wisdom and goodness of Providence. Pleasure at large cannot be the proper standard of estimation; for we must specify our pleasure, selecting that only which is conditioned by virtue. Again, Beauty and Deformity may be resolved into Excellence and Defect. Ferguson agrees with Alison, whose Essay had been recently published, that material objects can give no emotion of beauty save as associated with some character or disposition of mind. All beauty is in reality beauty of mind, indicating either the wisdom and goodness of the Creator or the good meaning and temper of His creature. Thus beauty has no meaning apart from excellence, in which man is doubly interested, both as an agreeable object of contemplation and as an end to be attained. Man is so constituted as to be able to perceive excellence, and to perceive is to admire and esteem it as superior to pleasure, interest, or safety.

In

What, then, is the specific excellence of man? answer to this question Ferguson falls back on the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude, including Beneficence under the larger meaning of Justice, and defining Wisdom as "a just discernment of the considerations on which we are to rely for happiness, and the undisturbed possession of the faculties which are given for the government of life." Prosperity and Adversity are dealt with also in the Stoical manner. The gifts of fortune are valuable only in the use which is made of them; "to be reasonably and properly occupied about them is enough." Virtue is at once the preferable pleasure and the proper use of the situation in which we are placed. Lastly, the specific good of human beings is

summed up under the title of Happiness, to be gained only by continued habits of wisdom, beneficence, fortitude, and temperance. Or, as he puts it otherwise, Perfection is always to be aimed at.

"If we are asked, therefore, what is the principle of moral approbation in the human mind, we may answer, It is the Idea of perfection or excellence, which the intelligent and associated being forms to himself; and to which he refers in every sentiment of esteem or contempt, and in every expression of commendation or censure."

He fully admits the difference of moral judgments in different nations and individuals, but he thinks that, when we penetrate to the intention of an act, there is no difference relating to the intimate nature of good and evil. Different opinions as to the beneficial or hurtful effects of conduct may lead men to act and judge very differently, but in all cases the cardinal virtues must be approved.

While Ferguson thus lays stress on Virtue, Excellence, and Perfection, we are struck by his readiness to substitute for these the idea of Happiness. The happiness of which he speaks is indeed to be distinguished from pleasure generally. But yet he tells us that "the distinction of good and evil originates in the capacity of enjoyment and suffering"; and, defining good as "that which being enjoyed constitutes happiness," he regards happiness as "peculiar to sentient beings," and as constituted by enjoyments which are habitual, lasting, and conceived to be secure. And when he comes to the important subject of the obliga

tion and sanctions of morality, he takes up the position that the will of a free agent can be determined only by presenting happiness as the reward of virtue, and misery as the punishment of vice. The principle, as he says, is the same, whether virtue be its own reward, or whether a reward be attached to it by an extrinsic fiat. Thus we are brought round, after all, to a modified hedonism. Enjoyment, conditioned by the habitual exercise of virtue, is made both the end and the motive of moral conduct.

It is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with Ferguson's avowed preference for Stoic as opposed to Epicurean philosophy, and with his frequent assertions that the activity of a strenuous, wise, and beneficent mind is itself the very good that we ought to pursue. To the mind of Ferguson, probably, it appeared of little consequence whether the end of man were stated in terms of virtue or of happiness, so profoundly was he convinced that the only true and lasting happiness is to be obtained through virtuous activity. Again and

again in the history of philosophy, from Socrates to Mill, the ideas of virtue and enjoyment have been blended together by men who felt, with Ferguson, that they could find their happiness only in a virtuous life. But the moral philosopher must make his choice between a doctrine which places the supreme good in virtuous activity, with the resultant pleasure as a concomitant or added element, and the opposing doctrine which derives morality from the sentient nature of man and consequently finds the end in enjoyment. In attempting to unite both these views, Ferguson leaves us with an unreconciled difficulty. The confusion may

be due, in part, to the somewhat large and loose rhetorical style of the Principles. But from the general tenor of his work, there can be no doubt that the fullest exercise of human faculty, apart from considerations of pleasure or of interest, was the end which was most prominent in his mind. His leading thought was excellence or perfection rather than happiness in the sense of enjoyment; and, as Cousin has said, the principle of perfection was at once more rational and more comprehensive than the principles of benevolence and sympathy which had been held by some of his predecessors. It was a true instinct which sent Ferguson back to the old Greek thinkers; and under their guidance he has given us much that is in harmony with later thought. He is especially clear and noble when he speaks of the universal standpoint of morality, and of man as a social and progressive being, whose nature is to be judged by what he may become rather than by what he is. In the literary and social history of Scotland in the eighteenth century Ferguson will always find an honoured place, though he will probably be remembered more as a moral teacher than as a moral philosopher.

CHAPTER XII.

DUGALD STEWART-(1753-1828).

THE mantle of Reid fell on Dugald Stewart, who imbibed the spirit and adopted the methods of his master. With slight claims to originality, Stewart was greatly superior to Reid in culture and expository talent, and in his hands the national philosophy acquired an added grace and polish.

Dugald Stewart was born in Edinburgh, where his father was professor of mathematics, on the 22nd November, 1753. During his early years, spent partly in the dwelling-house on the old College grounds and partly on his father's property at Catrine, in Ayrshire, his health was feeble and precarious. Passing through the High School, where he acquired a love of the Latin poets, he entered the University in 1765, completing his course in 1769. Here, again, we are struck with astonishment at the early age at which boys were sent to the Scottish Universities. Yet, elementary as the University education must have been in some respects, it cannot be doubted that it often acted as a powerful stimulus. The art of