is gradually slackened, instead of augmented as the charge advances. If the dread of dishonour still keeps the men from turning back, the belief in certain destruction also prevents them from going on; but the middle way, so dear to mediocrity, whether of talent or courage, is at hand, and no sooner does the firing begin than the whole of the plume-crested troop, vanquished before a shot has told, open to the right and left, fly, with brandished sabres, in wild confusion round the square, instead of rushing down upon it, receive the fire of four sides to avoid the fire of one, and, without striking a single blow for victory, resign with loss and disgrace a contest that by courage and confidence might have been successfully terminated at the expense of a few bayonet scratches.

I appeal to the officers who were present in the square at Waterloo, -to those, I mean, whose clearness of mind and tranquillity of imagination allowed them to see what their visual organs actually presented to them, for there are many brave and conscientious men who see only what they are told to see, or what they think they ought to see,-whether this is not an exact history of the best of the charges made by the French cavalry on that memorable day. I say the best charges, for on many occasions the horseman actually halted or turned as soon as the fire began, leaving a few individuals to dash forward and shake their sabres at those with whom they dared not close; and yet this is called charging, and by such foolery is the power of the cavalry to be estimated, and the infantry of England, the gallant and the brave, must still trust for victory only to the chance of similar conduct on the part of future foes, instead of trusting to those high qualities that, backed by an efficient system of tactics, would ensure them success in every species of contest.

There are, I know, many able and enlightened men who uphold existing institutions, less from any great admiration of the institutions themselves, than from habit, and from seeing the evident superiority of established regulations over the generality of those plans and projects so constantly forced upon the attention of the public and of men in power as in the end to dishearten all serious investigation; but I must beg of those who give way to this sort of apathy, just to take a glance at military history, and they will there see to what consequences a tenacious adherence to error invariably leads, even when mixed up, as in ancient times, with the most perfect military institutions.

The Greek phalanx was perfect in theory and invincible on level ground, but when any inequality broke its close formation, the soldiers were, from their arms and training, unable to cope individually with enemies better prepared for hand to hand combat. Their defeat at Cenocephalea rendered this sufficiently apparent, but the Greeks made no change in their system of tactics; the battle of Pridna followed; the last successor of Alexander was marched in triumph before the chariot of Paulus Æmilius, leaving the 2000 years of slavery, entailed by his defeat on the land of arts and arms, to serve as a melancholy illustration of the consequences resulting from a neglect of just tactical principles and military institutions.

The Romans again were, as infantry, invincible in close combat, but ignorant of the real action of cavalry, and almost defenceless against enemies possessing powerful means of distant annoyance. The new

light, as "Vindex" would call it, that flashed from the Parthian arrows, when Marc Antony was defeated, and when the legions of Crassus were destroyed was overlooked, the Romans made no change in a system of tactics sanctified by so many previous victories, and the consequence of all long continued military delusion followed as a matter of course; Valerian was defeated and taken, and Julian killed. Even in later times, the deep formations of the Dutch school, composed of alternate files of musketeers and heavy-armed pikemen, were deemed invincible, till the more moveable brigades of Gustavus Adolphus broke the spell; and it was the superior line-fire only of the Prussians that convinced the world of the weakness of Colonel Martinet's system, on which the fate of empires and of armies had been so often staked in confidence.

1

Thus delusions, dispelled only by disasters, have succeeded each other down to our own time, and the firmness of the British infantry threw some very unexpected light on the value of those French columns, that to the tune of "Ça ira," and "Vive l'Empereur," had all but frightened "the great globe itself," out of its propriety.

There are those, it seems, who would silence every speculation of this kind by appeals to some new science of war, or mode of warfare discovered of late years, and supposed to be far above all present improvement. I am rather sceptical on this point, and not altogether disposed to take a few fine phrases and new names, applied to old practices, for a new science. I look upon the knowledge we have acquired of the value of our own army, as the only very important military legacy left us by the war. That long contest proved the dauntless courage of our men, their strength and aptitude for war, the great skill of the scientific departments of our army, the high character of our officers, whose sentiments of honour admitted of a system of discipline and organization being founded on their responsibility that insured, on the most distant services, the administration of justice, and the performance of duty, with as much accuracy as on the parade at St. James's; thus giving strength, confidence and consistency to the scattered members of an army, that, though dispersed over every part of the world, are yet bound together by the Herculean sinews of the navy; the whole constituting a force which may almost be said to hold the globe within its iron grasp. A knowledge of this power we acquired by the war; and if properly used, it has been cheaply purchased. In all other respects, we seem to stand pretty well where we were before, and as to the great military intelligence of an age that sent hundreds of thousands of infantry, the strength of armies, to battle, without ever teaching them the use of arms, the less, perhaps, that is said about it the better.

