mus multitudinem illam varietatemque perceptionum amplius persequi, comparare, conjungere queat. In quo negotio ob id ipsum, quod certis notionibus destituitur, judicat varietatem illam pro ratione, qua ad ipsam judicandi facultatem apta sit atque accommodata. Eam vero judicandi rationem sensum pulcritudinis vocamus: qui propterea, quod ad plura pertinet, quam in cujusque rei notione insunt, generalium est per singularia perceptio. Tendit enim animus ad summum quoddam atque absolutissimum pulcritudinis exemplar, in idque intuens speciem quamdam deformare conatur, quæ id, quod nulla specie satis exprimi potest, quasi e longinquo monstret, mentemque propius spectandi avidam fugiendo alliciat. Sensit hoc, de quo nunc disputamus, prosæ orationis et poeseos discrimen Aristoteles, qui in artis poeticæ cap. ix. quum quæreret, poeta quid ab historico distaret, historicum singularia, poetam generalia tractare docuit. Ita is loquitur: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ ̓ ἱστορία τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστι δὲ καθόλου μὲν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖ ̓ ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀνάγκαιον· οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὰ δὲ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον, τί Αλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν, ἢ τί ἔπαθεν. Quæ hic τὰ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον dicit, ea sunt, quæ singularia vocamus. Est enim historici, ut prosa oratione utentis, officium, de certa re sic exponere, ut generalibus usus notitiis cognitionem comparet lectoribus. Poeta vero, qui generalia curat, quæ τὰ καθόλου dicit Aristoteles, non id agit, ut rem cognoscant auditores, sed ut cognoscenda re majorem quamdam, (12) multoque latius patentem imaginem animo concipiant. Ut, si quis historicus ea narraret, de quibus in Iliade expositum est, Achillem acciperemus Pelei et Thetidis filium fuisse, virum in Græco exercitu fortissimum. Longe diversus Homeri Achilles est. Nihil curamus, utrum ille sit Achilles e Peleo et Thetide, an alius ex aliis natus; nihil utrum hos, qui tum ad Trojam militabant, virtute superaverit, an alios: nihil utrum ea, quæ fecisse eum poeta refert, fecerit, an alia : sed simulacrum eum habemus atque effigiem viri uobilitate generis, animi et corporis virtutibus, factorum magnitudine et claritate excellentioris, quam alii sunt. Ita Herodotus, cujus historia quasi viam ab epica narratione ad eam, quæ vere est historia, munivit, quum non solum cognitionem rerum gestarum, sed etiam vim ad animi sensum spectaverit, interdum ultra prosæ orationis terminos egreditur. Ut in ipso operis initio: Ηροδότου Αλικαρνησσῆος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἤδε· ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωυμαστὰ, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται. Et cap. v. τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τοῦτον σημή νας, προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών· τὰ γὰρ τοπάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτέων σμικρὰ γέγονε τὰ δὲ ἐπ ̓ ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηΐην ὧν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμᾶ ἐν τωὐτῷ μένουσαν, ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως. Sed redeo, unde digressus sum. Singularia per generalia intelligere est cognoscere, generalia singularibus indicata persequi est cogitando ludere. Itaque prosæ orationis propria cognitio est, poeseos animi lusus. Nexus notionum, quæ sunt in prosa oratione, definitur legibus iis, quæ ad cognitionem rerum pertinent, unde objectivæ a philosophis vocantur: iisque legibus constituitur veritas. Nexus idearum, quæ sunt in poesi, leges habet, quæ ad animi sensum spectant, quas leges subjectivas dicunt philosophi: per has vero pulcritudo efficitur. Itaque quæ in descriptionibus, in narrationibus, in demonstrationibus falsa sunt et veritati repugnantia, demonstrari argumentisque refelli possunt: (13) quæ vero ad pulcritudinem minus polita, vel etiam inepta sint, indicare licet, si alii idem sentiant, probari autem, si quis dissentiat, non potest. Afferam exempli caussa epigramma Mnasalcæ, simile ei, quod supra com memoratum est. Ηδη τάδε μένω πολέμου δίχα, καλὸν ἄνακτος Neminem puto fore, cui placeat kaλòv oréρvov viro bellatori tributum, præsertim quum idem wерiμáкеα тãɣvν habuisse dicatur. Tamen quis neget, pulcrum pectus posse etiam tale intelligi, quale vel maxime virum valentem et robustum deceat? Nihilominus quis non persuasissimum sibi habeat, illud raλòv non esse a manu Mnasalcæ profectum? Hic, nisi fallor, káμvdy scripserat. Ab iis quæ hactenus disputata sunt, postremo ad eam deducimur cogitationum in prosa oratione et poesi differentiam, quæ in vi posita est, quam utrumque genus ad animum habet. Apertum est enim, cognitionis finem atque effectum persuasionem esse, lusu autem oblectationem gigni. Unde persuasio propria est prosæ orationis cujus artem qui scientiam accommodate ad persuadendum dicendi esse censent, definiunt rectissime. Poeseos autem est oblectatio, atque ars poetica continetur facultate apposite ad sensum pulcritudinis dicendi. Hæc quidem etsi satis per se clara sunt atque perspicua, paucis tamen exponendum videtur de persuasione. Persuasum esse est credere convenire aliquam rem cum nostra ejus rei perceptione. Est autem hæc triplex convenientia, pro tribus illis viribus, quibus universa animi natura continetur: intelligendi facultatem dico, et sensum, et voluntatem. Ac res ad intelligendi facultatem ita referuntur, ut appareat, quales per se sint; ad sensum ita, ut intelligatur, quo effectu ad jucunditatem sint; ad voluntatem denique ita, ut mutua efficientiæ ratio inter res externas atque animum intercedens perspiciatur. Itaque omnis orationis, quæ ad persuadendum spectat, (14) triplex officium, triplex forma est. Etenim aut in simplici rerum externarum expositione versatur, ut historicorum, philosophorum, eorum, qui artes ac disciplinas tradynt: aut in animi affectionibus et motibus excitandis expromitur, ut in laudationibus, omnique illo genere dicendi, quod éπideitiKOV