courage), tends to make a good officer, and especially a good cavalry officer, viz. prompt decision. The moment he saw the enemy, he formed and charged. The French were aware of the vicinity of a large force, and finding themselves vigorously attacked, a panic seized them, and they fled. Colonel Head, himself an Irishman, and commanding men mostly from that country, duly appreciated their impetuous courage, and did not hesitate to attack, convinced that the enemy did not know his force, and that he would be supported. He might have done less, and escaped without blame, but he bravely took advan tage of circumstances in his favour, and succeeded, as brave men generally do succeed, under similar circumstances. Had he been advancing over a plain, and had he opened the ball in the usual manner, with skirmishers, supports, &c. the enemy would have been enabled to estimate his force, and would have felt confident. Had he then charged, he would have been guilty of rashness, and, without a doubt, would have been most shamefully defeated. He used his wits as an officer ought to do; in doing so, he acted the part of an experienced soldier, as far as leading the actual charge; that service would probably have been as ably performed by Corporal Logan. After receiving the reward of his valour, we have heard that Colonel Head was addressed -"I believe, Colonel, that you would have galloped into Badajoz, if the gates had been open." "By Gad, General, I believe I would," was the answer; and we believe so too; the boys were so fresh. And if he had done so, and manoeuvred on the bastions, and played " Hie cocollorum tus" on the 24-pounders, we could hardly have blamed him. We might have allowed a little rashness. Rare failing! When a body of dragoons has charged, they become loose and broken, and are of little service, till they have been regularly reformed and told off. As the orderly-book very properly observes, an officer must have a support. We believe that the 13th never got over the effect of the unjust treatment they met with. Perhaps some one of the officers who were present may honour this paper with perusal. We know that the leading facts are correct. If we have not done justice to the exploit, let it be attributed to want of power, and not to want of will. We have now recorded two instances in which the British cavalry were accused of rashness, instead of being rewarded for valour. A work might have been as well published, entitled, "A plan for the abasement and farther deterioration of the British Cavalry." This was not done, but the treatment experienced by the 13th and 23rd, added to the well-known advantages of a whole skin, afforded a practical lesson, which, no doubt, was profited by, although not to the extent which might have been fairly expected. Another inducement to inactivity was held out, in the absence of any reward to junior officers: an order, such as is given by all the Continental powers, would have a most beneficial effect. It is needless to refer to the ardour produced by the Legion of Honour, although its decorations were so lavishly bestowed. With us the rewards were confined to the commanders of regiments, or distinct bodies, and were, perhaps, distributed indiscriminately enough. We cannot deny that we feel sorely, but this soreness does not arise from any private wrong. We have no unrequited claim on the service; indeed, we have no claim at all; but we feel anxious that the public should be made acquainted with the difficulties against which the British cavalry had to contend. SHIPS' WATER TANKS. As it is of importance that a ship of war should carry, without difficulty, at least three months water, and as to procure an upper tier of tanks, a new* shaped tank has been devised, which enables the hose to reach the lower tier, by cutting off a portion of the corners of the upper tier, according to the following diagram, 4 feet. 4 feet. 4 feet. 4 feet. I am induced to remark, that the same object, that of carrying more water in tanks, may be much better and more economically effected, by increasing the depth of the midship tiers of tanks to 6 feet, instead of 4 feet, as at present. No loss of space would then arise by cutting off corners, and the economy of the thing no one can dispute, since the only additional material and workmanship would be that due to 2 feet more of sides. Such a tank as I propose, viz. 4 feet square by 6 feet (or even 8 feet), could contain 2 tons of water, instead of 1 ton, which the 4 feet cube contains. There will also be a considerable saving in weight, for instead of having the entire case of a new tank, to hold the additional quantity of water, we should only have the increase of the weight of the sides due to 2 feet more height. The weight of a tank of 4 feet cube, is nearly 6 cwt. or the weight of one = 1.12 cwt. Hence the weight of the upright sides is 6.75 2:24 = 4:51 cwt. and, consequently, the weight of 1 foot of the upright sides is 4:51 112 cwt. and hence the additional weight of the tank of 4 feet square, and 6 feet high, would be 224 cwt. Now the weight of a corner cut tank is 4 cwt, and hence there will be a saving of 2:51 cwt. of iron in each tank, by the adoption of the proposed plan, besides the accompanying advantage of being able to stow a greater quantity of water. 