perspicuity, combined, the purest transcript of thought, which words seem capable of being rendered, is stigmatised by Sir James, as "cold;" a word of great reproach with Sir James. And the spirit of simplicity and sincerity, with which a great mind delivers its thoughts to others in the very shape in which it holds them, without the affectation of a thousand apologies for the impudence of differing a hair's-breadth from those who had never thought upon the subject, is charged upon Hobbes, as the arrogance of one who despises mankind. It is clear and conclusive evidence of the contrary.

It is worth while to remark, in connection with "Sir James on Dogmatism," what Hobbes says of it." There be two sorts of men that commonly be called learned. One is that sort that proceedeth evidently from humble principles, as is described in the last section, and these men are called Mathematici. The other are they that take up maxims, from their education, and from the authority of men, or of custom; and take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination: and these are called Dogmatici. Now seeing those we call Mathematici are absolved of the crime of breeding controversy; and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused; the fault lieth altogether in the Dogmatici, that is to say, those that are imperfectly earned, and with passion press to have their

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opinions pass every where for truth, without any evident demonstration, either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontradicted interpretation."-Human Nature, ch. 13.

So much for two out of the three causes of the success of Hobbes. Sir James tells us that his

style was the third.

And then he pronounces a panegyric upon his style which it well de

serves.

But the style of Hobbes, though admirable for its purpose, was the very reverse of a popular style. It has a charm for the man who is looking out for thoughts; because it gives them to him at once, and effectually; but it is repulsive to the common-place reader; and can have done nothing towards gaining admirers from the throng. No; if there had not been other causes of the success of Hobbes, his manner as a writer would have confined his works to the closets of the few.

II. We next receive the account of Hobbes's philosophy.

This ought to be sufficient, at the least, to remind us accurately of the doctrines maintained by Hobbes; the grounds on which he maintained them; the mode in which he connected them together, so as to compose a whole; and the point of view in which the subject must have order to draw his

-been presented to him, in

thoughts into that peculiar train which his writings present to us.

The first thing which Sir James tells us under this head is, "That his philosophical writings might be read without reminding any one that the author was more than an intellectual machine. They never betray a feeling except that insupportable arrogance, which looks down on men as a lower species of beings.' Such a feeling as this, most certainly they do not betray. So that Sir James's negation of feeling may be stript of his solitary exception.

This, however, is at best only a criticism upon the manner in which Hobbes delivered his philosophy. To the matter of it, with which alone he had here to do, it is altogether foreign.

But whether is it said, in praise, or in blame? That Sir James's words determine not. If said in praise, it is very high praise. It says that, in treating of intellectual objects, Hobbes dealt with them according to their nature, and did not pollute them by any heterogeneous admixture.

We know, however, by experience, that when Sir James talks of want of feeling, he talks of it as a great blemish. He cannot bear that intellectual things should be spoken of in the language of intellect. A clear expression of a clear idea is poor, with him, unless it be ranted about. Hobbes is blamed, because, in dealing with matters of pure intellect, he uses the language which is best adapted to convey them pure into the minds of others. Sir James did not understand a pure

conception of the intellect, nor the use of it; he wanted it always adulterated.

Yet his praise of Hobbes's style is not consistent with this talk. He says, "It seems" (Sir James is seldom sure about any thing) "it seems the very perfection of didactic language." If so, the very perfection of didactic language is to be unmixed with the language of feeling. Sir James's inconsistency, however, is so constantly occurring, that to remark a particular instance of it is of small importance. Sir James says again, "Perhaps" (he is never certain) "no writer of any age or nation, on subjects so abstruse, has manifested an equal power of engraving his thoughts on the minds of his readers." This is a happy expression. The minds therefore of Hobbes's readers, did not lose much, by not being "reminded that he was more than an intellectual machine." Sir James is at prodigious pains to assure his readers, that he is not a mere intellectual machine. He only fails in showing that intellectual can be very safely predicated of his machine.

This is the first part of the account which Sir James gives of the philosophy of Hobbes.

The remaining part is contained in this proposition, That Hobbes's moral system was propounded for the sake of his political.

Sir James announces this in the following "It was with perfect truth observed by my excellent friend, Mr. Stewart " (N. B. what

manner.

had we to do with the intrusion of the 'excellent friend?') "that the ethical principles of Hobbes are completely interwoven with his political system. He might have said," continues Sir James, "that the whole of Hobbes's system, moral, religious, and in part philosophical, depended on his political scheme; not indeed logically, as conclusions depend on premises, but (if the word may be excused) psychologically, as the formation of one opinion may be influenced by a disposition to adapt it to previously cherished opinions."

What is real in the case is stated by Hobbes himself, in his own simple and true language, in the opening of what he calls the " Explication of the Elements of Law, Natural, and Political.” He says, "the true and perspicuous explication of the elements of law, natural, and political, which is my present scope, dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature." Going, as he was, to expound the elements of political government, he saw, and he was the first to see clearly, that the elements of political government were the principles of human nature. It was necessary for him, therefore, to begin with the explication of human nature. And he no doubt is at pains to show, when he comes to his political doctrines, that they are correctly deduced from the principles of human nature. But Sir James goes beyond this. He says that Hobbes's moral opinions are twisted into deformity to make them