AN APOLOGY FOR THE INDIAN ARMY.

IN a recent Number of the United Service Journal, there have appeared some reflections on the probable duration of the English empire in India. The object of that article is to inquire whether the troops of that country are composed of materials calculated to ensure the continuance of our sway. The writer charges the sepoys with a deficiency in physical courage and energy, with inability to support privation or fatigue, with a disaffected and mutinous disposition; he accuses the European officers of a want of subordination and military feeling; and from these circumstances, combined with the probable nature of the wars in which we shall hereafter be engaged, he argues the insecurity of our Asiatic dominions. The remedy proposed is, the substitution of Arabs, Malays, Cafres, Ghoorkas, and Anglo-Indians, for a considerable portion of the native army. The imputations are heavy, and, if correct, our Indian empire is, indeed, in a perilous state. An attempt shall be made to disprove them, at least in some degree.

Three foreign empires have been established in India-the Patan, the Moghul, and the English. The inhabitants have also been exposed to frequent invasion. The degraded condition in which the lower castes are held, and the number who by their religion are devoted to peaceful occupations, will, perhaps, satisfactorily account for the low estimate which is formed of their national character; but it is surely unjust to designate the Indians generally, especially those of the higher castes, as deficient in those material qualities of character for which their northern and western neighbours are so conspicuous. This is an inference not warranted by the frequent invasion and subjugation of India, which is the principal ground for the opinion. The entire history of Asia, replete with instances of nations almost annihilated by the inroads of martial hordes, the history of Europe, that of our own country in particular, subdued by the Normans, and, in her turn, all but subduing France, achieving the conquest of Ireland with a handful of men,— sufficiently prove that the frequency of subjugation is no evidence of pusillanimity in a nation. Still less shall we find the circumstances of these invasions calculated to justify these imputations against their national character, as in all their struggles with their opponents, the Indians laboured under numerous disadvantages, arising partly from an inequality in physical strength, (a circumstance of far less importance now than when the combats were decided hand to hand,) partly from the inferiority of the Indian horse, which, in troops principally composed of cavalry, was of no little moment, but still more from the defective structure of their national polity. The country consisted not of a few great monarchies, whose union and co-operation, if not ultimately successful, would, at least, have prolonged their resistance, but of various principalities, whose number, discord, and mutual independence, rendered all unanimity hopeless. Neither is the testimony of a recent writer to be rejected. The historian of India, in "The Family Library," ascribes her frequent subjugation to the system of village policy, which weakens, in the minds of the natives, those emotions of patriotism which are felt by other nations. His affections are limited

to the welfare of his village; while it and its institutions are unmolested, he cared little who were the rulers of the state.

To revert to the earlier periods of Indian history, Alexander's invasion is among the first of which we have any precise knowledge. He led into India 120,000 men, gathered from the various countries which he had passed. Against such an army, under such a leader, the Indians made a vigorous resistance, not limited to one encounter, but continued through a succession of engagements. The admission of a large body of their troops into Alexander's army, proves the estimate which he formed of their valour. Though the tribes which bordered upon India may be supposed to have possessed the same turbulent and predatory habits which they have evinced in later ages, yet we do not find any record of her subjection to a foreign yoke from the period of Alexander and his immediate successors, till the foundation of the Ghaznavee dynasty at the close of the tenth century. When these invaders added fanaticism to their other qualities, they became victors. From Mahmood and his successors, who established the Patan dynasty in India, the Hindoos suffered terrible devastations, not, however, without a struggle; their resistance was vigorous, and in some instances successful, as, despite the efforts of Mahmood, the Rajpoots of Ajmeer preserved the independence of their country. The separate exertions of the India States were spirited, but being without concert or bond, they were destroyed in detail. Notwithstanding this, the Moslem conquests were sufficiently gradual, and it was not until three centuries after their first invasion, that the Mahommedan arms were carried beyond the northern boundary of the Dekkan. These circumstances are far from indicating a want of energy, and throughout the whole of the Patan and Moghul sway, we observe the same spirit displayed in the shape of continual resistance and incomplete subjugation. Ajmeer, though a province neighbouring to Delhi, always preserved a great degree of independence, even during the firm and powerful reign of Aurungzebe, who made vigorous but unsuccessful attacks on their freedom. On one occasion the Empress was taken prisoner, and Aurungzebe himself narrowly escaped. In Malwa, there were always a number of independent Rajahs: Gundwana and the eastern parts of Berar, remained in a similar state: Travancore, Tanjore, Canara, and Malabar, continued free until the middle of the eighteenth century, Whoever reads the defence of Chittore against Sultan Allahooddeen, or the exploits of Putap Sing, of Rajpootana, against Akbar, will find it difficult to imagine that the Hindoos, or at least certain classes of them, and of these classes the native army is chiefly composed, are destitute of active courage. To refute the charge more fully, let us consider the formation of the Mahratta empire towards the close of the eighteenth century. This tribe, though opposed by the power and wisdom of Aurungzebe, succeeded in wresting from the Mahommedans, a considerable portion of their empire. By their code, every man was a soldier on emergencies, and had not their career been checked by English discipline, they would have extended their dominion over the whole of the Moslem conquests in India.

