recommends. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all." Contrary motives are like advocates pleading opposite sides of a cause at the bar; the decision lies with the judge. If an action be traced to the agent as its efficient cause, Reid thinks there can be no difficulty in conceiving liberty. The points which provoke criticism here are the denial of efficiency or power in physical causation, the statement that volitions are possible without motives, and, lastly, the assertion of freedom of the will in the sense of a self-determining power. Reid's theory of freedom, though shared by eminent writers of the present day, seems to imply the fiction of an abstract will or ego, sitting apart from conflicting motives and arbitrarily choosing between them. If the efficient cause be thus separated from motives, then, as in the liberty of indifference, there is no ground for moral approval or disapproval, or for the prediction of human actions from character. If, on the other hand, as Reid is willing to admit, only those actions are moral which are influenced by moral motives, his theory of freedom requires revision. Moral action must be the expression of character, and thus freedom consists, not in Personality displaying itself in independency of or in an arbitrary sovereignty over motives, but in the fact that man is capable of forming and acting upon a moral ideal. And there is nothing parallel to this in the sphere of physical causation.

Reid has not elaborated his views on Natural

Theology in a separate treatise. But from his frequent references to this subject, we may gather that he would

base his argument for the Divine existence and character on the principle of efficient cause; on the evidences of design; and on the dictates of our moral nature. Here, as elsewhere, he is ready with principles of common sense. That the most perfect moral rectitude is to be ascribed to the Deity," and "that man is a moral and accountable being, capable of acting right and wrong, and answerable for his conduct to Him that made him," are, he thinks, "principles prescribed by every man's conscience." As Professor Fraser has pointed out in his Thomas Reid (in the Famous Scots series), it is characteristic of Reid's later thought that he attaches the greatest importance to the distinction between physical and efficient cause, physical science being "concerned only with the laws or methods according to which Power operates." In volition we are conscious of efficient causation; and it seemed to him that the working of the great machine of the material world, in accordance with constant laws, required the continual operation of Divine power.

Imperfect as was the philosophy of Reid, it was yet, in some important respects, an advance in the right direction. Inculcating a sturdy faith in the veracity of human nature, it had an immediate effect; it saved his countrymen from the subjective phenomenalism which afterwards became fashionable in the south; and its assertion of necessary truths made it comparatively easy for the student of philosophy to appreciate the deeper analysis of Kant. Introduced into France by Royer-Collard, it acted as a powerful counterpoise against the sensualistic and materialistic philosophy which in that country had been the result of

empiricism; the works of Reid were translated by Jouffroy; and it was to Reid that Cousin devoted the greatest attention, with praises which now appear exaggerated, in his Philosophie Ecossaise. Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid, published in 1858, is a testimony to the duration of his influence in Great Britain. And though philosophy has now flowed forward into other channels, Professor Pringle-Pattison has rendered good service, in his lectures on Scottish Philosophy, by comparing-with special reference to Reid-the Scottish and German answers to Hume. Professor Sidgwick, in an article in Mind for April, 1895, recorded his opinion that the student "may even now find profit in communing with the earnest, patient, lucid and discerning intellect of the thinker, who, in the history of modern speculation, has connected the name of Scotland with the Philosophy of Common Sense." And no one who has read the Methods of Ethics can have failed to notice the value attached by its author to common-sense beliefs as starting-points for practice and for speculative investigation.

CHAPTER VIII.

GEORGE CAMPBELL (1719-1796).

CAMPBELL was one of the original members of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, founded by Reid. The discussions of the Society took a wide range, including scientific as well as philosophical topics. Particular attention, however, was paid to "the philosophy of mind," and members generally agreed with Reid in opposing a doctrine of common sense to the scepticism of Hume. In a letter written in 1763, Reid conveys to Hume the compliments of his "friendly adversaries," Campbell, Gerard, and Gregory, and adds: "Your company would, although we are all good Christians, be more acceptable than that of St. Athanasius; and since we cannot have you on the bench, you are brought oftener than any other man to the bar, accused and defended with great zeal, but without bitterness." Campbell's contributions to the Society consisted chiefly of papers which were afterwards incorporated in his Philosophy of Rhetoric. This and other works gave him the reputation of being one of the most vigorous thinkers and writers of his day;

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but it was only incidentally that he dealt with the problems of philosophy in the stricter meaning of the word.

George Campbell, the son of a clergyman in Aberdeen, was born on the 25th December, 1719. He was destined for the law, but showed a strong liking for the church, and after attending theological lectures in Edinburgh passed through the Aberdeen Divinity Hall. He was ordained minister of Banchory Ternan in 1748, and nine years later became one of the ministers of Aberdeen. Here, in the midst of congenial society, he prosecuted the plans of study which he had already begun. In 1759 he was made Principal of Marischal College. In 1763 he published his Dissertation on Miracles in reply to Hume; and in 1771 he was elected Professor of Divinity in Marischal College, relinquishing the city charge which he had continued to hold in conjunction with the office of Principal. His Philosophy of Rhetoric appeared in 1776. Among his other works were a Translation of the Four Gospels with preliminary dissertations, and Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, published after his death. He resigned his office in 1795, receiving a royal pension, and died of paralysis in the following year, a few months before the death of Reid.

Though none of Campbell's works are purely philosophical, his Dissertation on Miracles and Philosophy of Rhetoric contain references to first principles. Hume had contended that no testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle. The evidence of testimony, he had argued, is founded on experience; but a firm and unalterable experience has established the laws of