Manual of Political Ethics: Political ethics proper

POLITICAL ETHICS.

BOOK THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

Reciprocal Relation of Right and Obligation.-The more Liberty, the more Rights, hence the more Obligations.-Danger of Absolutism in Republics, without due Attention to Political Ethics.-Additional Reason of their Importance derived from our Race.-Another Reason from the Period in which we live and the Direction which the Study of Political Sciences of late has taken.-Private Morality necessary for Public Success, especially in Free States, yet not sufficient.-Justice and Fortitude or Perseverance chief Virtues in Political Life.-Justice the Basis of the other Virtues.-Reputation for Character of Individuals and States chiefly founded upon it.-Power and Passion equally apt to blind against Justice.—Justice affords Power.-Coteries are unjust because they see distortedly.-May we do what the Law either positively or by not prohibiting, permits?

I. It has been my endeavor to show, in the first part of this work, the original connexion between right and morality, inasmuch as right is a relation necessarily proceeding from the moral character of men, and which can possibly exist only between moral beings. This connexion, however, extends farther; it is a lasting one. Where men, of whatsoever condition-rulers or ruled, those that toil or those that enjoy, individually, by entire classes, or as nations-claim, maintain or establish rights, without acknowledging corresponding and parallel obli

gations, there is oppression, lawlessness and disorder; and the very ground on which the idea of all right must for ever rest, that of mutuality, if we consider it in an ethical point of view; that of reciprocity, if we view it in the light of natural law,―must sink from under it. It is natural, therefore, that wherever there exists a greater knowledge of right, or a more intense attention to it, than to concurrent and proportionate obligation, evil ensues. What may thus be found a priori, is pointed out by history as one of its gravest and greatest morals. The very condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of obligations consists in rights. Since, therefore, a greater degree of civil liberty implies the enjoyment of more extended acknowledged rights, man's obligations increase with man's liberty. Let us, then, call that freedom of action, which is determined and limited by the acknowledgment of obligation, Liberty; freedom of action, without limitation by obligation, Licentiousness. The greater the liberty, the more the duty. For, the less bound or circumscribed we are in our actions from without, the more indispensable it becomes that we bind ourselves from within, that is, by reason and conscience. This is the fundamental law of all political ethics, applicable to all periods and all political relations.

Yet there are weighty reasons, which demand of us, in particular, that we should earnestly and conscientiously consider this fundamental, in its many applications and binding consequences (1).

(1). Reciprocity, as a necessary characteristic of right, and absolutism, (which at once ensues, where this reciprocity is denied,) as well as the inalienable moral character of man, and the primary foundation which this character forms for all jural relations, have been, the author hopes, sufficiently treated of in the first part.

II. Toward the end of the preceding volume the different character, yet equally injurious effect of monarchical and democratic absolutism has been spoken of; for our present purpose it is necessary to say a few more words on this subject. Monarchical absolutism, it was shown, is not real, in so far as the monarch, individually, can have no power; it must be lent him, he must be supported; and, again, it is substantial, in so far as individual responsibility goes. In his name the acts are done; of him the people, once risen, demand justice, and to him the wrongs of his menials are ultimately laid. However great his power, however many thousands he may find ready to do as he bids, still what is done is at his peril. There is a visible despot, and therefore a visible malefactor when the time of reckoning comes; while the consciousness, that he must lend his name to all acts, and that" the water, although when calm, supports the boat, but, if roused, will overwhelm it," (1) may keep even the Chinese emperor from too oppressive measures (2). Democratic absolutism, on the other hand is real, inasmuch as it demands no support; it is an over-flooding power itself; and it is not substantial in so far as it is nowhere visibly embodied; it acts, it strikes, with fearful certainty; but the moment after, where can the author of the deed be grasped? Responsibility evanesces; the injured party cannot seize it, and the absolute actors neither fear the rising of those over whom they sway, nor do they themselves feel so distinctly their responsibility, because it appears divided. Their conscience feels appeased; although, as we have seen, there is, in fact, no divisibility of any thing which belongs to morals (3). But liberty, or untrammeled action, without conscientiousness of action, which we

have called licentiousness-rights, I repeat, without acknowledged obligations, necessarily lead to absolutism, first to democratic, and, through it, generally to monarchic. A sincere reverence, therefore, for liberty, demands imperatively that we should well know our political obligations, both that liberty may not degenerate into absolutism, and that, on the other hand, we should feel our duty in prizing, cherishing and supporting, keeping, watching and jealously defending this last and highest of earthly goods, lest the forms of freedom with the spirit of bondsmen become only the fitter means of thraldom. For a government, which rules with the traditional forms of past liberty over a servile people, shifts its responsibility of all odious acts upon the people themselves. "Parliaments, without parliamentary power, are but a fair and plausible way into bondage," was the ruling maxim of Pym. And this "parliamentary power," of course, presupposes parliamentary spirit, that is, true love and esteem of liberty. Tyranny and mere tranquillity are things for which men may be trained, into which they may be forced. There are no more quiet and peaceable people on earth than the Chinese. But liberty is too noble in its nature; to support, enjoy and perpetuate it, man must cultivate his best and noblest parts (4). An active and preventive police may do much toward making fit subjects; but the essentials of a freeman are within; they cannot be forced upon him from without; they must grow out of his moral nature. They require character, love of justice, love of truth, self-respect and devotion to our neighbors, esteem of our kind and ardor of cultivation.

(1) A Chinese Emperor, so say the ancient books of the Chi

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