If, from the centre of India, we turn our eyes to the north, we find similar instances of Hindoo valour. The disciples of Nanuc Shah commenced their fierce and obstinate struggle in the reign of the same

potent ruler, and at this day we behold the Seiks not only masters of the large province between the Sutlej and Indus, but reducing their former invaders, the Afghans, under their sway. About the middle of the eighteenth century, the Jauts, another Hindoo tribe, made themselves independent, and from them, in 1805, the English received at Bhurtpore, the severest repulse which their arms have sustained in Hindoostan. With these examples before us, can it be said that India does not possess materials for a bold and active soldiery, that the character of her people renders them unfit to remain in our ranks, and that we must seek for her defenders in other lands? In this brief abstract of her history, do we not rather recognise the descendants of those men, the apprehension of whose valour was one cause of the mutiny of Alexander's soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis, and whom Arrian, the historian of that campaign, describes as " by far the most warlike of the then inhabitants of Asia ?"

Though the Mahommedan Indians form but a small portion of our army, it will be appropriate to present to view some of the remarkable events in their history. The Moslems commenced their conquests towards the conclusion of the tenth century; about the year 1210, the Moghuls first made their appearance in India. From this time until the invasion of Timour in 1398, their attacks on India were incessant, but unavailing against the intrepid resistance they encountered.

Timour* appeared in India when it was in a frightful state of discord and anarchy. There were as many kingdoms as provinces, while rival candidates struggled for the imperial throne; the conquest, therefore, could present no great difficulty to his hordes, nor cast any heavy imputation on the vanquished. Hoomayoon, the son of the founder of the Moghul empire in India, was expelled by the Patans, but, availing himself of the anarchy into which the kingdom had again fallen, he returned and regained his dominions. The invasion of Nadir Shah and Abdalla Shah were effected, as usual, when the em pire was falling to pieces, when the monarch had no authority, and when the provinces had thrown off all obedience. We too availed ourselves of similar circumstances in no inconsiderable degree; and in their contests with us, the Mahommedans displayed no contemptible military qualities, particularly in the wars against Hyder and Tippoo.

In my opinion, the writer of the "Considerations" is equally mistaken in his estimate of the deficiencies of our present military system, and in the plan which he proposes as a substitute. In endeavouring to secure these great and distant dominions by the aid of the inhabitants themselves, we adopt the policy of Alexander, who entrusted the defence of his conquests to armies of native troops, disciplined and controlled by Macedonians. During the continuance of their power in India, the French (from whom, indeed, we adopted it) pursued a similar principle; but in the "Considerations," it is proposed to substitute troops differing from each other in language, manners, and religion, qualities the union of which in an army has been hitherto deemed

It is not a little curious that, about the year 1247, an army of Moghuls broke into Bengal, through the mountains of Thibet. They were repulsed, but the experiment may be repeated.

of such importance. Arabs, Malays, Cafres, Ghoorkas, and Anglo-Indians, are the materials of which it is proposed to construct this army. With regard to the Ghoorkas, by whom is probably meant Hillmen, the real Ghoorkas being by no means numerous, and having ample employment in their own country, the question does not arise. In consequence of certain stipulations at the conclusion of the Nepaul war, four regiments of Ghoorkas and Hillmen were taken into the Company's service. It appears to have escaped the notice of the writer, that in language, manners, and religion, these Hillmen differ no more from the inhabitants of the plains, than many of the Hindoo nations do from each other. What has been observed in the " Considerations" regarding the lower classes of the Anglo-Indian population, appears very judicious. The employment of these men in our service is an act of common justice. The officers of the Indian army, who are capable of forming a judgment, the drummers of native regiments being composed of Anglo-Indians, believe that they would make excellent soldiers. Of their bravery there can be no doubt; they are cleanly, intelligent, tractable, and seldom guilty of drunkenness; their chief vices are extravagance and improvidence.

