were charged home by Zisca himself, at the head of his cavalry. Their rout was total: the defiles which they had so rashly passed delayed their retreat, and nearly the whole chivalry of Bohemia perished on this fatal day, for the Taborites, incensed at the oftrepeated perfidy of their opponents, gave but little quarter. The Chevalier de Folard censures the conduct of Zisca, in not leaving a small body of soldiers to seize the pass in rear of the Calixtins. The experience of modern times has shown that the Hussite General was better acquainted with the true principles of war than his critic. I have already trespassed too far, and as time presses, I will for the present defer the account of the battle of Dreux. H. J. A VETERAN'S VISION. THE other day, having been present at a review, I returned to dinner; after which," while by the fire I musing sat," my thoughts naturally reverted to the scenes of the morning; and while I was following in my mind the compact and easy movements of the infantry, and the rapid and impetuous charges of the cavalry, I was lulled into a pleasing reverie, in which methought there appeared to me the spirit of a departed warrior. He approached my chair in a graceful and military gait, and after requesting him to be seated, I asked to what I was indebted for the honour of his visit? With apologies for his abrupt appearance he thus addressed me :-" You see before you one who fought and died for his country (that country was not unmindful of his services, nor ungrateful for the blood which he spilt in her cause). Perceiving that you were employed in musing on a military topic, I have taken the liberty to intrude, in order to hear if that country is still the same grateful country which it was half a century ago; if it still holds the same high station with respect to its neighbouring nations that it then did; for even in the peaceful regions of Utopia, I often recall to my recollection the glorious fields on which she proved her superiority, and the magnanimous deeds of her sons, then matchless for their courage, loyalty, and virtue." 66 My friend," I replied; you had better have remained where you were, for I can tell you, I am afraid, nothing that will gratify your expectations. Since your days, for, if I am not mistaken, I can discover, even under the disguise of your ghostly form, the hero who now honours my humble cot with his presence-since the brilliant victories which signalised your name on the American continent, and at one of which, and that one at once the most brilliant and melancholy of them all, Britain was deprived of the valuable services of the brightest of her heroes, her soldiers have fought in many a glorious field; her little island has shone more resplendent than ever, glittering alone, while all around her were dimmed with anarchy and war 66 But, alas since those days, since the never-to-be-forgotten victory which closed the late war put a stop to the blood that for years had deluged the whole of Europe, and banished to a distant isle the gifted man, for whom nations contended with nations, in order to allow him to be the umpire of their prowess,-since all this, the star of Britain's military fame has set. British supremacy has fallen like a spent thunderbolt, unmindful of the sons who raised her name so high, and who spilt their blood and hazarded their lives in her cause; she casts them into oblivion; grants them just sufficient to drag out a miserable existence in some lonely garret in the metropolis, or in some humble cot in a retired village, and raises over their heads young, inexperienced boys, who were not born by the time they had grown old in the service of the country." Overcome with the unpleasant thoughts which this short retrospect had excited, I paused, and on turning to my guest, I perceived that he too, who but an instant before was all on fire with the recollection of his former days, now sat "with downcast look," mute with astonishment and vexation, his eyes fixed on vacancy, and his arms planted across his noble, manly breast, which now heaved with the emotion that was working within: "Revolving in his altered soul The various turns of fate below; After a pause of some minutes, he at last broke silence, and with a voice which betrayed his sorrow, said-" Is it possible? Can the men who sit at the helm of the British vessel of state, be so lost to shame? It is hard enough to climb the slippery steep of fame, without their increasing the obstacles (already too many) which impede the ascent. After such treatment, what can they expect in case of a future war? Do they imagine that, with the recollection of such ingratitude deep on their minds, the sons of the men who now pine in misery and oblivion, will ever be stimulated to deeds of valour, when they know that their utmost reward will not even be common gratitude; when they know that they will even be looked down upon by those, who, while they were fighting their battles, sat snug by their firesides, and who, in the words of Lord Erskine, without virtue, labour, or hazard, grew rich, while the defenders of their country were impoverished; and laughed from their desks at bravery and science, while they added figure to figure, and cypher to cypher. Such was not the case in my days; merit was then the only ladder to distinction: the only road to promotion was that which leads to glory. The names of Britain's defenders should be remembered, while Britain has a memory, with gratitude and pride." "Unfortunately," I replied, "those days are gone, and the remembrance of them lives only by the historian's pen. While every other European army holds out as a reward to merit the hope of promotion, the British aristocracy, who have scraped every place of power into their own hands, demand high birth, wealthy connexions, and relations of interest, as the