4 feet. side is 6.75 6 4 In a first-rate ship, therefore, an unnecessary weight of 10 tons is incurred, by the precipitate adoption of such a blundering alternative; as if the simplest method of stowing an additional quantity of water, were not the increasing of the vessel in which it is to be contained. The only argument that I can perceive, for the adoption of this plan is the benefit that it affords to the iron trade. Were I an ironmaster, and wholly wrapped up in selfinterest, I should recommend that the present four feet cubed tanks be divided and subdivided ad infinitum; that there should be as many bottoms and tops as possible, and the corners taken off into the bargain. However, joking apart, I do sincerely trust that these matters will soon be squared again. Portsmouth Yard, 1831. *The St. Vincent was stowed with them at this port. IRONSIDES. SERVICE AFLOAT DURING THE LATE WAR.* BEING THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF A NAVAL OFFICER. HALIFAX during the winter months (which, if the period of frost and snow, fogs and sleet, be considered as such, include six out of the twelve) must be but a dreary place, more particularly in time of peace, when the garrison and squadron, which are the life and soul of it, are so much reduced. Nevertheless there are many advantages to be had here, especially in the cheapness of the living; those in particular who like salt cod and the finest partridges, may contrive to live excellently well. Of the former, I have seen one weighing upwards of twenty pounds sold for a shilling. The town is irregular, and for the most part built of wood. The harbour is one of the finest in the world. Our visit contributed in no small degree to give life and animation to the place; in particular we commenced a series of dramatic representations, with Home's Tragedy of Douglas, which was got up in a style that astonished the natives. But that which excited the greatest admiration amongst the honest Halifaxonians was a magnificent ball given on board our ship by the Admiral a short time previous to our departure, and which probably eclipsed any thing of the kind before witnessed in these hyperborean regions. For this purpose, the ship was hauled alongside the dock-yard wharf, through which an avenue of pine-trees and other evergreens, suddenly transferred from the neighbouring forest as if by the touch of enchantment, produced a novel and pleasing effect. The whole length of the deck, from the forecastle to the taffrail, (the main-deck being sparred over for the occasion) having a temporary roofing of plank, was internally decorated with flags and various emblematical devices. Two orchestras, one for the band of the 8th regiment, the other for our own, were tastefully fitted up round the main and mizen masts in a corresponding style; the whole formed a ball-room of one hundred and eighty feet in length by twenty-four broad, which when lighted up, and animated by a brilliant moving mass of between five and six hundred gay visitors, including the officers of the garrison and the ships in port, with all the beauty and fashion of Halifax, furnished a coup-d'œil not often witnessed on board ship. After an agreeable interval of three months we bade adieu to Halifax, and, to say truth, nothing loth, notwithstanding the fascinating smiles of its belles,-it being celebrated for pretty women-for already sundry visits and hints from the Barber (as the cutting northwestern blast is called by the seamen) had given us a specimen of a Nova Scotia winter. The vicissitudes of this climate are as sudden as intemperate; it is no uncommon thing to experience a change of temperature of thirty, forty, and even fifty degrees of Fahrenheit in the course of an hour. A shift of wind from a southern to a north-west quarter at once changes the scene, and transfers you from a torrid to an arctic clime. We did not, however, bid farewell to these stormy regions without a taste of their quality. Although but the beginning of November, “dread Winter" had already "spread around his glooms, and reigned * Continued from page 359, Part III. 1831. U. S. JOURN. No. 38. JAN. 1832. F tremendous o'er the conquered year." We quitted the harbour in a snow-storm, and had not been long at sea ere it came on to blow a gale; this increasing, by midnight it was found necessary to keep all hands on deck, to furl the courses, fore and mizen-top sails, and close reef the main-top sail. It was now that the enervating effects of a warm climate were felt and exhibited by us all. It was a bitter cold night, and blowing tremendously hard. As I sat shivering on the collar of the main-stay superintending the operation of furling the main-sail, with difficulty retaining my station from numbness and the heavy lurching of the ship, I could not avoid thinking that I had seen "these matters better managed" among our channel cruisers. Although we had as fine-looking a body of men as one might wish to see, they seemed to have lost much of their native energy, and it was with the greatest difficulty, after more than an hour's striving, that the sail was at last made snug. Sleet and snow was so new to many of us that we felt quite out of our element, and we by no means regretted being en route for a kindlier clime. A few days wafted us thither, and we accomplished the remainder of the passage without other accident than carrying away our main-yard in the slings in a sudden squall of wind. On the 17th of December we made Deseada. On the 18th, between that island and Guadaloupe, we were joined by His Majesty's sloop Pultusk, a small brig of ten guns, which brought us information of the vicinity of two enemy's frigates La Loire and La