The policy of employing Arabs, Malays, and Cafres, is more questionable. They would be mere mercenaries; whoever paid highest would have their services, and a change of fortune would be a signal for a change of masters. The common mercenary passes without remorse and without discredit to alternate sides; to-day he fights on one side, to-morrow he is found equally conspicuous on the other. The sepoy is not a common mercenary; in the Bengal army he usually is a smail landholder, who has an interest in good order and in the permanency of a government. He frequently is of a wealthy family, and enters the army for the sake of the influence and privileges it bestows. That his fidelity has been sometimes shaken, there is no doubt; but, as far as the writer of these observations knows, it has always been under peculiar circumstances, and the object of his insubordination has usually been to obtain the redress of a real or supposed grievance.

The Malays may be brave; they have the reputation of being treacherous, and the two characters are rarely combined. It would be very desirable if the writer of the "Considerations" had explained upon what foundation, and from what facts, he has reached the apparently groundless conclusion that the Malays possess a superiority in courage over the sepoys. It ought not to be dismissed from recollection, that Alfonzo de Albuquerque, with an inconsiderable number of Portuguese, subdued Malacca; in the expedition against Java, the Malay and the sepoy came into collision, and assuredly the reputation of the latter did not suffer in the encounter. Neither is it to be forgotten, that during the administration of Lord Clive, Colonel Ford, with 300 Englishmen and 700 Sepoys, opposed 700 Dutchmen and 800 Malays, and that he slew or captured the entire party.

In Hamilton's Gazetteer is to be found the following character of the Malay-"The Malay sailor, although strong and occasionally active, is by no means perseveringly so, and during extreme cold or bad weather is found to skulk sooner than the more feeble but docile Bengalese Lascar." The same publication says, that he is ferocious, vin

dictive, treacherous; that his courage is of a kind that acts on the impulse of the moment, but is not of a steady character, and that, if offended, he will stab privately.

What especial merit the Cafre possesses to recommend him to our adoption, lies, perhaps, in still greater obscurity than that of the Malay, unless it be said to consist in his superior strength; but in the present mode of warfare, this will scarcely be a sufficient motive for the change. The strength and weight of a German do not always give him the day. Our West India regiments are composed of men resembling the Cafres -was their conduct in the last American war such as to entitle them to so high a degree of admiration as to allow us to introduce this change without reluctance? Perhaps it would be unfair to regard their frequent revolts as slaves, as bad tests of their fidelity as soldiers, if they were in large and powerful bodies.

At length we have arrived at the Arab. His valour and energy are unquestionable, so are his turbulence and untameable disposition. It is difficult to say by whom he is most feared, by his employer or the enemy. In the last wars with the Mahrattas, large bodies of these men were employed by the Peishwa and the Rajah of Berar. Whoever reads the accounts of these wars will find ample proof of their untractable character; very frequently they were quite beyond control, and acted as masters. In Hamilton's Gazetteer is the following paragraph:-"The greater part of Candeish had been usurped by Arab colonists, who, in fact, without any premeditated scheme, were in a fair way of becoming paramount in Hindoostan, having already all the petty chiefs, whom they served as mercenaries, more or less under their domination." Under English discipline, no doubt, they would be more manageable, yet still the leaven of their hatred of control would be always to be feared. But would the Arab submit to this discipline? Many of the native races of India, though probably less wild and impatient of authority, decline entering our service. The writer of the "Considerations" adduces the Arab Fellahs, who are in the disciplined service of the Pacha of Egypt; he will readily acknowledge the total difference of character between the Fellah and the Arab adventurer who seeks military service in India. In a large army, composed of such diversified materials, raised from nations so remote from each other, how delicate would not the management be! Their officers would be compelled to acquaint themselves with four or five languages, unless these mercenaries are forced to learn English or Hindoostanee as a common tongue, and with the equally varying habits, manners, and modes of thinking of this Babel army. It altogether seems an arduous operation, and unattended with security, notwithstanding the assertion of the writer of the "Considerations," that "they must be faithful to us under every difficulty, (an assumption altogether unproved,) since the camp would be their home." True, the camp would be their home, though whose camp, ours or the enemy's, would be a matter of indifference to them, and of serious doubt to us.

Another objection urged against the sepoys in the "Considerations" is, their "having customs and religious prejudices which keep them so distinct from their British officers as to admit of scarcely any community of feeling or intercourse beyond that which takes place on parade." This is a very decisive assertion, which the facts scarcely