Painful as it may be to mix up any thing like personal matter in a professional discussion, I cannot, in justice to myself, conclude this paper, without a few brief remarks in answer to the charges brought against me in the December Number of the Journal, by the author of the article on the British Cavalry. An anonymous writer must be tenacious of his consistency, having no name to which he can appeal.

I am first very gravely lectured for not knowing that infantry soldiers when they receive, in squares, the attack of the cavalry, have generally had opinion and confidence on their side. Such a charge

would not have been made, had "Vindex" read the essay he had deigned to criticise, for my knowledge of this rare fact is there distinctly mentioned, page 14.*

Further, "This new doctrine," continues my Critic,

once establish

ed, that cavalry can force their horses to gallop over infantry, it will follow that the latter are scarcely of any farther use in modern warfare, except as garrisons," &c. No-it will only show the necessity of a more efficient system of infantry tactics, as advocated in the first part of this Essay. Infantry must always constitute the strength of armies and can always, when properly trained and armed, contend successfully against cavalry.

Again" J. M. tells us, in part of his paper, that he had himself purposed defending the cavalry from the aspersions thrown upon their efficiency during the late war, but really if half his theory could be proved, such an attempt would be as inconsistent on his part as vain and impossible on the part of any other person."

Here are two distinct points blended together; the first relates to the superiority claimed for the French over the English cavalry; the second to the relative power of infantry and cavalry. I had proposed to uphold the superiority of the English cavalry questioned by Napier, which superiority has nothing to do with the affair of infantry squares; for in this respect, the French were not, I believe, supposed to be better than their neighbours. If we say that Dick is a finer fellow than Tom, it does not follow that we must therefore uphold him to be absolute perfection. "Vindex" must learn to be more logical.

"If good-will alone is necessary for breaking infantry squares," proceeds this Hussar Aristarchus, "who shall ever pretend to say a word in favour of our cavalry? Why were not the French infantry, either driven quite out of the Peninsula, or starved into surrender after seeking a temporary refuge in the strongholds of that country?" Vindex," the critic here, forgets what "Vindex" the soldier knew perfectly well, first, that the Peninsula is not altogether a level plain; secondly, that the British cavalry, though superior to the French on fair terms, were never in such strength as to be masters of the field, until the first part of the campaign of 1812; and then, if I recollect right, the French infantry cut no such mighty figure either at Salamanca or at GarciHernandez. In 1813 and 1814, the ground was not in general well suited for cavalry action. In the October Number of the Journal, other causes are stated which it is here needless to repeat.

After having in the brief letter, which has so particularly excited "Vindex's" displeasure, stated, "that in fair fight, cavalry against cavalry, the British were always victorious," and having further added, that "if not upon the whole so successful as the infantry, the failure of the cavalry was to be sought for in causes over which the men and officers had little or no control," I think I should not have been attacked in this manner upon the mere wording of detached sentences, that, as I have before had occasion to observe in this very Journal, cannot, when taken alone, be always expected to convey the meaning of the writer; for instance, I never said of the cavalry, that "at the battle of Waterloo, the only occasion on which they were fairly

* United Service Journal, Part II. 1831.

U. S. JOURN. No. 40. MARCH 1832.

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tried, they were not found over efficient in line fighting:" though the words quoted are mine, the meaning attached to them by "Vindex" is not; he must for the future become more liberal in his constructions and more precise in his accusations-all charges, whether in writing or in the field, should be distinct to the point, and right onward. Your hussar caracolles are fit only " pour jetter de la poudre aux yeux."

