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however latent: so far, indeed, that where they differ essentially from one another, they often lead to effects perfectly contrary, though the agent which operates be individually the same:

Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,

Uno eodemque igni, &c.

Virg. ut sup. p. 270. It is from this theory we perceive the reason of that ancient axiom, Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis; than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood.

As to the active powers, there is an important distinction between those called rational, and the irrational. The subordinate are mostly confined to the producing one contrary out of two. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But the rational powers imply both contraries at once, and give to their possessor the alternative of producing either. The musician has the power both of melody and dissonance; the physician, the power both of healing and making sick; the magistrate, the power of deciding both justly and unjustly.

The reason of this is, that rational power alone is founded in science, and it is always one and the same science which recognises contraries; that which teaches us harmony, teaches us discord; that which informs us what is health, informs us what is disease; that which discerns truth, discerns also falsehood. Hence, therefore, it is, that as every science may be called double in its powers of knowledge, so all action founded on science may be called double in its powers of acting. A noble privilege this to man, if well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abused; since by this he alone, of all sublunary beings, is properly entitled either to praise or dispraise.

With respect to powers in general, there is this to be ob served: so important are they to the constitution of many beings, that often, though latent, they are more regarded than

· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κάμπυλον γινώσκομεν, κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν δ κανών· τὸ δὲ κάμπυλον, οὔθ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε TOû ev éos: "One of the two parts in the contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. It is thus that by the straight we come to know both the straight and the crooked, for the straight rule of the artist is a judge of both. But the crooked, on the other side, is no judge either of itself, or of the straight." Arist. de An. i.

5.

• Kal Tŵv dvváμewv ai μèv čσovτai to γοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου—καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δέ ἱατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας

αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπι στήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγ μα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν: “ Of powers, some will be found irrational, others are attended with reason: and as to those which are at tended with reason, the same powers will extend to things contrary: but as to the irrational, one power will extend only to one contrary: what is hot, for example, will only conduce to heating; but the art of medicine will become the cause both of disease and of health. The cause is, that this medicinal science is reason, and the same reason discovers both the thing and its privation." Arist. Metaph. p. 143. edit. Sylb.

See also p. 68, and note ƒ; and p. 294, especially in note 4.

the strongest apparent attributes. Thus it is from their medicinal powers only that we value the several species of drugs; and from their generative powers only that we value the several species of seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is, their apparent qualities, further than as they help to indicate those invisible powers.

The just opposite to power is energy, which, as its etymology shews, implies the existing in deed or act, as opposed to that existence which only implies possibility.

It

And here it is worth observing, that every thing existing in power is necessarily roused into energy by something, which itself existed previously in energy." Events and incidents never stand still; some agents or other are perpetually energizing, though all, perhaps, by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them, at least, as are of the subordinate tribe. happens, indeed, in the world, as in a ship upon a voyage. Every hand at a proper season has his hours of rest, and yet the duty never ceases, the business of the ship is never at a stand; those that wake, rousing those that sleep, and being in their turn roused again themselves.

But another way to shew that energy is of necessity previous to power, consists in admitting the contrary hypothesis.

Let us suppose, for example, a man placed in a part of space, where there was, and ever had been, eternal silence; or otherwise in a part where there was, and ever had been, eternal darkness; could such a one ever actually either have heard or seen, however exquisite his powers both of hearing and seeing? And why not? Because to the evocation of one of these powers, there is a necessity of actual sound; to that of the other, of actual light; so that had not these energies existed previously, his powers must have remained dormant through the period of their existence. Suppose, therefore, all energies of all kinds to stop; how could they ever revive? Were they all once sunk into one universal sleep, where should we find a waking cause, to rouse them from their slumbers ?*

'Ev pyy, "In act, in deed." See a sketch of the difference between act and power, p. 7.

It was a doctrine of the Peripatetic school, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς OT: "that energy is prior to power:" Arist. Metaph. p. 150. 152. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦν τός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ hon oriv: "that which exists in energy is always formed out of that which exists in power, by something which exists (already) in energy; for example, man is formed by man, the musical artist by the

musical artist, there being always some first (or prior) being, which gives the motion. Now that which gives this motion is itself already in energy." Aristot. Metaph. p. 151. edit. Sylb.

Όσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνῃ, ὑπὸ ἐνερ γείᾳ ὄντος γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει τοιού του : "Whatever things are made either by nature or by art, are made out of something, having a capacity to become the thing produced, and that through the ope ration of something, which already exists in energy." De Animal. Gener. p. 204. edit. Sylb.

It is hence that Aristotle, speaking according to the principles of his philosophy,

And what then are the inferences from this speculation, that power necessarily arises from previous energy? One is, that all those doctrines about order springing from disorder, beauty from confusion; of night and chaos being the oldest of beings; in general, of the perfect and actual arising from the imperfect and potential; however they may be true as to the material cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their real and essential origin. There is nothing, in fact, more certain, than that the actual and perfect are previous to their contraries; else there could never have been in the universe any thing actual or perfect.

Another inference is, that the most minute and contemptible energy, now actually existing, necessarily proves the existence of an eternal energy, to which, as to its cause, it is ultimately referable. And what can such eternal energy be, but something whose very essence is that energy; something, which knows no remissions, like subordinate energies, no occasional retirings into power and dead capacity, but is ever the same immutable and perfect? Without such a principle the universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this principle? Shall we call it body or mind? The best way to answer this, will be to search within ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of either being, together with the several attributes appertaining to each.

