are averse to placing a larger body under the command of the Duke d'Albuquerque, who I know that the Junta of Estremadura have insisted should be employed to command the Army in this province.

I cannot avoid to observe these little views and objects, and to mention them to your Excellency, at the same time that I lament that the attention of those who have to manage such great and important affairs as those are which are entrusted to the management of the Central Junta, should be diverted from great objects to others of trifling importance.

I cannot conclude this letter without adverting to the mode in which Don Martin de Garay, in his note to your Excellency of the 25th instant, disposes of the Portuguese troops, without having had one word of communication with the Portuguese Government, or any body connected with it, respecting them.

In fact those troops have been equally ill, indeed I might say worse treated, than the British troops, by the Officers of the Spanish Government, and were at last obliged to quit Spain for want of food; and I will no more allow them, than I will the British troops, to enter Spain again, unless I should have some solid ground for believing that they will be supplied as they ought.

It is a curious circumstance respecting Marshal Beresford's corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have 30,000 of 100,000 pounds of biscuit (which I had prepared there, in case the operations of the Army should be directed to that quarter, and for which the British Commissary had paid) and seized the biscuit on the grounds that debts due to the town of Ciudad Rodrigo by the British Army lately under the command of Sir John Moore, had not been paid; although one of the objects of the mission of the same Commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo was to settle the accounts and discharge those debts.

Yet this same Cabildo will call for assistance as soon as they will perceive the intention of the Enemy to attack them, having seized, and holding probably in their possession at the moment, the means which, if lodged as directed, in the stores at Almeida, would enable me effectually to provide for their relief. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed)

His Excellency the Marquis Wellesley,

ARTHUR WEllesley.

&c. &c. &c.

Copy of a Dispatch from the Marquis WELLESLEY to the Right Honourable GEORGE CANNING.

SIR,

Seville, 15th September, 1809.

On the 4th of September I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 12th of August, by the messenger, Daniel. Not having at that time received any communication from Sir Arthur Wellesley, respecting the arrival of the copies of your dispatch at the head quarters of the British Army, I forwarded to him on the 4th of September the letter of which a copy is inclosed.

On the 5th of September I received from Sir Arthur Wellesley a letter dated from Badajoz, the 3rd of the same month, in which he notified to me the receipt of a copy of your dispatch, and added his observations upon its

contents.

On the 7th of September I received from Sir Arthur Wellesley his answer to my letter of the 4th of the same month; and on the 8th I addressed to Don Martin de Garay the note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. The substance of His Majesty's commands, as notified to me in your dispatch, appears to be contained in the following statement: first, the opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley is to be taken with regard to the expediency of engaging a British Army of thirty thousand men in the operations of a campaign in Spain; if his opinion should be adverse to such a plan, the Spanish Government is to be distinctly apprized that the security of Portugal must form the more particular and exclusive object of our attention in the Peninsula, and that the utmost extent of the aid to be afforded to Spain by a British Army, is to be confined to that species of occasional concert which recently took place between the forces under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley and of General Cuesta: secondly, in the event of a determination to employ a British Army of thirty thousand men in the operations of a campaign in Spain, effectual measures are to be taken, previously to the commencement of joint operations, for securing the means

of transport, and of constant and regular supplies to our troops: thirdly, with a view to secure the effectual co-operation of the Spanish Army, and (in a case of extremity) the safe retreat of our troops, the supreme command of the Spanish Armies is to be vested in the British Commander in Chief, and a British garrison is to be established in Cadiz, if these conditions should be deemed indispensable to the security of our operations in Spain, on the scale of an extended campaign.

The letters which I have had the honour of addressing to you since my arrival at Seville, and the correspondence which has passed between Sir Arthur Wellesley and me, will have already furnished you with sufficient information respecting our sentiments with relation to the first and second articles of your instructions of the 12th of August.

You will observe that on the same day of the date of your instructions, I addressed to M. de Garay a representation of the defective state of the supplies of the British Army acting in Spain; that in consequence of the increasing distress of our troops, I was not contented with the mere assurances of the Junta, but required satisfactory arrangements to be actually made for securing provisions and means of movement to the British Army; and that, at length, finding no satisfaction either in the promises or acts of the Spanish Government, I concurred with Sir Arthur Wellesley in the necessity of withdrawing his Army to Portugal, and of abstaining from all engagements to co-operate with the Spanish troops within the territory of Spain.

