energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in natural species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already" in the instances of Φιλιππίζειν, Syllaturire, 'ATTоkaιoapwoývaι, and others, how substantives may be transformed into verbal attributives. We shall now shew how they may be converted into adjectives. When we say the party of Pompey, the style of Cicero, the philosophy of Socrates, in these cases the party, the style, and the philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect. Those persons, therefore, perform the part of attributes, that is, stamp and characterize their respective subjects. Hence, then, they actually pass into attributes, and assume as such the form of adjectives. And thus it is we say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian style, and the Socratic philosophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet of brass, we say a brazen trumpet; for a crown of gold, a golden crown, &c. Even pronominal substantives admit the like mutation. Thus, instead of saying, the book of me, of thee, and of him, we say, my book, thy book, and his book; instead of saying, the country of us, of you, and of them, we say, our country, your country, and their country; which words may be called so many pronominal adjectives.

It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that adjectives, as marking attributes, can have no sex." And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with nouns, and separating them from verbs, though with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to verbs, as both sorts denote attributes; they are heterogeneous with respect to nouns, as never properly denoting substances. But of this we have spoken before.

The attributives hitherto treated, that is to say, verbs, participles, and adjectives, may be called attributives of the first order. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed attributives of the second order, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCERNING ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER.

As the attributives hitherto mentioned denote the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the attributes only of attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind: when we say, "Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil, both of them wrote;" in these instances the attributives, eloquent and wrote, are immediately referable to the substantives, Cicero, Virgil, &c. As therefore denoting the attributes of substances, we call them attributives of the first order. But when we say, "Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably;" in these instances, the attributives, moderately, exceedingly, indifferently, admirably, are not referable to substantives, but to other attributives, that is, to the words eloquent and wrote. As therefore denoting attributes of attributes, we call them attributives of the second order.

Grammarians have given them the name of ἐπιῤῥήματα, adverbia, "adverbs." And indeed if we take the word pĥua, or “verb,” in its most comprehensive signification, as including not only verbs properly so called, but also participles and adjectives, [an usage which may be justified by the best authorities, we shall find the name erippnμa, or "adverb," to be a very just appellation, as denoting a part of speech, the natural appendage of verbs. So great is this dependence in grammatical syntax, that an adverb can no more subsist without its verb, than a verb can subsist without its substantive. It is the same here, as in certain natural subjects. Every colour for its existence as much requires a superficies, as the superficies for its existence requires a solid body."

9 Thus Aristotle, in his treatise De Interpretatione, instances v0pwπos as "a noun," and λeukos as "a verb." So Ammonius: Κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον, τὸ μὲν καλὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα— ῥήματα λέγεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ὀνόματα: “According to this signification, (that is, of denoting the attributes of substance and the predicate in propositions,) the words fair, just, and the like, are called verbs, and not nouns." Am. in libr. De Interp. p. 37. B. Arist. de Interp. I. i. c. 1. See also of this treatise, c. vi. note g, p. 141.

bant vel casuale. Priscian. 1. i. p.

574.

This notion of ranging the adverb under the same genus with the verb, (by calling them both attributives,) and of explaining it to be the verb's epithet or adjective, (by calling it the attributive of an attributive,) is conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an adverb as follows: Μέρος λόγου ἄπτωτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγό μενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, καὶ οἷον nieerov phuaтos: "A part of speech devoid of cases, predicated of a verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the verb's In the same manner the Stoics talked of adjective." 1. iv. (where, by the way, we the participle. Nam participium connu- may observe, how properly the adverb is merantes verbis, participiale verbum voca- made an aptote, since its principal some

Among the attributes of substance are reckoned quantities and qualities. Thus we say, "a white garment," "a high mountain."' Now some of these quantities and qualities are capable of intension and remission. Thus we say, "a garment exceedingly white;" "a mountain tolerably high, or moderately high." It is plain, therefore, that intension and remission are among the attributes of such attributes. Hence then one copious source of secondary attributives, or adverbs, to denote these two; that is, intension and remission. The Greeks have their Oavpaσтws, μάλιστα, πάνυ, ἥκιστα: the Latins their valde, vehementer, maxime, satis, mediocriter: the English, their greatly, castly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.

Further than this, where there are different intensions of the same attribute, they may be compared together. Thus, if the garment A be exceeedingly white, and the garment B be moderately white, we may say," the garment A is more white than the garment B."

