But Modern History, it may be imagined, furnishes a remarkable exception to the rule, which the records of earlier times appear to sanction, and the success, which attended the exertions of the Provincial Militia of the North American Colonies, in the war which established their independence, may be thought to supply an irrefragable argument against those who, in the present day, insist on the inferior ity of that description of force. The Militia of the Colonies had, however, been placed in circumstances well fitted to make them soldiers, and give them, in some degree, the characteristic qualities of a regular army. Exposed, as they had been, for a series of years to the attacks of the Indians and the encroachments of the French, and left, for the most part, by the mother country to their own exertions, they had felt the necessity of remaining constantly in a state to repel inva sion, and in their frequent appeals to arms, they had acquired considerable practical knowledge of military affairs. The troops sent from England, we should also remember, were so insignificant in point of numbers, as even to elicit on more than one occasion, from the Opposition in Parliament, the remark, that the Ministry, if resolved to persist in a course of compulsory measures with regard to America, should conduct them on a scale more suitable to the magnitude of the object in view the reduction of an entire continent to obedience. The American forces had moreover the advantage of an intimate acquaintance with the localities of the country, and, what was sufficient to compensate for every deficiency on their side, obtained supplies of every kind, with a facílity strikingly contrasted with the difficulty and danger which attended every effort on our part to procure the most ordinary necessaries. The Militia did not, however, with all these circumstances in its favour, prove itself a match for our army. By the losses and defeats of a single year, Washington was so convinced of his inability to meet us in the field, that he resolved, in imitation of the Roman general, qui cunctando restituit rem, to avoid, as far as was practicable, all risk of an engagement, and leave us to be vanquished by the difficulties of our situation. The successes towards the conclusion of the war, which immortalised his name, were achieved by the combined exertions of his own troops, who had by this time acquired the advantages of discipline, and of the well-trained soldiers of France.

We may then safely assert, that the utmost amount to which our Militia could be raised, would not permit any great reduction of our Regular Army without a corresponding loss of rank and diminution of our influence as a European power. Could we interfere, or our interference have weight in questions of foreign policy, if in the scale of military strength we were known to be below many of the subordinate states? Even our naval supremacy, though in the event of war it might guard our commerce, and could, if necessary, create embarrassment to every other maritime power, would lose half its value, did we not keep a sufficient land force to follow up and secure the advantages it had conferred upon us.

With regard to our Colonial possessions, could we retain any hold of them were the Army once superseded by a Militia? Or would it be thought enough to make an exception in favour of the troops occupied in foreign service, and fix the limit, below which reduction should not be carried, at 30,000, about the amount of force generally so employed? The idea is absurd. In many of our Colo

nies, a few years' residence is found to diminish the strength of a regiment by at least a half. How then are the vacancies to be filled up, unless from an Army maintained at home? The old and exploded system too, by which the same regiment was kept abroad, sometimes for a period of twenty years together, had a most fatal effect on the habits and discipline of our troops. Banished for so long a time from their friends and their home, doomed to spend a great portion of their lives in an uncongenial climate and country, and receiving for all their toils and privations so trifling a pecuniary recompense, they saw little to be gained by superior good conduct; and self-interest, the most powerful and universal of motives, ceased to exert any favourable influence over them. But, should the Army be reduced to the bare number required to occupy the Colonies at any one time, the sentence of expatriation would actually be for life. What gentleman of talents, or character, or real merit, would, under such circumstances, accept of a commission in the service? It is then the interest of England at all times to maintain such a force at home, as may supply a continued succession of troops for foreign service,* and enable a regiment to return after a term of residence abroad, which (with the exception of India) ought not to be much longer than three or four years. Even a general disarmament on the part of the other great powers, would not be a reason for the adoption of that measure by the Government, which is placed in the singular situation of having to attend to the concerns of a vast Colonial empire.

