nugatory observation; neither more nor less that this, that it is sometimes immoral to obey a desire; but it is never immoral to obey conscience in opposition to a desire; which seems to come to this, that it is moral to act morally, immoral to act immorally. And this is the sum and sub

stance of Sir James's "theory."

At the same time, and after all this laborious trifling, the subject itself is simple.

There are, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, two sets of feelings (using feeling generically as the name of any state of mind) concerned about moral acts. The first set of feelings are those which precede the act in the mind of the actor, and are the cause of it. The second set are those which follow the act, and are caused by it.

About the first set of feelings, there never has been any difficulty. They have been always well understood. They are the motives to the acts, and the dispositions or affections from which the motives proceed. There never was a question about them but one, whether they were original or derived; that is, whether they were ultimate facts, or had their origin in the personal feelings of the individual.

The second set are comprehended in the terms moral approbation and disapprobation. With respect to the existence of these feelings, there is as little room for controversy. Every man has

the consciousness of them; knows what causes them, and what the effects which it is their tendency to produce. But there has been great controversy about what they are, and various opinions have been put forth and maintained concerning them.

Sir James undertook to tell us what they are; and, after a tedious round of talk, has ended by telling us-what we are not the wiser for.

The greater part of what he has said relates to the first set of feelings, those which precede the act, about which we had no need of his talk; for every body understands them; and the only inquiry which concerns them, viz. what is their composition, he has left untouched. He has told us, that they are desires; that, as such, they have objects; that these objects are their objects; that they are in contact with the will. This, however, is only a strange way of stating the matter of fact, which all men know, that moral acts, like other acts, are produced by volitions, and volitions by desires.

The remarkable thing is Sir James's transition to the sentiments which follow the act, and are produced by it. He says, that the sentiments which precede the act are also the sentiments which follow the act; and that they are so by being in contact with the will.

And this is Sir James's account of moral approbation and disapprobation.

of himself, in the article on Mr. Benthas to be the SUR JAMES has made the most perfect ever too He begins, as most due, with a par James need himself. He has had the courage exclusively

nestly of former philosophers. He is of truth and to put his courage and honesty toters of other w

test, in speaking of Mr. Bentham. And,

de task he had under

to the very few who are at once is it, who can speak

and unbiassed," whether "his firmness
have stood this trial."

to be the dictates of mes says, it was the body, at least an way or other, regar

d bim to that height pleased any body by a justice, he seems to think

which Sir James give

BOT

after another, (the sor in a magazine, am together like beads o

sophy), the first

pa

way of biograp e article on Bentha

121

ntham's) followers, or softening his oppo-
"Who called pea Sir James for any such
ient?" His business was to appreciate
ly the merits, and demerits of the writer,
consulting the pleasure, either of those
d, or of those who disliked him. "The
elessness of any such expedient may,"
perhaps enable a writer to look steadily
t what he believes to be the dictates
justice." If Sir James needed helps,
m to regard exclusively what "he
the dictates of truth and justice," in
the characters of other writers, he
for the task he had undertaken.
of man is it, who can speak other
believes to be the dictates of truth
Sir James says, it was the utter
pleasing any body, at least any of
part, one way or other, regarding
elevated him to that height of
e have pleased any body by au
ath and justice, he seems to think,
indifferently.

iscourses, which Sir James gives
mes, one after another, the sort
make articles in a magazine, and
be hung together Like beads on
ry of philosophy, the first part
hing in the way of biography

in the article on Bentham.

When any one takes on him to state matters of fact, material to the reputation of individuals, even those of former times, much more those who are alive, (Mr. Bentham was alive when the notable dissertation appeared), he is bound to the utmost vigilance, in ascertaining the truth, even to minuteness, of every thing which he states. The accusation against Sir James, on this score, is very serious.

The degree of ignorance which he displays respecting the habits of Mr. Bentham, considering the opportunities of knowledge which he had, is amazing. His statements, confidently given, are, with hardly any exception, such departures from the truth as deserve the name of misrepresentations; and, as they are on the unfavourable side, of unfounded imputations. This does not entitle us to impute wilful, and malignant mendacity to Sir James. But it proves him to have been a man who, in speaking of others, to serve a purpose, little minded whether he was speaking correctly or incorrectly.

He begins his talk about Mr. Bentham, with some unknown persons whom he calls his disciples. He frames a picture in his imagination, as remote from the truth as can well be imagined, at the same time very unfavourable to the parties concerned in it, and vouches for this to the public, as a statement of matters of fact.

What motive Sir James had for such a pro