In these instances, the adverb more not only denotes intension, but relative intension. Nay, we stop not here. We not only denote intension merely relative, but relative intension, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say, "the mountain A is more high than the mountain B," but "that it is the most high of all mountains." Even verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following example: "fame he loveth more than riches, but virtue of all things he loveth most ;" the words more and most denote the different comparative intensions of the verbal attributive loveth.

And hence the rise of comparison, and of its different degrees; which cannot well be more than the two species above mentioned, one to denote simple excess, and one to denote superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited number, when in all subjects, susceptible of intension, the intermediate excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite degrees of more white, between the first simple white, and the superlative, whitest; the same may be said of more great, more strong, more minute, &c. The doctrine of grammarians about three such degrees, which they call the positive, the comparative, and the superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their positive there is no comparison at all, and times has cases, as in valde sapiens; sometimes has none, as in valde amat.) Priscian's definition of an adverb is as follows: Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit adverbium verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix vir; feliciter vivit. 1. xv. p. 1003.

And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says, Etiam adverbia nominibus vel verbis connumerabant, et quasi adjectiva verborum nominabant. 1. i. p. 574. See also Apoll. de Synt. 1. i. c. 3. sub. fin.

Qui (scil. gradus positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero graduum non computatur. Consentii ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.

because their superlative is a comparative, as much as their comparative itself. Examples to evince this may be found everywhere. Socrates was the most wise of all the Athenians;

66

Homer was the most sublime of all poets."

Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris.

Virg.

It must be confessed, these comparatives, as well the simple as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative nature, and only retain their intensive. Thus in the degree, denoting simple excess,

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes.
Rusticior paulo est.

Virg.

Hor.

In the superlative this is more usual. Vir doctissimus, vir fortissimus, "a most learned man, a most brave man ;" that is to say, not the bravest and most learned man that ever existed, but a man possessing those qualities in an eminent degree.

The authors of language have contrived a method to retrench these comparative adverbs, by expressing their force in the primary attributive. Thus, instead of more fair, they say fairer; instead of most fair, fairest; and the same holds true both in the Greek and Latin. This practice however has reached no further than to adjectives, or at least to participles, sharing the nature of adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more variations without perplexity.

As there are some attributives which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as when we say, "a circular table, a quadrangular court, a conical piece of metal," &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say, therefore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all attributives, denoting definite quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot rule A, cannot be more a two-foot rule than any other of the same length. Twenty lions cannot be more twenty than twenty flies. If A and B be both triple or quadruple to C, they cannot be more triple, or more quadruple, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no comparison without intension and remission; there can be no intension and remission in things always definite; and such are the attributives which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why no substantive is susceptible of these comparative degrees. A mountain cannot be said more to be, or to exist, than a mole-hill, but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more a lion than the lion B; but if more any thing,

he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard, nor a tiger more than a cat; but if any thing, they are more bulky, more strong, &c. the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite, "that substance is not susceptible of more and less." But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of adverbs.

Of the adverbs, or secondary attributives already mentioned, these denoting intension or remission may be called adverbs of quantity continuous: once, twice, thrice, are adverbs of quantity discrete; more and most, less and least, to which may be added equally, proportionally, &c. are adverbs of relation. There are others of quality, as when we say, honestly industrious, prudently brave, they fought bravely, he painted finely, a portico formed circularly, a plain cut triangularly, &c.

And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ honest, honestly, and honesty. The answer is, they are in essence the same, but they differ, inasmuch as honest is the attributive of a substantive; honestly, of a verb; and honesty, being divested of these its attributive relations, assumes the power of a substantive, so as to stand by itself.

The adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to verbs of every species; but there are some which are peculiar to verbs, properly so called; that is to say, to such as denote motion or energy, with their privations. All motion and rest imply time and place, as a kind of necessary coincidents. Hence, then, if we would express the place or time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper adverbs; of place, as when we say, he stood there, he went hence, he travelled far, &c.: of time, as when we say, he stood then, he went afterward, he travelled formerly, &c. Should it be asked, Why adverbs of time, when verbs have tenses? The answer is, though tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of time, yet to denote them all by tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of forms to denote yesterday, to-day, to-morrow, formerly, lately, just now, now, immediately, presently, soon, hereafter, &c. It was this, then, that made the temporal adverbs necessary, over and above the tenses.

To the adverbs just mentioned, may be added those which denote the intensions and remissions peculiar to motion, such as

· Οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον Kai To HTTOV. Categor. c. 5. See also Sanctius, l. i. c. 11; 1. ii. c. 10, 11. where the subject of comparatives is treated in a very

masterly and philosophical manner. See also Priscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur comparativa a nominibus adjectivis, &c.