but Sir J. would thus have expressed himself?) nor had a thought of doing any such thing. He is giving a short account, in a familiar letter to a friend, of a book which had just appearedDe Principio Juris Naturalis. After mentioning several other things discussed in the book, he says, Quæritur deinde, utrum custodia societatis humanæ sit principium juris. And he adds, Id negat vir egregius (the author) contra Grotium qui societatem, Hobbesium qui mutuum metum, Cumberlandium et similes qui mutuam benevolentiam, id est, semper societatem, adhibent. Who does not see, that Sir James has mistranslated the passage, and as well by the translation as the comment, that he knew neither the meaning, nor object of it? First of all, the proposition is not the proposition of Leibnitz, but of the author of whom he is speaking, who removes this opinion of the principium juris, viz., that it was custodia humanæ societatis, in which opinion he considered that Grotius, Hobbes, and Cumberland, with others, coincided; in order to establish his own opinion, that it is the will of God, jussum Creatoris. But when this author thought that the principium juris was not this custodia, and when Grotius, Hobbes, and Cumberland thought that it was, there is no necessity that any one of them should have confounded the moral quality of actions, with the feelings of which those actions are the exciting cause? "Here the great phi

losopher considered benevolence or fear, to be the first principles of the law of nature." This is

almost incredible. First, it is not the thought of Leibnitz, but Leibnitz's statement of another man's thought, which is "here" at all. And then, most assuredly, that other man did not impute to Grotius and Hobbes, the absurdity of considering benevolence or fear to be the first principles of the law of nature; because, for one thing, he was not speaking of the law of nature at all, but of the principium juris.

It is not easy to know what Sir James meant either by "principles" or "laws of nature." One would suppose the law of nature was the principle of every thing else.

Laws of nature are of two sorts; laws of physical or corporeal nature, and those of mental nature; powers of body being denoted by the one term, powers of mind by the other.

But neither of these sets of powers has any first principles; and certainly nobody would say that benevolence and fear are the first principles of either.

Perhaps Sir James meant laws of society, agreeable to nature; namely, those laws which men in society impose upon themselves for their common advantage. But when Sir James calls them laws of nature, what nature does he mean? I conclude the nature of man; because, in any other acceptation, his words are without sense.

The law of nature must therefore mean the laws prescribed by man's nature. But the laws

prescribed by man's nature are, of course, the laws tending to human good, whether they be laws actually fixed by any society for its own use, or not. The law of nature therefore in this case, and the principle of utility, are the same. But what can be meant by Sir James, when he talks of the principles of this law! This law is the principle of all other law. What can he mean, when he says the " great philosopher" (proprio nomine Leibnitz) considered benevolence or fear to be the first principles of this principle; i. e. the first principles of the principle of utility?

But whatever Sir James gives us to do in finding out his meaning, it is very easy to see what the author spoken of by Leibnitz designated by his principium juris. He meant by its principium, that to which it owed its origin, that on account of which it was brought into being.That on account of which, according to some, it was brought into being, was the guardianship of human society. To that society, men were led, according to Grotius, by their expectation of good from one another; according to Hobbes, by their fear of harm from one another; but in whatsoever way they were led to it, they did value its preservation, and seeing the necessity of law for that end, gave existence to law accordingly. And these opinions assuredly both Grotius and Hobbes

might hold, without believing, as Sir James would have it, that "benevolence or fear are the first principles of the law of nature." Sir James adds; "in the same sense in which the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community may be so regarded." Let us try to find, if we can, a meaning for this. The sentence put together stands thus: Leibnitz "considered benevolence or fear the first principles of the law of nature in the same sense in which the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community may be so regarded." There are here two subjects, and one predicate. The predicate is, "regarded as the first principles of the law of nature." The first of the two subjects is, "benevolence or fear;" the second is, "the tendency of certain actions to the well-being of the community." Of both, Sir James says, it may be predicated, that they are the first principles of the law of nature. "In the same sense," Sir James says. But what is it that must be in the same sense? The phrase must of necessity be construed either with the subjects, or the predicate. If with the subjects, the sense will be, that benevolence or fear, and the tendency of actions, are the same thing; if with the predicate, he declares that if the words "first principles of the laws of nature," be understood both times in the same sense, they may be predicated, according to Leibnitz, both of "benevolence or fear,"

and also of "the beneficial tendency of actions."

Sir James did not understand the passage. Among the questions discussed by the anonymous author, one, says Leibnitz, was, whether the safeguard of society, meaning a care for its safety, was the origin of law, or that to which law owed its principium? This opinion he denied, says Leibnitz,-in opposition to Grotius, who maintained the sociability of men-and to Hobbes, who maintained the fears men have of one another. The expressions are elliptical. Grotius ascribed the origin of human society to the social dispositions of men, Hobbes to their fears. But whether men valued society for their loves or their fears, in either case they would seek the preservation of that which they valued; and therefore would establish laws. Benevolence, according to Grotius; fear, according to Hobbes, was the principium societatis humana; and the custodia societatis humanæ, i.e. the desire of that custodia, and the knowledge of what was required for it, was the principium juris, or the cause why it began

to exist.

It is strange that Sir James saw in this any thing like a confusion of the ideas of a moral action, and of the state of mind of him who contemplates it.

Sir James never omits an opportunity which he either finds, or can make, of panegyric on a popu lar name.

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