the mightiest of our race; they would have overwhelmed the highest angel in irretrievable misery. As it was necessary, therefore, that the penalty of the law should be inflicted on the nature which had sinned, so it was necessary that that nature should be so sustained in the dreadful enterprise, as, although bruised and broken, not to be utterly destroyed. The Son of God united it to himself; he was present with it more intimately than he is with the angels of heaven; he upheld it by the power of his divinity; and hence, although the man Christ Jesus was in such an agony, that his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling to the ground, he bore all his woes with invincible fortitude, and closed the scene with the words of triumph on his expiring lips: "It is finished."

The assumption of our nature by the Son of God is expressed in the Scriptures, by his "partaking of our flesh and blood," by his "being made flesh," and by his "being manifested in the flesh." The Greek writers call it ανθρώτησις, ενανθρώπησις, ενσωμάτωσις, and ενσάρκωσις ; of which last term, the ecclesiastical Latin word incarnatio, which we have adopted into our language, is a literal translation. The act by which the union was formed, we cannot explain; but it constituted such a relation between him and our nature, that it is now as really his nature as is the divine. He is as truly man as he is God. This peculiar relation was indispensably necessary to the unity of the Mediator. Had the two natures, however intimately connected, not been personally united, their actions would not have been referrible to one agent; there would have been two agents, perfectly distinct, whereas now the person of Christ, if I may so express myself, is one principle of operation in the accomplishment of our redemption.

To illustrate this point more fully, I remark that it was not a human person which our Saviour assumed, but a human nature. The distinction between these is important, and should be carefully considered. By a person, we understand an intelligent being subsisting by himself, and not dependent upon any other. This is the meaning of the word when it is used in reference to men; when applied to the Trinity, it expresses a distinction which we cannot explain. To say that the Son of God assumed a human person, would be an express contradiction, because there is an idea imported in the word assumed, with which the personality of his human nature is absolutely inconsistent; for it imports that he made it his own; and besides, on this supposition, as we have already remarked, the acts of the man would not have been the acts of the Son of God, and consequently would not have been available for our salvation. He assumed a human nature, or, in other words, made it his own nature, by giving it a subsistence in his divine person. The term personality merely imports, that the nature of which we are speaking, subsists by itself. To deny, therefore, the personality of the human nature of Christ, takes nothing from it that is essential; it simply represents it as standing in a peculiar relation to another nature. It would have been a person, if it had not been united to the Son of God; but, being united to him, it cannot be called a person, because it does not subsist by itself, as other men do; each of whom has an independent existence. "The Son of God," says our church, “became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man, in one person for ever." And the Athanasian creed affirms, that," although he be God and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ."

When, in speaking upon this subject, we use the phrase, the constitution of the person of Christ, it is necessary to guard against a misapprehension of the meaning. It is not that his person is made up of two constituent parts, the divine and the human nature; for this would imply that the Son of God was not a person before the union, or that he became a different person after it. The union of the soul and the body is the object in nature which most resem

bles it, particularly in this respect, that as these compose one individual, what is said of either of them may be predicted of that individual; and, in like manner, what is affirmed of either of the natures of Christ, may be affirmed of Christ himself. But the resemblance is not exact; for neither the soul nor the body is a person by itself, but the divine nature of our Saviour had a personal subsistence prior to its union to the human. His person is not a compound person; the personality belongs to his Godhead, and the human nature subsists in it by a peculiar dispensation. The assumption of our nature caused no change in his person; it added nothing to it; and the only difference is, that the same person, who was always possessed of divinity, has now taken humanity.

It was the second person of the Trinity who alone was incarnate, as is evident from the Scriptures. It was the "Word" who "was made flesh,' the "Son" who was "sent forth in the fulness of time, made of a woman. The incarnation was a personal act, and was therefore limited to the person whose act it was. We say, indeed, that the divine nature was incarnate; but we speak of it not immediately, to adopt the language of scholastic Theology, and as it is considered absolutely and in itself, but mediately in the person of the Son, or as far as it is determined and characterised in the person of the Son. The incarnation was not an act of the divine nature, but of a person in that nature, and therefore terminated upon that person alone. The whole divine nature may be said to have been incarnate; but this is true only because the whole divine nature is in the second person of the Godhead. this way we may explain our meaning; but I am not sure that any distinct idea will be conveyed into the mind of the hearer. If the divine nature is in all the persons of the Trinity, we cannot understand how the incarnation was the act of one, and not of all; and the reason is, that we do not understand in what their personal distinction consists: yet we are certain that there is such a distinction, in consequence of which some acts are ascribed to one person, and others to another; and, in particular, that it was the Son who assumed our nature, and not the Father, or the Holy Ghost, although both concurred in this act; the Father by his appointment and approbation, and the Holy Ghost by his immediate agency in the miraculous conception.

