"which stirs within us," it is evident from his works that he meant the latter, and was any thing but a materialist,—The analogical language of Plato, Locke, and their followers,-sensible species of things, images, shadows, phantasms, impressions, ideas, has been proved by Dr. Reid and Dugald Stewart to be inadequate to explain or account for the phenomena of mind. It feels conscious of its existence, and equally conscious of the existence of external objects, let its modes of operation be distinguished as they may. No man will ever be able to explain how mind acts on matter to enable him to lift his arm contrary to the laws of gravity, or why a particle of matter cannot be destroyed. He will be equally acquainted with the facts, but from induction; he can never go farther. He may,

from an examination of nature, shew the probability of the electric fluid being the medium through which mind communicates motion to matter-but he cannot shew how mind operates upon it, how that which has

neither weight nor sensible appearance can impel that which has-this is beyond the reach of man. We know that we have the mysterious power of willing and acting in a limited sphere-no more; and we may reasonably suppose that we are a portion of that Great Intelligence, which wills in wisdom and in love the operations of the uni

verse.

If we can only change the form of a particle of matter, but not destroy its constituent parts, we have no analogy or reason in nature for supposing that the mind can be destroyed-like heat, it may, by accident or design, be lost to the operation of our senses; but through every evolution of time it continues latent, indestructible, immortal. The matter which gave form to one plant or animal gives form to another, or is diffused through many, according to the will of the Deity. In like manner, the life of one animal may give life to another, or be diffused through many, according to the will of the Deity. But it does not follow,

that an all-good and benevolent Deity would allow to be diffused, or lost to consciousness and a knowledge of its unity, that to which he gave a longing after immortality, with capacity and powers of mind beyond our penetration, and which, in the most learned man that ever has existed, or will exist for ages to come, was, and will be in infancy, in comparison to the maturity which it is capable of attaining.

Des Cartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, in their writings on the human understanding, have proved by logical reasoning, what I corroborate by an examination of nature, that sensation is in the mind, and not in the part which is injured or disturbed.

We agree in the position that colour, smell, taste, sound, heat, and cold, which the unreflecting take to be qualities of body, are not qualities of body, but mere sensations of the mind. But I do not arrive at the spiritualizing conclusions of Berkeley, nor the sceptical materializing deductions of Hume. I cannot agree with Berkeley, that

G

we have the same reasons to hold FIGURE

AND

EXTENSION то BE MERE SENSATIONS, AS WE HAVE COLOUR, SMELL, TASTE, SOUND, &C.; AND, THEREFORE,

THAT THERE IS NOTHING MATERIAL IN

EXISTENCE :—nor with Hume, who says, these sensations, which Des Cartes, Locke, and Berkeley call IDEAS, ARE MERE IMPRESSIONS MADE BY MATTER, and, therefore, that there is nothing spiritual in

existence.

It may be as well to state Hume's argument on this subject, from his "Enquiry on the Human Understanding," section the twelfth, in order to shew how easily it can be answered, AND THAT SCEPTICISM, of WHICH THIS HAS BEEN CONSIDERED THE

IMPERISHABLE BASIS, can no longer impose upon common sense, through the assumed and high-sounding title of philosophy.

He says, "It is universally allowed by modern inquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold,

white, black, &c., are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind without any external archetype or model which they represent. If this be allowed with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and SOLIDITY, nor can the LATTER be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling, and if all the qualities perceived by the senses be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas, or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by abstraction-an opinion which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd.”

In admitting that hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c., are mere sensations of