And so much for the two arrangements or predicaments of action and passion.

says of things eternal, unalterable, and necessary, that is, things ever in energy-el ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν, “ if these were not, there could be nothing." Metaph. 153, ut supra. It is a pertinent question, stated by the same author, in another part of the same tract—Πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μηθὲν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἤγε ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν: “ How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no cause (previously) existing in energy? Mere matter itself cannot move itself.” Ibid. 201. And soon before, in the same page, 'Evdéxeται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἂν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια: "It may happen, that the thing, which exists in power only, may not exist at all: there must, therefore, be (in the universe) such a sort of principle, as that the very essence of it should be energy."

See the note preceding. The founder of the Peripatetic sect, speaking of the Deity, uses the following expressions:

yàp voû èvépyeia, Swn' ’Exeîvos dè, ʼn èvépγεια: "The energy of mind or intellect, is life and He (the Supreme Being) is that energy." Metaph. p. 203. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpretat. p. 198. B. &c. where the arrangement of beings is deeply and philosophically discussed and exhibited, Εξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιδείξαι βουλόμενος, κ. τ. λ.

It is agreeably to this reasoning we are told, Toû xpóvov ȧel πpoλaμßávei évépyela ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πрúτws: "that one energy in point of time always precedes another, till we arrive at the energy of that Being, which eternally gives motion in the first instance." Metaph. . n. p. 152. edit. Sylb.

Which is as much as to affirm, (in other words,) that there is a gradual ascent of active efficient principles, one above another, up to that one active Principle which is original and supreme.

CHAPTER XII.

CONCERNING WHEN AND WHERE. CONCERNING TIME AND PLACE, AND
THEIR DEFINITION. WHEN AND where, HoW DISTINGUISHED FROM
TIME AND PLACE, HOW CONNECTED WITH THEM. DESCRIPTIONS OF
WHEN AND WHERE-THEIR UTILITY AND IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN
LIFE-VARIOUS TERMS DENOTING THESE TWO PREDICAMENTS-OTHERS
DENOTING THEM NOT, YET MADE TO DENOTE THEM. WHEN AND
WHERE, THEIR EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE-PLAUSIBLE TOPICS-CON-
CURRING CAUSES.
OPPORTUNITY, WHAT. CHANCE, WHAT IT IS NOT,
WHAT IT IS. FATE, PROvidence. COOPERATING CAUSES.
INTELLIGENCE.

SUPREME

We have said already, that time and place agree, as they both belong to quantity continuous." So essential is this character, that could either of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be intervals without time, and distances without place. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a million of different things may exist in one instant of time, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one place.

And hence the nature of place may be called distributive, while that of time may be called accumulative. Hence, too, as they agree in some respects, and differ in others, they are necessarily not simple, but compound ideas, both belonging to one genus, and each distinguished by specific differences. Having a genus and a difference, they become capable of definition, since it is on these two requisites that all definition is founded."

Time, therefore, is continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of its proper subjects; place is continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of its proper subjects.

We have said thus much about these two beings, because when and where, though distinct from both," are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this connection.

Men, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal beings, as none of them are infinite either in duration or extent, must have something of course to limit and circumscribe them. Now place circumscribes their extent, and time their duration; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their

* See before, p. 303, 304.

* Omnis definitio constat genere et differentia. Fell, 218. Termini vero essentiales (definitionis scil.) genus et differentia. Sanderson, l. i. c. 17. See also Wallisii Logic. 1. i. c. 23. Oi μèv yàp

ὁρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους καὶ τῶν συστατικῶν εἰσι διαφορών, τουτέστι τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. Amm. in quinque voces, p. 67.

How they are distinct, see below, particularly in note d, also P. 337.

motions, of all their accidents; in short, of all they are able to do, and of all they are able to suffer.

For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the time and place, or their meeting would not be practicable. First, then, for the time: When shall we three meet again,

In thunder, light'ning, or in rain?

Shaksp. Macbeth. The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain time; and in the relation between these two, we behold the rise of the predicament, when:

Again:

When the battle's lost and won,
When the hurly burly's done.

Where's the place?

The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain place; and in the relation between these two, we see the rise of the predicament, where :

Upon the heath,

There we go to meet Macbeth.d

Let us take another example. Virgil, we are informed, wrote his Georgics at Naples. By Naples, in this instance, is the place of Virgil circumscribed, which might else have been at Rome, at Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this city gives us an answer to the question, where?

Again, he wrote them, we are told, while Cæsar Augustus was on his Oriental expedition. Here the time of this expedition circumscribes the time of writing, which might else have been (for aught we know) during the wars with Brutus, with Antony, &c. This relative connection gives an answer to the question, when?

Dum Cæsar ad altum
Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo:
Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti.

• Οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτὸν τὸ ποτὲ, ἀλλ ̓ εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς Tov xpóvov: "Nor is when the same with time; but if any thing, it consists in the relation which it bears to time." Simpl. in Præd. p. 87. B. ed. Bas. 1551. And again: Οταν δέ τι πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον ἂν τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυ μαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίγνεται, ἡ τοῦ ποτὲ, ἄλλη οὖσα παρὰ τὸ ποσόν: « But when any particular thing, which is assumed from time, and which is not assumed as any part of time, has a relation to time, and for this reason is in time; as, for example, the sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at such a parti

Georg. iv. sub. fin.

cular time: then there arises a different predicament, that of when, a predicament different from that of quantity." Simplic. in Præd. p. 88. ejusd. edit.

4 Αλλ ̓ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρόνος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνου τί· οὕτως ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον, ἢ τόπου τί: “ For as in time, time itself is one thing, and that which is according to time, or something belonging to it, is another thing ; so also is place one thing, and that which is according to place, or something belonging to it, another thing." Simpl. in Præd. ut sup.

Ubi non est locus, sed esse in loco. Quando non est tempus, sed esse in tempore. Fell, p. 104, 107.

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