In

This doctrine concerning the person of Christ was opposed by two heresies, which were broached in the fifth century, and after much disputation and confusion, terminated in the separation of their respective adherents from the communion of the catholic church. The first was the heresy of Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, who is said to have taught that there are two persons in Christ, a divine and a human. It originated in the conduct of one of his presbyters named Anastasius, who publicly condemned the title of bros, or Mother of God, which was frequently given to the Virgin Mary, because, as he said, she was a woman, and of a woman God could not be born. He was supported by Nestorius, who zealously taught the same doctrine, and maintained that she should be called only xpers, or the Mother of Christ, A great clamour was immediately raised; suspicions were entertained, that he denied the divinity of Christ; his enemies eagerly laid hold of the opportunity to humble and overwhelm him; and the affair having been brought before a council assembled at Ephesus, A. D. 431, his heresy was condemned, and it was declared," that Christ was one divine person, in whom two natures were most closely united, but without being mixed or confounded together." Not a few of the moderns are of opinion, that his sentiments were misunderstood and misrepresented during the violence of the controversy. Men do not always admit all the consequences which others draw from their opinions, nor even all which may be legitimately deduced. It is acknowledged by some ancient writers, and particularly by the historian Socrates, that he was

sound in his views of the Trinity, and consequently of the divinity of Christ.* He himself denied the charges which were fixed upon him by his enemies, and in one of his epistles virtually maintains the doctrine of his opponents, when he says, that Christ is a name significant of an impassible and a pas sible essence in one person, and that he acknowledged in him i v. Hence it is not improbable that he and his opponents agreed in sentiment, and differed only in words. The controversy, however, gave rise to a sect called by his name, which held this unscriptural doctrine, "that there were two persons in our Saviour, the one divine and the other human; that a union was formed between the Son of God, and the Son of man, in the moment of the virgin's conception, and will never be dissolved; that it was not, however, a union of nature or of person, but only of will and affection; that Christ was therefore to be carefully distinguished from God, who dwelt in him as in his temple; and that Mary was to be called the mother of Christ, and not the mother of God."

It is not necessary to engage in a formal confutation of this heresy, which expressly contradicts the passages formerly quoted, and others which affirm that the "Word was made flesh;" that he who was "in the form of God took upon him the form of a servant, and was found in fashion as a man;" that the Son of God was "made of a woman;" and that her child was "God with us;" all which assert, as clearly as words can do, the unity of his person. Were the doctrine of the Nestorians true, the hope of the church founded on the divinity of the Saviour would be vain; for he who died upon the cross was a man, more highly exalted indeed than other men, but still a creature only, whose blood could not have atoned for the sins of the world.

The author of the other heresy was Eutyches, the abbot of a monastery in Constantinople, who expressed himself thus; "I acknowledge two natures in Christ before the union, but after the union I acknowledge only one nature." He did not specify the time when the union took place; but some of his followers said, that it took place at the conception, some at the resurrection, and some at the ascension. His opinion seems to have been, that his human nature was absorbed by the Divine, and that the divine nature alone remained. It underwent modifications by those who succeeded him, some of whom chose to say, "that in the Son of God there was one nature, which, notwithstanding its unity, was double and compounded;" while others, who assumed the name of Monophysites, laid down this proposition, "that the divine and human nature of Christ were so united as to form only one nature, yet without any change, confusion, or mixture of the two natures." The heresy of Eutyches was condemned by the council of Chalcedon, A. d. 451, which promulgated the following decree, as expressive of the faith which all Christians should hold, "that in Christ two distinct natures were united in one person, without any change, mixture, or confusion."

The distinction of the two natures in Christ was manifest while he lived upon earth. As God, he knew all things, but as man, there were some things which he did not know; as God, he was blessed for ever; but as man, he was acquainted with grief; as God, he was the living One; but as man, he died upon the cross. That the distinction is continued in the heavenly state is certain from this fact, that " he will so come in like manner as he was seen to go into heaven;"† that is, will return in the human nature, and that he is the ordained man, by whom God will judge the world in righteousness. The absorption of the human nature by the divine, or the mixture of the two natures, is perfectly unintelligible.

The ancient church maintained that the two natures of our Saviour were

united, adizigers and ages indivisibly and inseparably, against the Nestorians, and args and oxurus without change and confusion, against the Eutychians. In opposition to both, it is declared in the Athanasian creed, that "though our Saviour be God and man, yet he is not two, but one Christ, one, not by conversion of the godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God, one altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person; for, as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." Our own church teaches, "that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man." 99*