To the accusation brought against me of speaking with contempt of the hussars, I answer only as it gives me an opportunity of expressing my conviction, that the British army holds not in its ranks braver and more nobly officered corps than the hussar regiments. I have myself served for a time on the staff of their most distinguished leader, one whose fearless part

And gallant bearing won my heart;"

and can form some estimate of the men, though I may not like their equipment. The Hungarian grenadiers are verily fine fellows, yet we should surely smile to see them stripped of their honest pantaloons, arrayed in kilt and hose, and metamorphosed into Austrian Highlanders; and are English horsemen, dressed up in the un-British, fantastic, and more showy than elegant costume of Hungary, and named besides after the old Hungarian cavalry levies,* in the least more consistent? If the term "newfangled," applied to the dress and appointments of those corps, has given offence, I am on that account sorry for having used it, though it has in itself no offensive meaning, as it only signifies "formed with a love of novelty."

I must now take my leave of "Vindex;" and as I am confident we have both the same object in view, that of bringing professional opinions and practices to the test of fair investigation, I shall be happy to meet him again, notwithstanding our difference, should he be disposed to raise a pen in defence of modern strategy, which, like tactics, may possibly require some aid; and when we discuss the field of Waterloo, I shall be able to convince him that I am not so ignorant of the gallant charge made by Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade as he seems to suppose; but as I am contending for principles alone, and do not attempt the dignity of history, I must content myself, at times, with quoting actions of minor importance, merely because they happen to lend more distinct support to the train of argument I may be pursuing.

Here for the present our contest ends; and though I could have wished that this personal set-to had been spared us, I hope we may yet say, like those who once broke off a combat of more deadly intent, Η μὲν ἐμαρνάσθην ἔριδος περὶ θυμοβόροιο,

Ηδ ̓ αὖτ ̓ ἐν φιλότητι διέτμαγεν ἀρθμήσαντε.—Iliad, b. vii. v. 301. that is," fiercely, indeed, as we have fought this battle, we yet part as friends."

J. M.

"The Hungarians call these horsemen hussars, from the word husz, signifying twenty; every twentieth man being by an old Hungarian ordinance of the fifteenth century, liable to take the field."-Bushe's History of Inventions, vol. ii. page 287.

MILITARY REFORMS OF TURKEY AND EGYPT.

THE victories and successes which, from the first institution of the Janizaries, continued for three centuries to mark the progress of the Ottoman arms, and strike terror and dismay into the remotest corners of Christendom, create little astonishment, when we recollect the description of national force employed by Christian powers during the principal part of that period. Nearly a century was suffered to elapse before any European Prince followed the example of Amurath the First, in the establishment of a permanent body of regularly exercised troops. Charles the Seventh of France was the first in adopting a system, the advantages of which had been fully proved by the successes of the Turks at Cassovia, at Nicopolis, and at Varna. The year immediately following the one signalized by this last victory, first saw a standing army at the command of a Christian monarch. The good effects of the innovation were so evident, in consolidating the resources of France, and communicating a new energy to all her exertions, that the neighbouring states were soon convinced of the propriety and necessity of making a similar change: and at length, in all the considerable kingdoms of Europe, the old feudal militia, though slowly, was yet gradually superseded by troops kept constantly in pay, and regularly trained to military subordination. Connected, however, with the feudal system, there were circumstances which long continued to prevent even those states which were earliest in adopting the improvement, from acting upon it to any great extent, or reaping its full advantages. No deeper wound could be inflicted on the power of the barons, than by establishing a force immediately dependant on the crown, and which, from its superiority of discipline, was likely, in a short time, to engross all important military operations. By their armies of retainers and vassals it was that the nobles were enabled to assume a position at once injurious to the royal prerogative and oppressive to the people. It is not then surprising, if they used all their endeavours, and to a certain degree succeeded, in opposing the introduction of a system, which would have the effect of rendering unimportant and of little value, a militia, which was ever more subservient to the will of its immediate and permanent masters, than disposed to obey the orders of the sovereign. To the military improvements of the Ottoman emperors, however, no such obstructions could be offered. In rank, in privilege, and in power, the distance between them and all classes of their subjects was immense, and only diminished, in particular cases, by the favour and condescension of the Caliphs themselves. The Janizaries, therefore, once instituted, soon rose to that rank and importance to which the will of their sovereign entitled them, and from their more intimate acquaintance with every branch of military duty were, not long after their first institution, held to be the most valuable part of the Turkish army. The concentrated despotism of the Ottoman empire, conferring on the Sultan, as it did, the absolute disposal of the whole irregular force spread over his dominions, was another source of military preeminence. There was little danger of a Grand Signior's plans being frustrated,