Græci vocant: aut ad agendum denique et negotia hominum, studiis et cupiditatibus vel commovendis vel flectendis, refertur, ut in judiciali orationum genere, omninoque in admonitionibus atque adhortationibus. Ac facile intelligitur, primum genus ex his, quod ad solam rei, qualis per se est, cognitionem spectat, maxime omnium simplex ac planum esse. Secundum genus, quia vim declarare debet, quam aliqua res ad animi sensum habeat, concitatione quadam indiget. Pellendus enim et commovendus est apimus, ut rem non tamquam ab se alienam consideret, sed aliquod momentum habere ad jucunditatem intelligat. Id igitur sic efficiendum est oratori, ut sive apertius sive tectius ea in mentem auditoribus revocet, quæ simul et cum re, de qua dicit, conjuncta esse, et ab auditoribus eo studio, quod pro caussa sua commovere vult, accipi videat. In qua re illud efficacissimum est adjumentum, quod homines, uti alios animo affectos vident, ita ipsi iisdem motibus tangi perturbarique solent. In illo denique orationis genere, quod tertio loco numeravimus, quum non solum sensu aliquo afficiendi sint animi, sed studia etiam excitanda, cupiditatesque incendendæ, etiam major vis, motusque vehementior requiritur, quam in secundo genere. Neque enim satis est oratori, demonstrando efficere, ut eligere, quid faciant, auditores possint, sed deducere debet mentes eorum, unde velit, et, quo velit, compellere, atque omnino ita constrictas tenere, ut contraria consilia ne posse quidem sequi videantur. Itaque in hoc quidem genere maxima vis oratoris virtusque elucescit. 90 NOTICE OF 1. Introduction to the WRITING OF GREEK. For the use of the Junior Greek Class in the University of Glasgow. In four Parts. By D. K. SANDFORD, Esq., A.M., Oxon. Professor of Greek at Glasgow. Third edition, enlarged and improved. W. BLACKWOOD, Edinburgh; and T. CADELL, Strand, London. 2. Rules and Exercises in HOMERIC and ATTIC GREEK: to which is added, a short System of Greek Prosody. For the use of the Second and Senior Greek Classes in the University of Glasgow. By D. K. SANDFORD, Esq., A.M. THE author of this treatise, which may be regarded as supplementary to his Introduction to the Writing of Greek, in his preface, modestly hopes some original observation may be found in his work; but more boldly claims the credit of industry in amassing and digesting the remarks of other scholars. The critical reader will indeed find many traces of original investigation in these pages, which might well entitle them to the examination of others than those for whose use they were designed. Porson's philological discoveries pretend to be addressed to none but adolescentes, though the grey-headed Grecian found instruction in them; and something similar might certainly be said of the second part of this book in particular. But we wish to speak especially of the laudable care with which the numerous discoveries of modern scholars are presented to the learner in a tangible form. The knowlege of the Greek language generally possessed by students, is by no means proportionate in extent to the light actually existing in the works of Porson and Elmsley, and Herman, and other scholars. But the observations of these critics are widely scattered through their comments on different authors. The student picks up the information by degrees only and in fragments, as he advances through the field of Hellenic literature. Many never advance far enough to gather what is to be found; and some have not leisure or ability to digest into consistency the information thus acquired carptim et vellicatim. It must also be confessed, that in our schools the communication of knowlege does not always keep pace with the discoveries of recent writers; a circumstance indeed very venial, when we consider the little leisure left to him who is laboring in the dust and heat of scholastic turmoil for examining the novelties of the teeming press of Germany, or the rarer productions of our own literati. The consequence of this is, that a great mass of knowlege really existing is of no use to any one but a few of the more distinguished students in our universities, Quis meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan. It has been buried in the depths of commentary, and the rising generation of school-boys often hears, without emendation or addition, the tale that was told to their grandsires before them. We must assign to Professor Sandford much credit for breaking in on this monotonous system. He has rendered accessible to all that which before was in a great measure written in vain, by presenting the approved decisions of modern scholars in the form of rules for composition. The condensation of useful hints and observations from the whole Philhellenic race is really admirable; and Professor Sandford merits the best thanks of every lover of the noble language which he so well illustrates, for having brought up criticism from the profundity of annotation and animadversion to dwell in schools. The Rules and Exercises on Homeric and Attic Greek, which, as the standard dialects, form the proper ground for exercise, are divided into two parts; in the former of which the remarkable usages of the different parts of speech are distinctly exemplified; and in the latter, the forms of independent and connected propositions are illustrated with a logical accuracy, to which we have certainly seen nothing similar in any work of the kind produced in this country. We will give the reader an opportunity of estimating the discrimination with which the phrases for illustration are selected, by laying before him a specimen of the idioms on which rules are founded under the fourth head of the first part; i. e. the Adjective: 1. τὰ πίστ ̓ ἐμαυτῷ τοῦ θράσους παρέξομαι. 2. ῥηίτεροι γὰρ μᾶλλον ̓Αχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε κείνου τεθνηῶτος ἐναίρεμεν. 3. βούλομ ̓ ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι. 4. τὸ γὰρ νόσημα μεῖζον ἢ φέρειν. 5. ἐλαφρότεροι πόδας εἶναι ἢ ἀφνειότεροι χρυσοιό τε Ρεσθῆτός τε. 6. δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν. 7. ἵν ̓ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν. |