Seine, at anchor in the small bay of Anee La Barque, a few miles to the northward of the town of Basseterre. On rounding the south end of the island a little after noon, we found an attack had already been commenced on these by a squadron consisting of the Sceptre, 74, the Blonde, Thetis, and Freja frigates, and the Hazard, Cygnet, and Ringdove sloops, under the command of Commodore Ballard in the former frigate; and on our arrival, they were warmly engaged with the enemy's ships, and a strong battery defending the bay to the northward. Calms and baffling winds under the high land prevented us from approaching sufficiently near to be more than spectators of the affair, and by the time we had closed sufficiently to take an active part in it, the battery was silenced, and the two frigates in flames. This, however, had not been effected without considerable loss on our side. The enemy's ships made a gallant resistance, and the battery, placed on a commanding eminence, made great havoc on board the Blonde and Thetis, within musket-shot distance, until carried by a detachment of seamen and marines, headed by Capt. Cameron of the Hazard sloop-of-war, who, landing to the left of the battery, and gallantly mounting to the assault up a steep and broken acclivity, drove the enemy forth and took possession. This brilliant little enterprise had been achieved hitherto without loss to the storming-parties, and it was not until the victory was gallantly won, and they were quitting the fort, that their gallant chief, while exultingly bringing up the rear with the well-earned trophy, the hostile flag, which he had himself lowered, hanging on his arm, was struck by a musket-ball which killed him on the spot. It was said that the fatal shot came from one of our own party, who, seeing him issue from the battery with a tricoloured ensign, mistook him for a Frenchman. The two frigates continued burning a considerable time, and the flames did not reach the powder until after the evening had closed. The explo sion was terrible. The flaming fragments of the wrecks, masts, and yards, projected high in the air with the eruptive force of Etna or Vesuvius, brilliantly illumined the atmosphere around, and furnished a grand and imposing spectacle. The recent capture of Martinico, Mariagalante, and the Saintes, had left the islands of Guadaloupe and its two small dependencies, St. Martin's and St. Eustatius, the only remaining transatlantic possessions of the enemy; and the moment was at hand when those also were to be wrested from them. In conformity with orders which reached head-quarters about this time, in the month of January, an expedition against these islands was prepared. Troops were collected from the different stations, together with the means of transport, and the whole were assembled in the noble and capacious harbour of Fort Royal, to which also was transferred the head-quarters of the Admiral's flag. The military force formed altogether an effective body of six thousand seven hundred men. These were divided into five brigades, subdivided into two divisions and a reserve; the third and fourth forming the first division, under the command of Major-Gen. Hislop, and Brig.Generals M'Lean and Skinner; the first and second, the second division, under Major-Gen. Harcourt and Brig.-Gen. Barrow; while the fifth brigade, one thousand five hundred strong, under the command of Major-Gen. Wale, was to act as the reserve. The whole were under the chief command of Lieut.-Gen. Sir George Beckwith. The embarkation being completed by the 22nd, the fleet of menof-war and transports weighed on that day, and proceeded to Prince Rupert's Bay, Dominica, which, being contiguous to the theatre of intended operations, was appointed as the general rendezvous. Here the final arrangements and dispositions having been made, the fleet weighed on the morning of the 26th, the second division proceeding to the Saintes, a small group of islands recently dependant on, and distant about three leagues from the southern extremity of, Guadaloupe. There it anchored the same day; while the first division and the reserve steered for the anchorage of Gosier, on the southern shore of that part of the island called Grande Terre, and reached it on the 27th. Guadaloupe is of an irregular figure, forty-five miles long and thirtyfive broad, being about 240 miles in circumference. It is divided in the centre (where an arrow isthmus, of six or eight miles in breadth, probably once connected the two parts,) by an arm of the sea called the Salt River. It may thus be said to form two distinct islands, differing essentially in climate, soil, and general character. The western division, or that which gives the name to the whole, is mountainous and rocky. A lofty range, extending north and south, terminates at the southern extremity by the cloud-capped summits of the still more lofty Souffrier, or the Brimstone mountain; a volcanic elevation which continually emits through various openings a thick black smoke, accompanied by sparks and flames, which are visible at night. On the western or leeward side of this ridge, contra-distinguished from the eastern, or Cape Terre, by the name of Basse Terre, stands the city called by the latter name, and used as the seat of government of the island. This is a large and well-built town, but unfavourably situated for trade, there being no harbour or shelter for vessels in the roads, the anchorage of which is rocky and unsafe. From every hill and valley |