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The Dongola Expedition

tion, and might subject us to the humiliation of scuttling out of it in an undignified manner in case of troubles elsewhere, as France was forced to leave Rome hurriedly in 1870. But there we are, and I do not see how we can go till we have provided an efficient substitute.

I am afraid I differ from most Liberals in being in favour of the Dongola expedition. The patient and industrious peasantry of Egypt suffered cruelly from the tyrannical domination of the Dervishes, and I sympathise with them as I do with the Armenians, though their skin is dark and their creed is Islâm. To break the power of the Dervishes is surely a service to humanity and civilisation. Mr. John Morley thinks that facts have refuted the two reasons given for the expedition to Dongola, namely, the relief of Kasala and the insecurity of the Egyptian frontier. Yet even so, I should hold the expedition justified by the recovery of a rich province from Dervish misrule. Nevertheless, I believe that there is more in the two reasons given for the expedition than Mr. Morley admits. The danger to Kasala after the disaster of Adowa is not disproved by Italy's subsequent half-formed intention of evacuating the place. I was in Rome at the time, and can testify that the danger was believed by the Italian Ministry to be a very real one. An attack on Kasala by the whole Dervish force at that critical moment might have succeeded, with the result of the

justified by the Facts and Results

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massacre of the Italian garrison. If that had followed the defeat in Abyssinia, it is doubtful whether the monarchy would have survived the tragedy. I rejoiced, therefore, when it was announced that the order had been given for an expedition to Dongola. The diversion thus caused probably saved Kasala, and it is not logical to infer from that safety the inutility of what caused it. Nor does the feebleness of the Dervish resistance to the Egyptian force prove that the Dervishes were not a source of danger. True, they could make no head against the frontier force at Wady Halfa. They were too prudent to try. But the contiguity of their presence, their minute knowledge of the desert, and their occasional raids, diffused a general sense of insecurity among the peasantry. On all accounts, therefore, I believe the expedition has done good service, and I trust, for my part, that the malign power of the Khalifa will be destroyed by the capture of his stronghold, which I believe will not be a difficult matter. The impetuous rush of the desert warriors is useless against disciplined troops with quick-firing guns and led by officers whom they trust. Having seen a good deal of the Egyptian and black troops, I had no doubt as to the success of the expedition, and I have still less doubt of its success if it should advance on Khartum. Whatever may be settled about Egypt, I, for one, shall rejoice at the delivery of as large an area as possible from the cruel yoke of the Dervishes.

CHAPTER XX.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

THERE are many aspects of the Eastern question on which I have not touched at all in the foregoing pages, for my object has been to confine my criticism to what is germane to the present situation. It remains only to notice a few points which escaped my memory when I was writing, or on which I touched too briefly.

The first is the following remark by the Duke of Argyll in the interesting letter which he published in the Times of October 28:

I have always held firmly to the great principle for which the Crimean War was waged-the principle, namely, that the fate of Turkey and the final disposal of her territories is a matter for Europe, as a whole, to determine, and not for any one of its Powers. If this principle was good against Russia in 1854-6, it is equally good against England now. If we were to attempt such a task alone--directly or indirectly-a great war would be inevitable.

I have already observed on the contention of the Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone, that the Crimean War was waged to repel a violation of the public law of Europe, as explained in the passage just quoted from the Duke of Argyll.

'Status quo ante' Crimean War

1

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Doubtless that was the impression at the time. It was the impression propagated so sedulously by the late Emperor of the French, by Lord Palmerston, and by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. And it is the impression which has possessed the public mind. A careful study of the official and other evidence, some of it unavailable then, has convinced me that the impression is erroneous. I have already shown who the real authors of the Crimean War were, and their motives. Before the Crimean War the relations of the Great Powers towards the Christians of Turkey, vis-à-vis of the Porte, were these: with the tacit, if not formal, consent of Europe, Russia exercised a protectorate over the members of the Eastern Churches; France over those in communion of the Pope; and Great Britain over Anglicans and other Christian communions. The other Great Powers did not interfere unless their intervention was invited by one or more of the three Powers named. The result of this arrangement was that when any outrage took place, the Porte found itself confronted by one Great Power, with the acquiescence, if not active support, of one or two more. Its plan of playing the Powers against each other was thus frustrated, and it either yielded, or, if it proved recalcitrant, it might be coerced by a combination of Powers, and some of its territory wrested from it, as in the case of Greece. This was the status quo ante the Crimean War, and Napoleon was

286

Statement of the Russian Case

the first to disturb it, in order to fasten a quarrel on the Emperor Nicholas preparatory to the war on which he had set his heart, provided that he succeeded in manoeuvring England into it. After sundry vexatious encroachments on the rights of Russia as protector of the Orthodox in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, Napoleon got a firman from the Sultan in favour of France, which ousted Russia from her traditional and acknowledged position. Nicholas, one of the ablest and most clear-sighted sovereigns of modern times, saw that Russia's whole position as protector of the Orthodox Christians of the East was at stake, and, on the principle of principiis obsta, he determined to make a stand at once. was, in fact, the hinge on which the whole controversy turned, though the real issue was disguised by the subtle craft of the diplomatists of France, England, and Austria. Russia was asking nothing new. Here is her case as stated by Baron Jomini on behalf of the Russian Government years after the dust and bitterness of the controversy had passed away :

That

In effect our claims had for their aim to confirm the obligations which the Porte had contracted towards us as to the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of the Orthodox Church; and to guarantee the status quo without any prejudice to the other forms of worship, without any innovation arming us with new rights. In the situation which had been made for us this demand was nothing but equitable. It seemed to us just and necessary, since the ancient guarantees had just