only recommendations for prefer ment. They tell you, to be sure, that the road to promotion is open to all, and that those who wish, may attain the end of it. They say you may enter if you can, but they shut the door in your face; they chain you by the leg, and then tell you to run as much as you like: the road is open, it is true, but it is strewed with thorns. Fortune and interest now are the young military aspirant's best companions: merit is a secondary consideration. Get money, get interest, and you get promotion. Obtain merit by your assiduity, honour by your courage, but forget interest and fortune, and you remain as at your first appointment, unknown, unhonoured, and unsung.' There are others more nobly connected, and wealthier than you, their turn of course comes before yours." My friend, unable any longer to contain himself, rose from his chair, and with clenched fist, and eyes sparkling with anger, exclaiming with a voice which shook the room, and re-echoed through every corner of the house, " Britain, beware!" vanished. I awoke, and lo, it was a dream. The awful words, however, sunk deep into my mind. I sat riveted to my chair in "sullen contemplation." After endeavouring in vain to solve the problem, I leaped up, and exclaiming aloud, " Nonsense; it was but a dream," darted out into the cool and refreshing air, and soon forgot all thoughts of dream and visitor. REVIEWS AND CRITICAL NOTICES. MEMOIR OF THE EARLY OPERATIONS OF THE BURMESE WAR. THIS is an unexpected compliment, but we are at some loss for the grounds upon which Lieut. Maw has so pointedly addressed us, for though he does not approve of the style in which our article upon this topic was drawn up, he cannot substantially disprove an item of the facts. Indeed, it would be a difficult task to shake the evidence which is before us, and which leads to much more than we thought proper to advance, because our object was-simply to adhere to what has been so reasonably complained of, and which, we repeat, stands thus:-a united expedition having cordially and successfully acquitted itself of the duties assigned it, rewards were ordered; but, in the distribution, one of the parties is excluded from a participation therein. This was an unlooked-for result, and in no way calculated to soothe angry feelings; when, just in the "nick of time," a book appears, written by an officer on the staff, and also, we believe, son-in-law of the general, in which the share borne by the excluded party in every toil and danger, is almost unmentioned. This was, if not ill-judged, at least unfortunate. In this dilemma Mr. Maw says, "I will endeavour to set matters right upon some points, which may tend to remove those feelings of jealousy that still appear to exist." The intention is good, but the intender has condemned himself to make bricks without straw; for he has little to say, except that of his being the personal friend of the author of the "Narrative." We are merely informed that he was a midshipman on the expedition to Rangoon, in May 1824; was lent upon the general's staff; and was obliged to quit the scene of action, in August of the same year, in consequence of a Memoir of the early operations of the Burmese War. Addressed to the Editor of the United Service Journal. By H. Lister Maw, Lieut. R.N. 66 very severe wound which he received in the assault of one of the Dalla stockades. Now, as the treaty of peace was signed on the 24th of February 1826, it is clear that his personal experiences" were in a confined compass; and so little does his " Memoir" exhibit, which has not already been treated of, that, except for introducing his own adventures, we see no good reason why he need have troubled himself with the turmoils of the press. The gallant Lieutenant commences operations by asserting that our sketch is "far from doing justice to the Navy, whilst it is most unjust to Major, now Lieut.-Colonel Snodgrass." The first position in this charge we must regret, as proving our ability to be less than our zeal; the second we deny point-blank,-because it is a publication that is criticized; and even where the author's name is unavoidably mentioned, it is always in his vocation of compiler of the "Narrative of the Burmese War," and not as an individual. The alleged excuse of Major Snodgrass, that his work is merely a detail of the military operations, palliates nothing; it is not so expressed in the title, and there must have been more trouble and ingenuity in separating the two services upon this occasion, than on any expedition we ever heard of. As to excuse the second, that the naval force was very small, we reply, "not so small either, from first to last;" but this has nothing whatever to do with the question, or what would become of those meritorious bodies, the artillery, engineers, and marines, when employed with large armies? The Lieutenant assures us that, in his judgment, the "Narrative" of Major Snodgrass is the best that is published: this may be, but it only proves that "bad is the best;" for even as a military narrative, its omissions are rather unfortunate for its impartiality. We suggested that Major Yates might have been named in the affair of Kemmendine; and we could also have added some of the on dits respecting the neglect shown in the Narrative" to that gallant corps of cavalry, the "body guard." Apparently, Mr. Maw has not seen the Memoir of the campaigns in Ava, by Capt. Havelock, a work of merit and system as a military history, spite of a certain grandiloquence of style. The Lieutenant has rushed before the public to put us right, and to extinguish any remaining jealousies as to favouritism: but how has he done it? Why, by stamping, as far as his confined evidence can go, the absolute correctness of our statements. He takes umbrage, indeed, at some expressions which fell from us, on