now induce me to remain in Spain, and to hold out hopes of further co-operation with the Spanish troops, to be decided on grounds very different from those which were to lead to a decision whether, being joined in co-operation with the Spanish Army, I ought or ought not to separate from them. I beg to lay my ideas upon this point before your Excellency, and to request the aid of your superior judgment, to enable me to decide upon it in the manner which will be most beneficial to the national interests.

When the two Armies were joined, this implied engagement existed between them, that as long as the operations were conducted by mutual consent -they were to continue in co-operation.

I should not have considered myself justified in separating from the Spanish Army unless Portugal should evidently have required the protection of the British Army, or unless the Spanish Army should have been under the necessity of adopting a line of operation, to follow which would separate me from Portugal, or unless driven as I was to separate by necessity, or unless the Spanish Army had again behaved so ill as a military body, as it did in its shameful flight from the bridge of Arzobispo.

I conceived this last case would have made it so notorious that it was necessary for me to separate; that I had determined that it should induce a separation equally with the occurrence of any of the other three; and I should have stated it broadly and fairly as my reason for withdrawing the British Army from all communication with a body endowed with qualities as soldiers in a degree so far inferior to themselves.

Your Excellency will observe that my conduct in continuing with the Spanish Army would have been guided by a fair view of our reciprocal situation, and by a consideration of what they might consider an engagement to act with them, as long as it was consistent with the orders I had received, to consider my Army applicable to the defence of Portugal; with which. orders the Spanish Government are fully acquainted.

At the present moment however I have been compelled to separate from the Spanish Army; and the question now is, whether I shall place myself in co-operation with them again.

The first point which I should wish your Excellency to consider is the difference of reasoning by which the decision of this question must be guided, from that which I have above stated would have guided, and did in fact guide me in the decision on the other; in that case I considered the Armies to be under an implied engagement to each other, not to separate except on certain defined or easily definable grounds: but in this case there is positively no engagement of any description; there is none in the treaty between His Majesty and the Spanish Government: there is none implied or expressed by me; indeed the argument would lead the other way, for, His Majesty having offered the Spanish Government the services of his Army upon certain conditions, the conditions were refused, and it must have been understood that His Majesty would not give the aid of his Army; and accordingly His Ma

jesty has never ordered, but has only permitted me to carry on such operations in Spain as I might think proper upon my own responsibility, and as were consistent with the safety of Portugal.

The question then comes before me to be decided as a near one, whether I shall join in co-operation with the Spanish Army again.

I must here take into consideration, as I did upon the first occasion, the objects of such co-operation, the means which exist of attaining those objects, and the risks which I shall incur of loss to my Army, and of losing sight of Portugal, for the defence of which country the British Army has been sent to the Peninsula.

The object held out in your Excellency's dispatch, and which I consider as only the first and immediate object (for I am convinced your Excellency must look to offensive operations as soon as the means will be prepared for them) is the defence of the Guadiana.

Upon this point I must inform your Excellency, that in my opinion the Guadiana is not to be defended by a weaker Army against a stronger. It is fordable in very many places, and it affords no position that I know of; and the result of withdrawing the Spanish Army from its present position to that which has been proposed to your Excellency for them, would be to expose them to be defeated before I could assist them.

The Spanish Army is at this moment in the best position in this part of the country, which they ought to hold against any force which can be brought against them, if they can hold any thing; as long as they continue in it they cover effectually the passages of the Guadiana, which they would not cover by the adoption of any other position; and their retreat from it in case of accidents must always be secure, there is no chance of their being attacked by superior numbers; I have reason to believe that Soult, as well as Ney, has passed through the mountains into Castille, and there remains only Mortier's corps and two divisions of Victor's in Estremadura, the total of which force cannot amount to 25,000 men.

The subsistence of the Spanish Army in their present position, particularly now that we have withdrawn, cannot be very difficult.

Upon the whole then I recommend that they should remain in their present position as long as possible, sending away to Badajoz the bridge of boats which is still opposite to Almaraz.

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