To Mr. Hume, and the other advocates for reduction on the score of economy, we would address a few plain questions. Is it not with nations as with individuals, that their rights are more likely to be respected, when they are known to possess the power of visiting the infringement of them with speedy punishment, than when the violators may hope to escape with impunity? And does not the facility, with which war can be entered upon, thus often become a security for the enjoyment of peace? Let us suppose a case. A regard merely to our colonial interests would not perhaps admit of a much greater reduction in the army-estimates for the year than one million. Now, if by incurring an annual expenditure to that amount, we multiply the chances of escaping an event, which may cost the nation fifty or a hundred millions, do we not, in abstaining from the reduction, act according to those grounds of probability and principles of prudence by which the most rigid economy is guided? Look at the expense, in which with a greatly reduced military establishment, the mere prospect of a war would involve us. Men must be enlisted on any terms, the recruits would for a long time be actually useless, and lie a dead weight on the country, and various preparations must in the mean time be continued at great cost, till such an exhibition of force be made as may awe the enemy into submission. But, should his obstinacy make it necessary to actually unsheath the sword, who can calculate the loss that might arise from a delay simply occasioned by the unprepared state of the army? The favourable moment for striking the blow, may have passed away in the interval, and a war, which an early appearance in the field might have brought to a speedy and suc

See the convincing statement of the Quarter-Master-General before the Finance Committee, published in a former Number of this Journal.

cessful termination, may for a length of years continue to exhaust the resources of the country. Considered in another point of view also, the support of a considerable standing army would appear in perfect accordance with a judicious system of economy: for it will not be questioned, that, in a case either of foreign invasion or insurrection at home, all the services to be expected from a National Militia would be better performed by a regular force, not more than a fifth of the number.

But of all the objections to a Standing Army, at once the most popular and futile is, the danger with which it is said to threaten a people's liberties. History does certainly furnish three very memorable instances, in which a usurpation of despotic power was effected through the instrumentality of a devoted soldiery. Cæsar, at the head of his legions, set at defiance the commands of the Roman senate, and in the end deprived it of all real authority; Cromwell, supported by his fanatical, but welldisciplined troops, first dictated to the Long Parliament, and then by an act of the most flagrant tyranny dissolved it; and Buonaparte dispersed at the point of the bayonet the pseudo-deputies of the French nation. In each of these cases, however, it was the imbecility of the executive, and the contempt and unpopularity into which the legislature had fallen, which left the way open for a favourite general to arrive at the summit of power, and centre all authority in his own person. The Roman senate had never enjoyed the confidence of the people, since the seditions consequent on the agitation of the Agrarian law, and Sylla, by afterwards filling it with his own creatures and dependants, destroyed in a great measure its character and dignity. As to the Government in the time of Cæsar, its total inefficiency is manifest from the mere existence of the Triumvirate, a coalition which, though recognised by no law, acquired notwithstanding the control of the whole empire. The Parliament which Cromwell turned out of doors, too, was not the same assembly which had carried on a successful war against the hereditary King of England, but a despicable remnant, which the secession of the Presbyterian party had deprived of the respect and sanction of the nation. As for an executive, there was absolutely nothing which by way of distinction from Parliament deserved the name. Equally contemptible was the Directory, which had undertaken to discharge the functions of government in the days of the French republic. What influence or authority could it have possessed, when even its own personal guard, deserting it, joined the forces under Buonaparte? The Council of Deputies was, perhaps, a more respectable legislative body than the Rump Parliament, but it had been in existence too short a period to have engaged on its side the feelings of the nation; and the ill success of its measures had moreover excited universal dissatisfaction. In all the above cases, turbulence and revolution had shaken legitimate government, and no universally recognized authority existed. From such instances therefore, to infer that the army might, in the hands of a government and under a constitution like ours, prove fatal to popular liberty, betrays equal ignorance of the change actually effected in each usurpation, and of the state of affairs which prepared the way for it. It argues an equally mistaken view of the principles and composition of the British Army. The Regular Force is not the quarter from which danger to the liberties and power of the British People may be apprehended.

THE SOLDIER.

IT has been my fortune, in consulting an old library for some military works, to meet with a curious Italian tactical treatise, entitled The Soldier, by M. D. Mosa, of Bologna," and which professes to have been written at the commencement of the seventeenth century (1620). It opens with a preface, in tactical treatises unusual, containing a declaration of the mental and personal qualifications requisite to form the soldier, no less than the gentleman. A translation of this preface I now lay before you.

The personal acquirements necessary for the warrior must, of course, depend materially on the strategetical systems of the day: the mental must always be the same, being based upon the immutable principles of honourable feeling, which have existed in all ages, though at times exercising a more or less obvious influence on the human race.

