character, not fit to be pursued.-They are not.-But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some habit or disposition of mind, by which we are induced to render to all men their own, and to regard the welfare and interest of society. It is impossible.-But the habit or disposition of rendering to all their own, and of regarding the welfare and interest of society, is justice. It is.-We may therefore fairly conclude, that nothing is naturally pursuable, but what is either correspondent to justice, or at least not contrary. I confess, said I, so it appears. But, further, said he, it is possible we may have the best disposition to society; the most upright intentions; and yet, through want of ability to discern and know the nature of particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our private interest, as the public. We may even pursue what is right, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our endeavours fruitless, and our purposes to fail.-I answered, it was possible.-But this would ill befit the character of a rational animal. It would. It is necessary, therefore, we should be furnished with some habit or faculty, instructing us how to discern the real difference of all particulars, and suggesting the proper means by which we may either avoid or obtain them.It is. And what is this, think you, but prudence?—I believe, said, I, it can be no other.-If it be, said he, then it is evident from this reasoning, that nothing is pursuable, which is not correspondent to prudence.-I replied, he had shewn it could not. But further still, said he, it is possible we may neither want prudence nor justice to direct us; and yet the impulses of appetite, the impetuosities of resentment, the charms and allurements of a thousand flattering objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both imprudent and unjust.-They may.—But if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as becomes our character, that we should be furnished with some habit which may moderate our excesses; which may temper our actions to the standard of a social state, and to the interest and welfare, not of a part, but of the whole man.-Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this habit, but the habit of temperance?-You name it, said I, rightly. If you think so, replied he, then nothing can be pursuable, which is not either correspondent to temperance, or at least not contrary.I replied, so it seemed. : Once more, continued he, and we have done it is possible that not only resentment and appetite, not only the charms and allurements of external objects, but the terrors, too, and dread of them, may mar the rectitude of our purposes.-It is possible.-Tyranny and superstition may assail us on one hand; the apprehensions of ridicule, and a false shame, on the other: it is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some habit, or our wisest best pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may.—And what is that generous, manlike, and noble habit, which sets us at all times above fear and danger; what is it but fortitude?—I replied, it was no other.-If so, then, continued he, besides our former conclusions, nothing further can be pursuable, as our inquiries now have shewn us, which is not either correspondent to fortitude, or at least not contrary. I admit, said I, it is not. Observe, then, said he, the sum, the amount of our whole reasoning nothing is truly pursuable to such an animal as man, except what is correspondent, or, at least, not contrary to justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude.-I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing pursuable, then nothing avoidable or indifferent, but what is tried and estimated after the same manner. For contraries are ever recognised through the same habit, one with another. The same logic judges of truth and falsehood; the same musical art, of concord and discord. So the same mental habitudes, of things avoidable and pursuable. I replied, it appeared probable. g To how unexpected a conclusion, then, said he, have our inquiries insensibly led us? In tracing the source of human action, we have established it to be those four grand virtues, which are esteemed, for their importance, the very hinges of all morality. We have. But if so, it should follow, that a life, whose pursuings and avoidings are governed by these virtues, is that true and rational * Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι : “ There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." Arist. de Anim. 1. iii. c. 3. This, by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated: Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπι· στήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσταται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατώμενος, ἐξαπατᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτερον : "Of things contrary there is one science, and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil, at the same time, to be something pernicious ; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other." See the Io of Plato, p. 531. vol. i. edit. Serr. Stobæus, having told us, that of the virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds: πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην· καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιο σύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις : “ The primary virtues are four; prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice: prudence is employed in moral offices; temperance, in men's natural appetites and pursuits; fortitude, in endurings ; and justice, in distributions.” Ecl. Ethic. p. 167. That the life according to virtue, was deemed the life according to nature, appears from what is said by the same author, in the page following: Haoŵv de ToÚTWY TŵV ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἑκάστην δὲ τούτων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρω που : "The end of all these virtues is, to live agreeably to nature; and each of them, by those means which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a man in possession of this end." So likewise Cicero: Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, “ convenienter naturae vivere,” id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, “cum virtute congruere semper.” De Ofic. l, iii. c. 3. life, which we have so long been seeking; that life, where the value of all things is justly measured by those relations which they bear to the natural frame, and real constitution of mankind: in fewer words, a life of virtue appears to be the life according to nature. It appears so. But, in such a life, every pursuit, every avoiding, (to include all,) every action, will of course admit of being rationally justified. It will.-But that which, being done, admits of a rational justification,' is the essence or genuine character of an office, or moral duty. For thus, long ago, it has been defined by the best authorities.-Admit it.-If so, then a life according to virtue, is a life according to moral offices or duties.-It appears so.But we have already agreed it to be a life according to nature. -We have. Observe, then: a life according to virtue, according to moral offices, and according to nature, mean all the same thing, though varied in the expression. Your remark, said I, seems just. XVI. We need never, therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, though the objects of choice be ever so infinite and diversified. As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a life and such a character, we may justly set existence before death, prefer health to sickness, integrity of the limbs to being maimed and debilitated, pleasure to pain, wealth to poverty, fame to dishonour, free government to slavery, power and magistracy to subjection and a private state; universally, whatever tends either to being, or to well-being, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several energies, exerted according to the virtues just mentioned, have put us in possession of all that we require;' when we enjoy, subjoined to See pages 56, 58, 66, 82, 83. i In the original, it is ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον Toxe amoλoyiopóv. Diog. Laert. 