not directed to every command of Cod alle, as they all stand upon the fame authority.

Because fuch an allowance would in eelt amount to a toleration of every vice in the world.

And, because, the strain of fcripture language excludes any fuch hope. When cur are recited, they are put collectively, that, as all and every of them required in the Chriftian character "Add to your faith virtue, and to sirle know.

ledge, and to knowledge temperance, and o "temperance patience, and to patience goo..zela, "and to godlinefs brotherly Kinonelt, and to bro "therly kindness charity.** On the other boss, when vices are enumerated, they are put digonce tively, that is, as feparately and severally exc. Zing the finner from heaven. "Netther foricaron, "nor idolaters, nor adulterers, Lor effeminate, "nor abusers of themfelves with mankind, nor "covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor ex“tortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of hea"ven."t

Those texts of fcripture, which seem to lean a contrary way, as that "charity fhall cover the mul"titude of fins" that "he which converteth a "finner from the error of his way fhall hide a mul"titude of fins;" cannot, I think, for the reafons above-mentioned, be extended to fins deliberately, habitually, and obftinately perfifted in.

3. That a ftate of mere unprofitablenefs will not go unpunished.

This is exprefsly laid down by Chrift in the parable of the talents, which fuperfedes all farther reafoning upon the fubject." Then he which had re"ceived one talent, came and faid, Lord, I know "thee that thou art an auftere man, "thou haft not fown, and gathering

2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7. Cor. vi. 9, 10. James v. 20.

reaping where where thou

1 Pet. iv. 8.

"haft

воок II.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHA P. I.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD? CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is right, fays one.-Because it is agreeable to the fitnefs of things, fays another.-Because it is conformable to reafon and nature, fays a third. Because it is conformable to truth, fays a fourth.-Because it promotes the public good, fays a fifth. Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a fixth.

Upon which different accounts, two things are obfervable.

FIRST, that they all ultimately coincide.

The fitnefs of things, means their fitnefs to produce happiness: the nature of things, means that actual conftitution of the world, by which fome things, as fuch and fuch actions, for example, pro

auce

duce happiness, and others mifery reafon is the principle, by which we difcover or judge of this conftitution: truth is this judgment expreffed or drawn out into propofitions. So that it neceffarily comes to pafs, that what promotes the public happinefs, or happiness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitnefs of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth; and fuch, (as will appear by and by) is the divine character, that what promotes the general happiness is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties muft needs be right; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

And this is the reafon that moralifts, from whatever different principles they fet out, commonly meet in their conclufions; that is, they enjoin the fame conduct, prescribe the fame rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cafes the fame determinations.

SECONDLY, it is to be observed, that these anfwers all leave the matter fhort: for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a fecond queftion, in which he will expect to be fatisfied, namely, why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; to conform to reason, nature, or truth; to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, FIRST, to examine what we mean, when we say a man is obliged to do the thing which we have propofed as an example, namely," to keep his word."

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

MAN is faid to be obliged, "when he is urged "by a violent motive rejulting from the command of another."

1. The motive must be violent." If a person, who has done me fome little fervice, or has a fmall place in his difpofal, afk me upon fome occafion for my vote, I may poflibly give it him, from a motive of gratitude or expectation; but I fhould hardly say, that I was obliged to give it him, because the induce ment does not rife high enough. Whereas, if a father or a mafter, any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my vote, I give it him of courfe; and my anfwer to all who afk me why I voted fo and fo, is, that my father or my mafter obliged me; that I had received fo many favours from, or had fo great a dependence upon fuch a one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.

SECONDLY," It muft refult from the command of "another." Offer a man a gratuity for doing any thing, for feizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it; nor would he fay be is; though he may be induced, perfuaded, prevailed upon, tempted. If a magiftrate, or the man's immediate fuperior command it, he confiders himself as obliged to comply, though poffibly he would lofe lefs by a refufal in this cafe, than in the former.

I will not undertake to fay that the words obligation and obliged are ufed uniformly in this fenfe, or always with this diftinction; nor is it poffible to tie

down

down popular phrafes to any conftant fignification : but, wherever the motive is violent enough, and, coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of a fuperior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged.

And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourfelves are to gain or lofe fomething by; for nothing elfe can be a "violent motive" to us. As we fhould not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magiftrate, unlefs rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, fome how or other depended upon our obedience; fo neither fhould we, without the fame reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God.

CHA P. III.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD?

L

RESUMED.

ET it be remembered, that to be obliged, "is to "be urged by a violent motive, refulting from "the command of another."

And then let it be afked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? and the anfwer will be, because I am urged to do fo by a violent motive," (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not)" refulting from the command of another," namely of God.)

This folution goes to the bottom of the fubject, as no farther queftion can reasonably be asked.

Therefore, private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule.

When I firft turned my thoughts to moral fpeculations, an air of myftery feemed to hang over the whole fubject; which arofe, I believe, from hence

-that