In addition to the total want of supplies of every description, you will have seen that the condition of the Spanish Armies, the failure of concert and cooperation in the Generals and troops of Spain, and the mismanagement of the whole system of the military department of this Government, opposed insurmountable obstacles to the ultimate success of the Army under Sir Arthur Wellesley. Even if the system of supplies could have been corrected, the state of the Spanish Army alone would have formed an irresistible motive in my mind for withholding from the Spanish Government any expectation of future co-operation, while the same evils should be left unremedied, and should menace the recurrence of the same misfortunes on every similaroccasion. Sir Arthur Wellesley appears to agree entirely with me in this branch of my opinion.

While the military resources and power of Spain shall continue in this state of inefficiency and disorder, it is my decided opinion that no British Army of whatever strength can safely be employed in joint operations with the Spanish troops within the territory of Spain.

The difficulties and dangers of our Army in any such operation could not be diminished (although they might be increased) by any practicable augmentation of its numbers. Within the limitation of numbers stated in your dispatch (whether 30 or 40,000 men) a British Army which should attempt to act in Spain, under the present circumstances of this country, and of the Enemy, would be exposed to the utmost hazard of total destruction.

Although some expressions in your dispatch might favour the supposition that you did not intend to apply to the case of an occasional concert and limited plan of operations in Spain, the same restrictive rules of precaution which are established with relation to a more extended scale of campaign; an attentive examination of your instructions convinces me, that it was not your intention to permit any movement of the British Army into Spain, until the British civil and military Authorities should be fully satisfied on all the important points of supply and co-operation. My sentiments and conduct have been conformable to this interpretation of His Majesty's commands.

The principles on which I have acted, are not confined in their application merely to the case of a general system of joint operation in Spain, which might lead the British Army to a considerable distance from the frontier of Portugal. Any advance into Spain, even for limited objects, or for purposes merely defensive, would, in my opinion, be attended with considerable peril, while our Army shall be subject to the failure of provisions, of means of movement, and of all adequate support from any auxiliary force.

The recent example of the distress of Sir Arthur Wellesley's Army is a sufficient illustration of the necessity of applying these precautions to all cases without any exception. Sir Arthur Wellesley entered Spain with a view of acting upon a limited scale of operations, and not with the intention of engaging in a plan of extended campaign; yet the defect of supplies and of auxiliary support frustrated the objects even of that limited plan, and exposed the Army to great danger. It is indeed difficult to fix the precise point at which the operations of a British Army shall cease, when it shall once have entered the

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Spanish territory, for purposes even of occasional concert. An operation, of which the original plan may have been defined within narrow bounds, may be extended by unavoidable necessity, and even by success. Difficulties and dangers may spring from success itself, and the occasional extension of a plan, originally limited, may furnish pretexts of complaint to Spain, if any exigency should require our General to revert to the original limits of such a plan. It must be observed, that Sir. Arthur Wellesley's difficulties commenced at Placencia, within four days march from the frontier of Portugal, and within a few days after his arrival at Placencia.

These objections would necessarily apply, with greater force, in proportion to the increase of the Enemy's strength in Spain; it is improbable that any crisis of affairs can occur, in which the Enemy's Army in Spain will be much reduced below its actual scale, unless he shall be compelled to evacuate Spain altogether. This event would create an entirely new order of things in Europe, and would lead to a new view of the situation of Spain. But the principles which I have stated are applicable to every probablę state of affairs in this country; and I therefore submit to you, without qualification, my opinion, that no British Army can safely enter this country for the pose of acting with the Spanish Armies, unless some important change shall take place in Spain.

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With these sentiments I presented my note to M. de Garay, under date the 8th of September ; I take the liberty of soliciting your particular attention to that paper, in which I have plainly declared the causes which occasioned the retreat of the British Army, in the full lustre of its glory; and have added my opinion, that " until these evils shall be effectually remedied to the entire "satisfaction of the British Government, and until other necessary arrange"ments shall be made for the security of the British troops, no British Army can attempt to co-operate with the Spanish Armies within the ter"ritory of Spain."

By these expressions it was my intention to leave open to future negotiation all questions respecting the employment of a British Army in Spain, the command of the Spanish troops, and the garrison of Cadiz.

It appeared to me to be proper, at the same time, to renew the general assurance of His Majesty's attachment to the alliance, and of His Majesty's