ing to the principle laid down by government. They establish it, they have the power, let them obtain it. This, it will be perceived is but a negative action; I do not speak of fraud, false statements, &c.

Different from the above is smuggling. Of course we cannot consider the smuggling by way of false entries, perjury or bribing custom officers; as too clear a case of ruinous immorality, to deserve any farther attention respecting the ethic principle involved in it. As to its baneful consequences and the general state of moral degeneracy which it requires before it can become general, we need only to examine the state of things of such countries as China or Mexico, to be fully and deeply impressed with the evil. A man does not easily perjure himself or allow himself to be bribed at once or in one particular sphere. The spirit of action does not depend upon its outward form, but springs from the inner original source of moral feeling. If it becomes turbid the impurity will flow into other actions likewise. But the question is, and actually has been put and discussed, whether a man has not a right to smuggle or otherwise evade, not by mere omission on his own part, but by positive action, the taxes levied by government, provided he be perfectly willing to submit to the penalty affixed to this action by those in power, in case of detection. Those who have maintained that he might, have started from the wrong view of a total separation of the government from the society over which it rules. We have seen however, that the state is natural, essential and necessary. Government however, is but the means and contrivance to obtain the ends of the state, and obedience to the laws is of itself a general duty.

The smuggler moreover robs the conscientious part of

the community, because as to the goods smuggled by him he obtains the tax which the scrupulous have to pay for their goods; he declares himself in opposition not to a set of men, but to the laws of his country, hence more or less to the society at large in which he lives; he must accustom himself and his whole family, to fraud and violence, for it is too futile to suppose that a man becomes a smuggler without being resolved at the same time to resist violently in case of detection while in the act of smuggling; and he prevents that easy, even and healthful operation of the laws which is one of the fairest attributes of a well-governed country. Experience in every country proves our position. Smugglers by trade have never yet been found otherwise than a highly dangerous, because lawless and violent, class.

It may be well to remember here what was said at the beginning of the work, that in a moral point of view we never can act through another; we either act or suffer; a mean is not possible. There is additional baseness in the action if we abet and aid in offences but have not the courage to commit the act itself, as for instance there must be always sly receivers who sell, where there are sturdy smugglers to import. I know of some former cases of piracy in the West Indies,and wherever this crime is committed they are not rare—when merchants, apparently fair in their dealings, received pirated goods, and had previously lent capital to the pirates to lay it out in their criminal business, excusing themselves on the ground that they had never been told for what the money was wanted, or whence. the goods came, and that they were not bound to inquire. But were they not? They were not legally

bound to inquire, but they were morally bound not to reject from their mind the evidence which was forced upon it. The mere words and outward acts do not constitute that upon which the morality of man's intercourse with his fellow men depends.

Perhaps it might yet be asked; How ought we to act under a tyrannical government? Suppose, what has but happened repeatedly, an unjust government imposes so heavy a tax upon the necessities of life, for instance upon salt and flour, that the poor man cannot maintain his family; or suppose a country is conquered, a new government imposed upon it, and exorbitant impost taxes levied, as was the case during the continental system under Napoleon-a period which might be called the classical age of smuggling, on account of its extent, refined ingenuity and daring. In this case the question becomes, as was already said, wholly a question of obedience to the laws, of which the more important must be obeyed before the less important. Nor do unlawful demands, be they unlawful in themselves, and demanded by lawful authority, or demands by unlawful authority, carry with them the obligation of laws. Since it is a duty to avoid giving opportunity for offence, or challenging it by enacting laws which will, according to the nature of men, infallibly lead to crime, governments are morally bound to avoid such legislation which cannot, as society is constituted, but lead to smuggling a general school of lawlessness-which are reasons why excises and import taxes are so much to be dreaded.

CHAPTER IV.

Ambition. Its various Manifestations. Is it radically bad?-Political Apathy a great Evil.-Political Ingratitude.-Jealousy.-Political Modesty.— Self-Esteem.-Vanity.-Titles without Office, and External Distinctions, such as Ribbons.-The Chinese.-De Ruiter.-Personal Affection.Friendship; in ancient Times; in modern.-Its high Value.-Epaminondas. Abuse of Friendship and of the Word.-Favoritism; in Monarchies; in Ministers and all other Citizens.-Its ruinous Effects -Washington and Pym.-Family Affection.-Providing for Members of the Family.-Papal Nepotism. Its Character when highest.

XXXVI. THE English word ambition is used for very different degrees of the same affection of the human soul, from its laudable original principle to its immoral or criminal excess, for which some other languages have different words. This want of terms has not unfrequently exercised an unfavorable influence upon the views which have been taken of the subject. By ambition we designate a desire of distinction or superiority, whether it only prompts to legitimate emulation, increases to a longing for distinction, or degenerates into a craving and ultimately into an ungovernable passion for it. If we comprehend all these gradations under one term, namely that of desire of distinction, I believe that we do no violence to language. Of course we must waive the Latin etymology of the word ambition, since the meaning originally attached to it in that language has entirely faded away in our own idiom. The question is, Is ambition a legitimate desire, laudable,

beneficial, or must a conscientious citizen extinguish it, and can he do it, or is it an original, elementary and, therefore, necessary principle in our soul, so that we ought to cultivate and moderate rather than eradicate it?

We have seen that men are ordained to exist as individuals, not only physically so, like the animals, not only each with his own moral value, but also with an infinite variety in the combination of mental faculties and ethical inclinations, a variety far greater and more surprising than that which we observe in the combination of matter around us. Diversity, taken in its deepest meaning, and not sameness, is the law of every thing that lives; the propelling agent, most especially, of society. Closely connected with, and indeed directly resulting from it, are emulation and competition. Without them little energy would be roused, and it is not only justifiable in, but it is demanded of us, that in whatever line we are conscious of possessing peculiar powers, we should strive to emulate those who are before or above us, to rise, if possible, superior to them, since we have enjoyed already the advantage of their example and acquisitions. Desiring then to distinguish ourselves is far from necessarily implying vanity, but it may, and indeed ought to be, a desire to develope our individual nature, stamped upon us as our peculiar intellectual compound character, to the utmost extent, so that we may be all that which our Maker destined us to be, and distinguish ourselves by perfection, if he has given us peculiar faculties. In this view ambition, or a desire of distinction is not only legitimate, but it is one of our great duties. Skill, knowledge, wisdom and virtue may thus become in a variety of spheres, humble or