With this noble and soldier-like feeling our author would seem to be thoroughly imbued; and though his reasonings be somewhat quaint, and his deductions obscure, yet the undying spirit of chivalry glows through every line of his confession of faith, and gives lustre and stability to every joint of that noble panoply with which he would fain invest his perfect warrior. Neither has he forgot that religion is a necessary ingredient in the perfect military character; he would rather seem to ask with Macchiavelli, in his "Art of War,"

"In quale debbe esser più timore d'Iddio, che in colui che ogni dì sottomettendosi ad infiniti pericoli, ha più bisogno degli ajuti suoi.”

He proposes for imitation no fanciful degree of excellence, no romantic exercise of valour or self-command; he merely reminds us of those feelings which we all possess, although we may have allowed them to wither in the blaze of passion, or droop unregarded in the chill of apathy.

As, however, I would fain hope that the days of feudal ferocity and mercenary barbarism have alike passed away and that war will henceforward be but a contest of honourable foes, where the sword shall be sheathed when resistance is at an end, I shall make no further apology for obtruding the reveries of an old tactician on the indulgence of your readers.

With one word I will conclude. The instructions and advice as to the attainments of an officer, would seem to have been dictated by a soldier of the present day; and, in fact, with but slight alterations, the passage in question would have appeared equally applicable from the pen of a Napier as from that of a Mosa.

IL SOLDATO.
Book I. cap. 1.

AU-MORT.

Of such persons as may of right style themselves soldiers and honourable cavaliers. SINCE in this noble and glorious subject I employ my pen and tongue, to celebrate the great qualities of those men who freely choose rather to die with honour than live without it, or allow it to

be in any way compromised by their professions; I am in doubt whether I may be permitted to invoke the gods to assist me making mention of such things as appertain to soldiers and honourable gentlemen.

But, for that their ineffable kindness has never refused just and lawful countenance to whomsoever has prostrated himself meekly before them, I will yet dare to obtest them: knowing that they have with the breath which issues from their most sweet lips heretofore, by the harmony of most persuasive speech alone, gathered together wandering tribes; that they have originated laws, ruled nations, animated the timid, restrained the fierce, assisted the distressed, consoled the wretched, protected friends, and vanquished enemies! Therefore do I hope to be still remembered of them.

I affirm then, that since honour is an incorruptible quality of nature, with regard to the mental powers, inseparable from the gentleman, (being innate, while he hath no perception of this sense of honour, not yet having discretion,) that they who have no discernment of vice and virtue, may be praised on one occasion and blamed on another, since they know not what they do.

Wherefore no one can follow the profession of arms before that he acquire a true and complete knowledge of the laws of honour and the duties of a soldier. For as he may not call himself a finished musician who knows not the rules of harmony, how much soever he may scream, seeing that the very cock screameth, and is nevertheless no musician, but an irrational animal; and since "the habit makes not the monk," nor screaming the musician: in like manner neither do the wearing of weapons, the enduing of trappings, the enjoyment of privileges and dignities, but virtue, and the practice thereof, constitute the cavalier, the soldier, and the honourable gentleman.

Moreover, I say, that there exists no difference between fortunate cavaliers and those who, albeit well practised in arms, are yet unprivileged: save that of good and false coin, the which, although it be base and illegal, bears the very and revered image of a monarch. Wherefore he alone ought to style himself cavalier and soldier who has, for six or seven years, blamelessly and with reputation, served under the conduct of warlike captains; since I judge it not possible but in that time he must have learned all that is requisite in the profession of arms and the devoirs of knighthood. During that time he should have been present at at least one stricken field, one service of artillery, one assault, and one siege; in time of peace he ought to have lived soberly and virtuously, according to the dictates of honour.

Nor should it avail any misproud ambitious man to seek, either by king-conferred dignities (and God knows wherefore), or the bequeathed power of their predecessors (perhaps dishonourably acquired), or descent from illustrious ancestors, to seek, I say, to take precedence of those noble warriors, who have by virtue and valour gained advancement, albeit they enjoy it without the grace of princes or the privileges of favourites! For we ofttimes see harsh and ungrateful fruit spring from a most beautiful stock; as the sorbapple, which if it be not tempered and ripened by the influence of