growth or production? If its "particles" did not begin to be, at that period, as he has admitted, why infer that his thinking principle began to be, and had no previous existence? We can neither make nor destroy matter, by any chemical or philosophical exertion whatsoever. We can only change its appearance and sensible qualities. And why not, in preference, suppose, (as supposition is Mr. Locke's philosophy on this subject,) that the thinking principle existed from all eternity, although memory, as in a dream, has been placed in abeyance for a good and wise purpose; and as the primary atoms of any thing which exists could never have begun to be, so, therefore, whether matter or mind, they can never cease to be—the Divine Mind and Architect of the Universe giving them what locality or form of existence in his wisdom and justice he may think proper.

Mr. Locke might as well have disputed the pre-existence of the carbon and hydrogen, that combustion or decomposition

proves to be the chief materials of animals and plants, because he could not have told what form or appearance those gases had in the variety of animals and plants they had alternately nourished and become incorporated in, as have disputed the pre-existence of that consciousness which he affirms, in his works, that we have more reason to believe in the existence of, than we have to believe in the existence of our sensations, or of any thing in nature. And as it would have been unphilosophical to have supposed that the conscious or "thinking being" ever began to be, so would it have been equally unphilosophical to have supposed that the constituents of visible matter ever began to be: his argument against the eternity of matter, therefore, goes for nothing, and its absurdity is most clearly evinced by admitting his premises; for, if he had proved that spirit was created out of nothing, he could have had no difficulty in proving that the Deity was continually creating at the desire of the meanest of his

creatures, and the most wicked and abandoned of mankind.

The next thing which should be considered in connexion with this argument is consciousness.-What is it?

Consciousness, according to the opinions of Des Cartes and other philosophers, can be separated from sensation so far as for any one to feel assured of his existence, without using any of those properties of mind which are called senses. As I imagine that I exist-therefore, I am conscious of existence! But why not enumerate consciousness in the list of our senses?-Can I have a knowledge of my existence in syncope or sleep, more than I can have a knowledge of hearing, seeing, &c.?- In reflecting, I feel that I exist.-Is not consciousness, then, in reality, a sensation arising from contemplation ?-We distinguish different properties of mind by names, and it has been considered necessary, without any good reason, to separate consciousness from the sensation of feeling, in con

but

sequence, philosophers say, of there being no external sensation that would convey an image to the mind! But why not consider it equally a sensation with hearing, seeing, smelling, &c., which likewise form no images or shadows of themselves, without internal or external examination; nevertheless exist, and are either active or latent, from circumstances, as consciousness, when awake or asleep? They are all properties of what has been called the subject of thought, or mind, and conduce separately or collectively to prove the existence of the body they are connected with, and the objects that surround them.

The theory neither of impulses nor repulsions can account for what are called the perceptions of the mind, no more than they can account for what are called its sensations. Neither can consciousness be separated from sensation. Des Cartes says, "I am thinking, therefore I am" but can thought be accounted for, more than the mode of communicating the images on the

58 Sir Isaac Newton-Sentient Substance.

retina through the optic nerve to the mind? I might as well say, I see, therefore I am, and have as much reason to believe in the existence of external objects as I have in my own capacity for reflection.

Sir Isaac Newton says, "Is not the sensorium of animals the place where the sentient substance is present, and to which the sensible species of things are brought through the nerves and brain, that they may be perceived by the mind present in that place?"

We agree in opinion, that the mind has all those properties which are called perceptions and sensations,-the nerves being, in my opinion, its feelers or agents. But what reason have we for calling the mind a sentient substance? or using such language as the sensible species of things?—A sentient substance either supposes matter to be sensible, (in the way he used it limiting the number of senses,) and to have consciousness, memory, and volition; or used analogically to express the animating principle