shows a true appreciation of the function of philosophy in limiting himself to the consideration of first principles, in declining to bow down before any popular verdict, and in electing to follow the guidance of reason whithersoever it may lead. His attack on psychology is, in reality, an attack on the psychological philosophy which confused the theory of fundamental principles or elements of reason with the science of mental phenomena. And nothing could be more effective than his exposure of the error of the philosophy which restricts our knowledge to phenomena, while asserting the existence of unknown substances or noumena. He is justified also, it seems to me, in taking human knowledge as our only clue to all knowledge. a strange infatuation which feigned the existence of unknown substances for ever impenetrable to the human intellect, and then perpetrated a double futility in supposing them to be known by an Intelligence of whose action we can form no idea. Is it not clear that we are using words without meaning when we speak of a possible knowledge which has nothing in common with the knowledge of which we are conscious? Our knowledge, however imperfect, must be to us the type of all other knowledge. If matter per se, or the ego per se, cannot be known to us, what right have we to assert their existence? And we lose ourselves still more hopelessly in the realms of the inane when we suppose a Transcendent Intelligence who may be acquainted, in a way which we cannot be, with the supposed transcendent realities.

Ferrier was fully in accord with recent speculation, not only in his separation of metaphysics from

psychology, but also in placing a theory of knowledge in the forefront of his philosophy. But his last and most important step-the transition from the theory of Knowing to the theory of Being-requires to be carefully watched. The starting-point of his theory is the synthesis of the individual self with the contingent elements of knowledge. The total object of knowledge is the "thing, or thought, mecum." This is the utmost of which each individual can be immediately aware. Since representation is based on presentation, Ferrier is enabled to say that this law must hold good for every intelligence of which we can form any conception. But so far, other minds are hypothetical only; and where is the evidence of their existence? He has nowhere shown that, on his premises, he is entitled to pass to the existence of finite minds other than himself. And his transition to a Supreme and Infinite Intelligence in synthesis with things proceeds on the assumption-for it is nothing more-that there is a universe independent of our finite minds. The con

siderations that there was a time when the universe was without man, and that there may be worlds beyond the ken of finite intelligence, suppose that we have already transcended, in some way, the synthesis of things with the finite mind; and the question arises how this fatal leap is justified. If we assume an infinite eternal universe, stretching beyond finite intelligence, then, on Ferrier's premises, we are warranted in asserting an infinite and eternal Ego; but not otherwise. That each of us is convinced of the existence of worlds of mind and matter, independent of his finite consciousness, is most true; but this conviction cannot

be forced upon us by the assurance that every possible intelligence must know in accordance with the law of subject and object. This universal condition still fails. to establish the existence of other minds. And the condition is satisfied, as Ferrier tells us, when the object is equivalent to nonentity, or to the particular in knowledge of which we are wholly ignorant. With these possibilities before us, we see how far we are, in the assertion of an abstract Ego in synthesis with things, from a Theism worthy of the name. Even if we grant Ferrier his infinite percipient and infinite perceived, as different aspects of one and the same reality, this does not satisfy the Theistic conception of God. A certain thinness of treatment and of result is the inevitable consequence of the narrow platform of Ferrier's initial proposition. However ingeniously, however eloquently, he seems to be saying the same thing over and over again. Many questions which lie within the province of philosophy are left untouched, and the abstract formula of "subject + object" is seen in the end to be inadequate to the requirements of speculation or of religion.

The influence of Berkeley is strongly marked throughout the speculations of Ferrier, and he owed much, probably, to Hamilton's theory of the relation of subject and object as a necessary condition of knowledge. He does not appear to have been fully aware of his indebtedness to German philosophy. Yet, when we compare his philosophy with that of Kant, we find the same prominence given to a theory of knowledge, the same separation of philosophy from psychology, the same refusal to follow the guidance of popular thought,

and even the same Copernican illustration of the distinction between the ordinary thoughts of men and the results to be attained by the savant or the philosopher.1 Thus, though the immediate influence of Ferrier on his contemporaries may not have been great, he anticipated the wave of continental speculation which was destined to change the character of Scottish philosophy in the latter half of the century. And the neo-Kantian speculation of recent years reproduces much that had been more simply said in the Institutes of Ferrier.

It has been impossible, in a sketch like the present, to convey an adequate idea of the charm of Ferrier's literary style. What, for example, could be happier

than the following characterisation of Plato?

Nevertheless, if Plato was confused and unsystematic in execution, he was large in design, and magnificent in surmises. His pliant genius sits close to universal reality, like the sea which fits in to all the sinuosities of the land. Not a shore of thought was left untouched by his murmuring lip. Over deep and over shallow he rolls on, broad, urbane, and unconcerned."

And this is only a specimen of the felicities which are scattered throughout his writings.

1"Are we to suppose that the real revolutions of the celestial spheres differ widely from their apparent courses; and that the same great law does not rule, and may not be found out, in the movements of human thought that mightier than planetary scheme?"-Institutes, Introduction, sec. 65.

CHAPTER XVII.

AESTHETIC THEORIES.

THE Aesthetic theories favoured by writers of the Scottish school, from Hutcheson downward, are marked by a strong family likeness. They are almost unanimous in adopting a psychological method of inquiry, discussing the characteristics of our feeling of the Beautiful, and asking by what quality or qualities it is excited. Hutcheson's theory of the beautiful is so important a part of his philosophy that it has already been considered, and the theory of Kames has also been noticed. I propose now to summarise, as briefly as may be, the results arrived at by other thinkers.

The theory of the Beautiful was commonly called the theory of Taste, the name indicating that Beauty, like the pleasures of the palate, has no existence apart from the mind which feels it. In this spirit, Hume held it to be certain that beauty and deformity are not qualities in objects, but belong entirely to sentiment. The sentiment of the beautiful is evoked by such an order and construction of parts as, either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by