1. vii. 8. 107. ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν ároλoyíav. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. 1. Vii. Thus rendered by Cicero: Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. De Offic. 1. i. c. 3. The reason of its Greek name, кaðîкov, is given by Simplicius: Kathкovτá čσT Tà γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλAovra: "Moral offices are those things which are done agreeably to what is fitting and expedient." Simplic. in Ench. c. 37. k By Tully, in his Offices, and by other authors of antiquity. 1 This was the idea of happiness adopted by the old academy, or Platonics: Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optime affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissime. Cic. de Fin. 1. v. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same school, held the same. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν-τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην—ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ: “ If this be admitted, it follows, that human good or happiness is the energizing of the soul according to the best and most consummate virtue, in a perfect and complete life." Ethic. Nic. 1. i. c. 7. A perfect and complete life, they explained to be such a life as was no way deficient either as to its duration, its bodily health, and its being attended with a proper competence of external goods, and prosperity. By the best and most consummate virtue, they not only meant that virtue which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the virtue also of that part which is in each of us most excellent. For there are virtues of the body, such as strength and agility; and there are virtues of the senses, such as accurate seeing, accurate tasting; and the same of every faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme. The sovereign good, or happiness, here spoken of, is again repeated, in other words a right and honest mind, both health of body and competence of externals; what can there be wanting to complete our hap piness, to render our state perfectly consonant to nature, or to give us a more sovereign good than that which we now enjoy? -Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of. There would be nothing, indeed, said he, were our energies never to fail; were all our endeavours to be ever crowned with due success. But suppose the contrary; suppose the worst success to the most upright conduct, to the wisest rectitude of energies and actions. It is possible, nay, experience teaches us it is too often fact, that not only the pursuers of what is contrary to nature, but that those who pursue nothing but what is strictly congruous to it, may miss of their aims, and be frustrated in their endeavours. Inquisitors and monks may detest them for their virtue, and pursue them with all the engines of malice and inhumanity. Without these, pests may afflict their bodies; inundations overwhelm their property; or, what is worse than inundations, either tyrants, pirates, heroes, or banditti. They may see their country fall, and with it their bravest countrymen; themselves pillaged, and reduced to extremities, or perishing with the rest in the general massacre. Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, et servantissimus æqui.m -It must be owned, said I, this has too often been the case. Or grant, continued he, that these greater events never happen; that the part allotted us be not in the tragedy of life, but in the comedy. Even the comic distresses are abundantly irksome : domestic jars, the ill offices of neighbours; suspicions, jealousies, schemes defeated; the folly of fools; the knavery of knaves: page 71, where it is called, "the attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office." The primary and just requisites here mentioned, are all things requisite to the use and enjoyment of our primary and natural perfections. These primary and natural perfections, mean the natural accomplishments of both our mind and body. They were called by the Latins, prima naturæ, prima secundum naturam; by the Greeks, та прŵта ката púow, rà πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included health, strength, agility, beauty, perfect sensations, memory, docility, invention, &c. See Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. 1. v. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. 1. xii. c. 5. A like sentiment of happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero: Virtute adhibita, frui primis a natura datis. De Fin. l. ii. c. 11. p. 113. It is there called, the opinion of the old Academics and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the same author: Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet. Acad. 1. ii. c. 42. p. 240. It is to be observed, that Cicero, speaking of this hypothesis, says, that it proposed an idea of happiness, which was not properly in our own power. Hoc non est positum in nostra actione: completur enim et ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, et ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate. De Fin. 1. iv. c. 6. p. 287. Hence, therefore, the deficiency of this doctrine. However justifiable, however laudable its end, it could not insure a due success to its endeavours. And hence, too, the force of what is objected to it in the Dialogue, in this and the following page. m Æneid. 1. ii. 426. from which, as members of society, it is impossible to detach ourselves. Where, then, shall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed happiness, after much inquiry, in attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office. But as to corresponding with our preconceptions, (which we have made the test,) does this system correspond better than those others which we have rejected? Has it not appeared, from various facts, too obvious to be disputed, that, in many times and places, it may be absolutely unattainable? That in many, where it exists, it may in a moment be cancelled, and put irretrievably out of our power, by events not to be resisted? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a good, of that character which we require; a good durable, indeprivable, and accommodate to every circumstance: far from it, our speculations (I think) rather lead us to that low opinion of happiness which, you may remember, you expressed," when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a sovereign good, it is the more probable sentiment, there is no such good at all. I should indeed, said I, fear so.-For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is congruous to nature, or not congruous; if the acquisition of one be as difficult as of the other, and the possession of both equally doubtful and precarious? If Cæsar fall in attempting his country's ruin; and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its defence?-It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy truths; and the instances which you allege too well confirm them. We were in the midst of these serious thoughts, descanting upon the hardships and miseries of life, when, by an incident not worth relating, our speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily; our question perplexed, its issue uncertain, and myself impatient to know the event. Necessity, however, was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our inquiries were postponed. PART II. These "BRUTUS perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more." words I was repeating the next day to myself, when my friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me good-morrow. I could not " See page 44. |