Let us now attend to the effects of the constitution of his person. The first effect which demands our attention, has been already noticed, namely, that by the union of our nature to his divine person, it was qualified to accomplish our salvation. It was not like our nature in Adam, which, although perfectly innocent, and endowed with all holy dispositions, was fallible, and might be overcome by temptation; but it was supported by the divine, and could not fail or be discouraged. While it was thus enabled to endure the arduous trial, a value accrued to its acts, which would not have belonged to them, although they had been performed by the highest creature in the universe; for they were the acts, not of the man alone, but of the Son of God, who was united to the man. When God says, "I have laid help upon one that is mighty; I have exalted one chosen out of the people," he refers to the constitution of the Messiah's person; and the might which is ascribed to him, was not inherent in his human nature, but in the divinity. This is evident, even to the adversaries of his Godhead, who, aware that upon their hypothesis he could not have performed the work which we assign to him, deny that he did perform it, or that he offered an atonement for sin; and even proceed so far as to affirm, that he was subject, not only to the sinless, but to the sinful infirmities of our nature. Indeed, a human Saviour might have taught us our duty, and communicated such revelations as God had empowered him to make; but he could not have averted the wrath of God from us, nor have restored us to his favour. Such a Saviour could not have been proposed as the object of religious confidence. "Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord.-Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is." The object of the faith of the ancient Church was the same divine Redeemer who is exhibited to us as "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person, who by himself purged our sins."§ Surely, shall one say, in JEHOVAH have I righteousness and strength; even to him shall men come, and all that are incensed against him shall be ashamed. In JEHOVAH shall all the seed of Israel be justified, and shall glory."||

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The second effect of the constitution of his person is what the Greeks called κοινωνία ιδιωμάτων, and frequently αντιδισις ιδιωμάτων. In our language, it is the communication of properties, by which Theologians mean, that, in consequence of the union of the two natures, the properties of both are ascribed to his person; or the properties of one nature are ascribed to his person, when it is denominated from the other. It will make the matter more -distinct to say, that the properties of one nature are predicated of the other, because both belong to his person. One of the Fathers gives the following example : "We may say concerning Christ, He who is our God, was seen by †Ps. lxxxix. 19. Jer. xvii. 5, 7. § Heb. i. 3. | Is. xlv. 24, 25.

* Westm. Conf. c. viii. §. 2.

men, and conversed with them; and, This man was uncreated, impassible, and incomprehensible." The Scripture furnishes a variety of examples. The properties of the divine nature are ascribed to the human, or to him in the human, when Peter said to him, "Lord, thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee;"* and Thomas, "My Lord and my God."† Human properties are ascribed to the divine nature, or to him as possessing the divine, when it was said that "the Lord of glory was crucified," and that God purchased the Church with his own blood;"§ for, after all that Griesbach has alleged against it, the word God, in this last verse, is probably the true reading, and, as such, is retained by some eminent writers. The reason that, in both cases, the properties of one nature are attributed to another, is the identity of the person to whom they equally belong, and who may be described by the one or the other, as occasion requires.

This is the sense in which we speak of the communication of properties, as an effect of the hypostatical union. We do not mean, that the properties of one nature were really communicated to the other; but that, all being the properties of one person, they are predicated of him, as denominated sometimes by the one nature, and sometimes by the other. The subject, however, is not always so understood. The Lutherans maintain a real communication of properties from the one nature to the other, or, at least, from the divine to the human. This opinion they have been led to adopt, with a view to support their peculiar ideas of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Renouncing transubstantiation, or the conversion of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, as held by the Church of Rome, they have embraced a dogma equally unintelligible, but more harmless in its consequences, namely, consubstantiation; which imports, according to the meaning of the term, that, although the elements are not changed into the substance of Christ, he is literally present in, with, and under them. Against this notion, it was an obvious objection, that such presence was impossible, as his human nature is in heaven. In attempting to evade this difficulty, they have furnished an illustration of the remark, that, if a man has told a lie, he must tell another to cover it, lest it should rain through; and they fairly admonish us to be cautious in adopting opinions, lest, finding ourselves involved in one absurdity, we be led into another, and then into a third, and all for the purpose of defending the first. Consubstantiation cannot be true, unless the human nature of our Saviour be present in all places; but we know that a man cannot be in two places at the same time; that he is a local being, necessarily confined to a particular spot, which he must leave, when he wishes to be in another. The Lutherans remove this impossibility by supposing another, namely, that the human nature of Christ is endowed, in consequence of the personal union, with the property of ubiquity, or that his divine nature has communicated to it the attribute of omnipresence. It is the first step, as we say, in some cases, which is difficult; the rest are easy. We are not, therefore, surprised that, having bestowed one divine perfection upon the human nature of our Saviour, they should make a donation of others, and affirm, as some of them do, that it is also possessed of omniscience and omnipotence. I am not aware that it is necessary to discuss this strange and irrational doctrine. There are some opinions which confute themselves simply by being stated, and this, I apprehend, is one of them. It confounds the divine and human nature of Christ, by assigning the same properties to both. It deifies the man Christ Jesus, and, consequently, makes him cease to be man; it, in fact, represents him to be as truly God as the Second Person of the Trinity. The Scripture points out, most clearly, the distinction between his natures; and if in any John xxi. 17. † Ib. xx. 28. # 1 Cor. ii. 8. § Acts xx. 28.