studying the most authentic accounts we could procure, and of which we had more than sufficient to warrant our conclusions. In this spirit he takes the trouble to copy HALF of a paragraph,—not of the facts we adduced, but of reflections arising from analysing those facts, which he contrasts with some praise we bestowed upon particular exploits. But an insertion of the whole paragraph would at once have shown, that it was in no way our wish to disparage the operations; and we anticipate that every unprejudiced reader of the official documents must arrive at our inferences. We stated that, on the whole, the difficulties of this war were rather in the nature of the service, the obstinacy, cunning, and semi-barbarous habits of the enemy, and the wasting tendency of the climate and the country, than in the positive intrepidity, discipline, or military skill of the Burmans. If our estimate of the Burmese tactics was wrong, why are we not shown where? We observed that they were "abundantly given to flight," and really, from a close examination of all the official documents, we can only say, that if they did not run, they must have sunk into the earth and been run over. Even in the very little that was witnessed by the Lieutenant, he is obliged, although the champion of their military prowess, to admit, page 19, that "the Burmese authorities started off at the third broadside of the Liffey," and also that, before landing at Rangoon, "opposition had been expected here, and had any been made, it might have been effective." In the attack on the Syriam pagoda, page 74, he says, "The position was found to be strong, and had the Burmese stood as they should have done, or did in some of the first affairs, it would have been difficult to carry; but they were now losing their confidence, and as the troops advanced to the foot of the numerous steps that led up to the pagoda, the enemy gave way, and retreated from the opposite side into the jungle." And at page 89 he sums up thus:-"The Burman mode of warfare appears to consist rather in starving their enemies by surrounding them in circular lines of detached stockades, the area of which they gradually diminished so as to cut them off, than in fighting battles in the field." We are also "twitted" with not having closely followed Lieut. Marshall's account of the same operations, and, as we look upon his work as more worthy than the Major's, though not so imposing, we should be sorry to find our statements differ in essentials. But assuredly, with authentic papers before us, and information on every hand, we should have been highly culpable to adopt exclusively the views of any individual. It is from numerous relations, which, though conflicting on trifles, are corroborative on the whole, that our inferences are deduced; and however ignorant we may have been that "a dinner was a dinner at Rangoon," we really think the view we have taken of the campaign may not be incorrect in the main. If the official documents may be depended upon as furnishing us with TRUTH, they are, of themselves, sufficient to bear out our speculations: but with these we have compared many facts and statements, which we know to be founded on practical knowledge and the personal experience of our informants; and we confidently trust that an unprejudiced reader will readily see, what we had hoped could never have been doubted, that our object has not been to undervalue the Burmese expedition in any of its ramifications; but, on the contrary, to assert, that the two arms of service, having acquired laurels by an union of zeal and ability, are mutually entitled to an equal share of reward. The traits of gallantry personally observed, and now recorded by the writer, serve to aid the objects of our impartial reclamation.* The Lieutenant reminds us of the good-natured friends alluded to by Sheridan. At page 34 is a curious critique upon an admitted fact which we mentioned, of certain anomalous interferences in the command afloat. This the censor takes up by vindicating the personal character of Capt. Ryves, which has never been questioned, or still more, even alluded to, but in terms of praise ! Whatever may have been the reports "so kindly and so safely circulated," they bear in no respect upon what we have written; and our mention of a fact, in the order of occurrences, was in accordance with the assertion we started with, viz. that all the operations of the Burmese war were of a combined nature. Indeed, in order to show results rather than details, we purposely avoided anecdotes of the tenor alluded to by the Lieutenant: nor did we mention the injury offered by the Lords of the Treasury in appointing the Directors of the East India Company to be trustees for the squadron employed in the Irrawaddy, although they had been earnestly prayed to appoint Sir George Cockburn. By this harsh measure they have succeeded in establishing a precedent quite at variance with the usage and custom heretofore observed on conjoint expeditions; and this was the more hurtful, inasmuch as the squadron had already experienced manifest injustice at the hands of the Directors, by their invidious refusal to consider the navy as entitled to the same consideration as the army. In conclusion: We give Lieut. Maw due credit for the goodness of his intention, in explaining away "jealousies," but, at the same time, beg to assure him that he has not said a syllable to the purpose. He wishes to defend the * Amongst those whose conduct is noticed by the gallant officer with deserved admiration, is the late Capt. Abercrombie Trant, whose recent and premature death we deeply lament, in common with all who had opportunities of appreciating his character and talents-both of no common order. A sketch of the brief but brilliant career of this accomplished officer will be found in our Obituary.—ED. |